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ABSTRACT 
 
Ethics of Freedom, Pragmatics of Constraint: Theatre in a Post-Mandela South Africa 
By 
Nathanael M. Vlachos 
 
 This dissertation, an ethnography of South African theatre artists, traces the moral and 
ethical contours of a “post-Mandela” South Africa. While “post-apartheid” South Africa is 
marked by ethical nation-building projects like racial reconciliation and the push for a nonracial 
“rainbow nation,” post-Mandela South Africa is characterized by a growing skepticism of these 
projects and a sense that many South Africans have yet to enjoy the freedoms promised by 
Mandela and others. In dialogue with the anthropology of ethics and Foucauldian ethical 
frameworks in particular, I examine the implications of a post-Mandela South Africa with regard 
to processes of shaping and forming self and community. What moral and ethical resources are 
available for imagining and enacting a good life when moral nation-building projects collapse? 
What new moral exemplars and pedagogues emerge from a context where former icons of 
struggle are now seen as collaborators with a colonial past and an insidious neoliberal present? 
How has this moment mutated those things most integral to understandings of self, like race, 
class, kinship, and politics? What forms do freedom and constraint currently take in this context? 
These questions and others are answered through an ethnographic study of South African theatre, 
drawing on fieldwork from Johannesburg, Soweto, and Grahamstown. Rather than undertaking a 
study of audience reception or conducting close readings of plays, I focus on the artists 
themselves, contextualizing their aesthetic sensibilities, the ethical journey of becoming and 
being an artist, and the inescapable historical entanglements with which they grapple. As I 
iii 
 
 
 
explore the freedoms and constraints at the heart of South African ethical life, I engage their 
implications for classic and contemporary conversations in anthropology, including kinship, 
political economy, epistemology, pedagogy, and whiteness. At the same time, the dissertation 
contributes new conversations to the landscape of South African anthropology, charting 
emergent ethical subjectivities, diverse understandings of freedom, and the shifting significance 
of race in South Africa and beyond.
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Introduction 
Ethics of Freedom, Pragmatics of Constraint: 
Theatre in a Post-Mandela South Africa 
 
A Post-Mandela South Africa  
In November of 2013, I attended a conference in Soweto titled “The Unfinished Business 
of Truth and Reconciliation: Arts, Trauma, and Healing,” sponsored by the “Drama For Life” 
program at University of the Witwatersrand. The conference, taking place nearly twenty years 
after apartheid,1 was a recognition that there was indeed much unfinished work to do in the 
country’s transformation to a “new” South Africa. Delivering a keynote address at the beginning 
of the conference, John Kani, an aging icon of apartheid-era protest theatre, bemoaned the 
political trajectory that delivered democracy—rather than freedom—to the people of South 
Africa. Many of the panels beyond this keynote address were similarly concerned with the ways 
in which South Africa had not only failed to progress socially, politically, economically, and 
racially, but indeed had failed to sufficiently process and heal from the wounds of apartheid.   
To South Africans and careful observers of South Africa, there is little new in these 
narratives. The shortcomings of “Truth and Reconciliation” and other stalled processes of 
transformation have indeed constituted the central points of departure for critical analysis in and 
of the country for the last twenty years (e.g. Ashforth 2005; Fassin 2008; Gillespie and Dubbeld 
2007; Robins 2010). At this point, the assertion that South Africa is not the “rainbow nation” that 
Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu worked hard to build is not only obvious but becoming 
                                                          
1 An institutionalized form of white supremacy, Apartheid was officially in place from 1948 to until 1994 in South 
Africa. Among other things, it included mandated racial segregation and restricted the areas where non-white South 
Africans could live and work.   
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increasingly hackneyed. I certainly did not need to go far to hear that there was still a lot of work 
left to be done. 
At the same time, there was a new narrative emerging at the conference, and during my 
eleven months of fieldwork in Guateng and the Eastern Cape more broadly. After twenty years 
of governance, the ruling African National Congress—the party of Nelson Mandela that rode a 
wave of good will and high expectations during the transition from apartheid and since—was 
increasingly the target of criticism for the ways in which South Africa’s democratic revolution 
seemed perpetually suspended (Habib 2013). It is not particularly surprising that the ANC had 
come under increasing scrutiny in recent years. Since taking office in 2009, president Jacob 
Zuma in particular has found himself in the midst of numerous scandals large and small, most 
recently accused of misappropriating some 215 million rand (approximately sixteen million 
dollars) for dubious “security upgrades” to his home (Public Protector 2014). Before Zuma, there 
was Thabo Mbeki, who ran afoul of activists in his own country and the international community 
more broadly for expressing skepticism that HIV was the cause of AIDS (Fassin 2008). The 
ANC’s legitimacy, politically and morally, had been under popular fire for some time, and not 
only by conservative white South Africans who remain deeply suspicious of the ANC. What was 
new—at the Drama for Life conference and during my fieldwork more broadly—was the extent 
to which Mandela himself was an increasing target of criticism.  
One of the more provocative performances at the DFL conference, for instance, was a 
short twenty minute piece called “Mandelema,” the title a mash-up between the names Mandela 
and (Julius) Malema.2 The play staged a fictional confrontation between old and new, youth and 
                                                          
2 The leader of the ANC Youth league who had recently been ejected from the party and had gone on to form the 
Econonic Freedom Fighters (a populist and leftist party that continues to fight for the appropriation of land from 
white South Africans and the nationalization of major industries like mining). 
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elder, as the two engaged in argument about the past and the future of South Africa. Malema was 
caricatured as a vapid ideologue whose slogans were spoon-fed to him by sycophantic members 
of the radical intelligentsia. Mandela, though, was equally caricatured as a doddering old man 
who spoke in empty platitudes about reconciliation and forgiveness. South Africa’s past and 
future, the play suggested, are both contested and contestable in the present.  
Nelson Mandela died less than two weeks later, initiating a nationwide flood of 
celebration and mourning, and more fundamentally, renewed assessments of Mandela’s legacy. 
Over and over again, particularly from my interlocutors in Soweto, I would hear of the ways that 
Mandela “sold out,” in favor of a constitution that favored white South Africans. Unlike Shaka 
Zulu who fought hard for his culture and his people, they told me, Mandela “left culture behind” 
through compromise in pursuit of a form of reconciliation that has not changed much of 
anything. Throughout the course my interview with them, Mandela would emerge again and 
again as a central locus of blame for losing focus of the real fight and compromising his 
principles.   
This dissertation is thus a study of “post-Mandela” South Africa: a period that is 
adjoining but also divergent from what is frequently called the “post-apartheid” period. To say 
that South Africa is now post-Mandela rather than post-apartheid is not to suggest that Mandela’s 
death constituted a radical rupture or state of transition from the past to a new present. Indeed, 
one thing that characterizes the current zeitgeist is the sense that South Africa has never been 
post- anything, but instead, to borrow from Jean and John Comaroff’s description of modernity, 
“a complex product of things old and new, things continuous and discontinuous” (1998, 10). Or 
even more accurately, one could deploy Achille Mbembe’s description of the postcolony to say 
that post-Mandela South Africa “encloses multiple durées made up of discontinuitites, reversals, 
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inertias, and swings that overlay one another, interpenetrate one another, and envelope one 
another: an entanglement” (Mbembe 2001, 14). These entanglements, and the ways in which 
ordinary South Africans are making sense of them, shape the contours of a post-Mandela South 
Africa and are what lie at the heart of this dissertation. Rhetorically, I demonstrate and perform 
entanglements in a number of ways: tracing the legacies and mutations of Black Consciousness 
in South African theatre (chapter one), showing the continual relevance of classic British Social 
Anthropology to South Africa (as in chapter two, where Isaac Schapera and A.R. Radcliffe-
Brown are important conversation partners), and arguing that the events that occurred during my 
fieldwork set the stage for events currently unfolding (as in chapter four).  
Throughout the dissertation, I track the implications of a post-Mandela South Africa with 
regard to processes of shaping and forming self and community. What moral and ethical 
resources are available for imagining and enacting a good life when nation-building projects like 
reconciliation and the “Rainbow Nation” collapse? What new moral exemplars and pedagogues 
emerge from a context where former icons of struggle are now seen as collaborators with a 
colonial past and insidious neoliberal present? How has this moment mutated those things most 
integral to understandings of self, like race, class, kinship, and politics? What forms do freedom 
and constraint currently take in this context?  
These questions and others are answered through an ethnographic study of South African 
theatre artists, drawing on fieldwork from Johannesburg, Soweto, and Grahamstown. A study of 
South African artists—and theatre artists in particular—may strike some as an odd choice 
indeed. One might suppose that I could have found answers just as easily by looking at social 
movements (Robins 2006, 2010), infrastructure (Von Schnitzler 2013), migration (Owen 2015), 
or the ever-popular topics of HIV (Fassin 2008; Thornton 2008) and witchcraft (Ashforth 2005; 
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Niehaus 2013). A few words are in order from the outset about what the study of South African 
theatre—and South Africa itself—offers to anthropology.   
 
Why Study South African Theatre? 
The question “why study South African theatre?” has been posed to me numerous times 
by family, friends, colleagues, and wary grant reviewers. Depending on where one puts the 
emphasis in the sentence, it is actually two separate questions. One—“why study South African 
theatre?” is a question about the legitimacy of South Africa as a locale for an anthropological 
study, whether of theatre or anything else; a question of South Africa’s “place-in-the-world” 
(Ferguson 2012) within the discipline more broadly. A second question: “Why study South 
African theatre?” is a question of the social scientific utility of theatre as a point of departure for 
an anthropological study of South Africa. Giving a cogent answer to both questions is important, 
and the answers to both questions are mutually reinforcing.  
Why Study [South African] Theatre? 
Why should an anthropologist from the Global North study South African anything, for 
that matter? South Africa is no longer a Cold War proxy or a notorious bastion of 
institutionalized white supremacy. Political violence on a massive scale came and went during 
the transition from apartheid; it is no longer a state mired in open and deadly conflict. All that 
remains to be studied, the story might go, is found in the exotic: persisting beliefs in magic and 
witchcraft; the scourge of AIDS and the rampant misinformation that continues to perpetuate it; 
the occasional “service delivery” protest that might get a bit out of hand from time to time; the 
occasional outburst of horrendous xenophobic violence with an African twist. Poor competition 
indeed amid global terrorism, new iterations of authoritarianism in Europe, the deepening crisis 
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of climate change, and shifts toward post-human ontology that are (perhaps) better studied 
elsewhere. 
Responding (albeit more implicitly) to some of the same questions, Alex Golub (2016), 
discussing the global “crisis of liberalism,” resists the exoticization of Papua New Guinea and 
argues instead for the ways in which the country runs parallel to—and diverges in interesting 
ways from—the United states. “We are seeking to understand a contemporary country as it exists 
in the present,” he argues. “To imagine that ‘we’ have crisis while ‘they’ have culture is to deny 
the coevalness of a country whose people are actively and successfully—perhaps more 
successfully than we are—navigating the crisis that marks our current moment” (2016, para. 9). 
Much the same could be said of South Africa. The exotic is certainly within reach; what is far 
more interesting, however, are the ways in which South Africa, as a contemporary country, not 
only mirrors the Global North but has indeed foreshadowed, numerous times, developments that 
are currently taking place in Euro-America (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012).  
In years past, for example, I often explained South African president Jacob Zuma as “the 
George W. Bush of South Africa” to North American friends and colleagues. But given the 
recent election of Donald Trump as president, the comparison between Trump and Zuma is a 
good deal more apt. The order of the comparison must now be switched, however: Trump is the 
Zuma of the United States, for Zuma came first as a national political figure: on trial for rape in 
2009; suspected of inappropriate financial relationships and shady business dealings; accused of 
misappropriating funds for dubious security upgrades to his private residence; a populist 
champion who came to power by ousting the elites of his own party (former president Thabo 
Mbeki among others). Beyond Zuma, foreshadowing abounds. South Africa has long wrestled 
with a level of xenophobia that the United States is (disturbingly) coming to mirror, not only 
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with regard to immigrants but also refugees, and South Africa has also long been confronting 
economic inequalities that only recently have become nascent on a popular level in the United 
States with the rise of Occupy Wall Street and politicians like Bernie Sanders. South Africa does 
not embody the Global North’s past or its culturally exotic other. It is the future of the Global 
North unfolding in the present (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012), and certainly worth studying for 
that reason among many others.3  
This response only constitutes a partial answer to one iteration of the question—some of 
the reasons why, as an anthropologist, I find South Africa a compelling context. There is another 
sub-question embedded here though: why study South African theatre in particular, rather than 
theatre in Brazil or Greece? Or, staying on the African continent, why not study theatre in 
Nigeria or Ghana, both of which also have compelling and provocative performance traditions 
that are deeply engaged with sociopolitical realities (Boh 2015; Odam 2015; Shipley 2015)? The 
short answer is that I came to the ethnographic study of South African theatre as a scholar of 
South Africa, rather than as a scholar of theatre. I am attracted to South African theatre because 
of the racial, social, and political contexts in which it unfolds; contexts that, in my experience, 
are always just under the surface of performance if not completely explicit.  
 South Africa is not the only place where one might find Physical Theatre, Theatre of the 
Oppressed, or high-concept performance art. It is, however, unique for the questions that its 
theatre practitioners actively engage: questions of the body shaped by the specific historical 
context of apartheid; questions of race, refracted through persisting privilege and inequality and 
                                                          
3 At the same time, I do not intend here to tell a story laced with Afro-pessimism (Mbembe 2001) about South 
Africa. Throughout the dissertation, I point to salient areas of constraint in South African ethical life to the extent 
that they throw into relief the ethical strategies through which South Africans attempt to transcend them. As Elias 
Bongmba argues of Africa more broadly (Bongmba 2006), one should not write off South Africa for its problems, 
but instead see hope in the rich moral and ethical resources that South Africans make use of in response to them. 
The “dialectic of optimism and pessimism” at play in Bongmba’s work thus animates this dissertation as well.    
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in dialogue with a rich black intellectual history; questions of how a history of colonialism and 
apartheid and a neoliberal present converge toward constraint or allow for greater freedom. It is 
likely the only place where one could find an artist like Brett Bailey (discussed in chapter five), 
whose provocative ethnographic exhibitions have toured Europe to spark violent protests and 
equally violent arguments about privilege, whiteness, and representation. It is an artistic context 
that has long been political. It is still political in many ways, though it is consistently generating 
new relationships to politics and new conceptions of the political itself. South African theatre, 
simply put, is an artistic form deeply engaged in telling the story of South Africa’s past, present, 
and possible futures.  
Why Study South African [Theatre]? 
Theatre occupied a central place in protest culture during apartheid. Particularly during 
the height of the Black Consciousness movement, Black Theatre in particular (discussed in 
chapter one) was a powerful tool for the affirmation of blackness and a way of giving voice to 
experiences of life under apartheid. Internationally touring productions by white and black South 
African artists alike helped bring apartheid to the attention of Global Northerners in compelling 
ways, and protest works like Sizwe Bansi is Dead continue popular revival productions. 
Stalwarts of Protest Theatre like Mike van Graan and John Kani are currently revered not only as 
icons of theatre but as public intellectuals, and their critiques carry weight. The importance of 
theatre not only as entertainment but as social commentary persists, in many ways. 
Grahamstown, for instance, hosts the annual National Arts Festival each year, a ten day 
explosion of theatre that is the largest in the Southern Hemisphere and second only to Edinburgh 
globally. My attendance at three National Arts Festivals and my observations of theatre in 
Johannesburg, Soweto, and Alexandra were more than enough to convince me that the end of 
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apartheid has not dulled, in the slightest, the sharp edge of theatre as a form of public critique. 
South Africans continue to take their theatre seriously, and theatre continues to have serious 
things to say about South African life.  
 At the same time, even when South Africa enjoyed periods of more intensive 
anthropological focus, ethnographic studies of theatre and performance in South Africa have 
always seemed to proceed from a position of defense and apology. If it was questionable to focus 
on performance in the waning years of apartheid (Coplan 1985:1), what makes it any more 
appropriate at this point and for this study? Why, given all the anthropological avenues to 
studying South Africa, from HIV to witchcraft and from migration studies to political economy, 
use theatre as an ethnographic vantage point into processes of shaping the self in a post-Mandela 
South Africa?  
It is important to note, at this point, that my interest was drawn to a particular kind of 
theatre in South Africa, marked by a particular set of histories, practices, and concerns. I was 
certainly not interested in globally touring Broadway productions or their South African 
equivalents, which offer all the glitz and glamor of show business that one might expect. I 
encountered one such environment when I accepted the invitation of a contact to see a work that 
would take place in the basement of the Joburg Theatre in downtown Johannesburg. His work 
happened to be occurring at the same time as a large-scale production of Aladdin, and when I 
arrived at the theatre’s lobby, it was bustling with children holding slushies (and their 
exasperated parents who had paid upwards of thirty U.S. dollars per ticket), costumed men 
whirling flaming batons, and couples dining in the theatre’s restaurant. Once the production 
began, I imagined, children would be squirming in the seats of a darkened theatre, watching the 
show unfold passively as though watching a movie—escapist entertainment at its best. Rather 
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than join them, I made my way to a dimly lit basement through a partially-opened security gate, 
not even sure if I was in the right place. My contact’s production, titled Boom Bap vs. Swag Rap, 
was a one-man show staging a confrontation between the materialism of “swag rap” culture and 
the revolutionary ethos of hip hop. It asked the audience to participate in numerous ways, 
inviting us all onto the stage at the finale for a dance party. It was, in short, the opposite of the 
type of theatre that was transpiring directly above us. It drew deeply from the artist’s own 
journey and philosophies of art, which were both in dialogue with the rich history of Black 
Consciousness in South Africa. 
 Boom Bap vs. Swag Rap was itself on the periphery of a stream of South African theatre 
that is emerging in a post-Mandela South Africa: one in which artists use theatre as a technology 
to form and shape the self. Through processes of production and performance, the artists I 
studied actively engaged the creation of theatre as a transformative process and as a way to 
imagine and enact new ways of living and being in the world. I found this type of theatre across 
the racial and aesthetic4 spectrum: from black and white artists, and from elite and “community” 
theatre. Far from being aesthetically distanced in form or content from self and society, these 
works are the culmination of intimate forms of struggle and are attempts to answer the question 
of how one ought to live in a post-Mandela South Africa. Aesthetically speaking, the lineage of 
this theatre is as diverse as its practitioners: among its progenitors are indigenous performance 
traditions, the European avant-garde theatre of Bertholdt Brecht, the physical theatre of Jacques 
                                                          
44 Although ‘Aesthetics,’ refers on the most general level to the domain of inquiry surrounding the appreciation and 
criticism of artworks, “aesthetic” is a broad and nebulous term that is used in a number of different ways. As a 
branch of philosophy, Aesthetics is concerned with questions as many and as varied as other branches like 
Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy. This being the case, it is important to note that I use the term ‘aesthetic’ in two 
different senses. Primary, I use ‘aesthetic’ to refer to the set of principles and artistic choices that shapes the 
construction of an artwork (e.g. “the modernist aesthetic” or “Black Consciousness aesthetics”). Phrases like 
‘aesthetic judgments,’ ‘aesthetic evaluations,’ and ‘aesthetic devaluations’ refer to judgments about the value of an 
artwork and the types of qualities that can or cannot be predicated of it. Saying that a particular work is ‘good,’ 
‘bad,’ ‘hackneyed,’ ‘original,’ ‘gaudy,’ or ‘grotesque,’ are all aesthetic judgments.  
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Lecoq, and the theatre of Black Consciousness that found its voice at the height of apartheid. 
This diversity certainly manifests itself in a variety of different forms of theatre; what unites 
them is a fundamental concern with an ethics of self.  
For a study of ethics in a post-Mandela South Africa, I found emerging theater artists to 
be a compelling research population to study. They are explicitly occupied with questions of 
ethics, taking the materials at hand around them to continually fashion selves that are worthy of 
the esteem of others (Faubion 2011). They take as points of departure questions of the body, of 
apartheid, of race, and of self-becoming, though not always in ways that are didactic or obvious. 
Collectively, they provide an avenue for exploring the ways in which South Africans are 
processing a post-Mandela moment, and generating new subject positions in response to it.   
Given that the practitioners of this theatre of ethics are distributed across spectra of race 
and class, studying these artists allowed me to probe the social configurations of this post-
Mandela moment. In this sense, the dissertation is, in part, a study of distinction (Bourdieu 1984) 
that uses theatre to probe the ways in which understandings of art—and the self—are shot 
through with the particulars of race, class, and history. The white artists I studied at an elite 
university (the University Currently Known as Rhodes)5 had radically different conceptions of 
what theatre is and the freedoms that it offers than their black counterparts in the township of 
Soweto. They also labored under different (and far less daunting) constraints. For both groups, 
these freedoms and constraints shape the possibilities of the kind of self that they could 
reasonably hope to become. They also have implications for distinctions between good and bad, 
high and lowbrow art, and designations like “community theatre.” A study of theatre, in short, 
                                                          
5 Rhodes University is currently in the midst of a lengthy process to formally change its name in response to protests 
aimed at the colonial legacy of the university and the colonial magnate for whom the university is named. I refer to 
Rhodes University as “the University Currently Known as Rhodes” (shortened to “the UCKAR” in the usage of my 
informants) throughout the dissertation in deference to this movement. 
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illuminates something of the current shape of distinction and current forms of habitus that have 
continued to evolve since apartheid.  
The dissertation, taken as a whole, answers the question: “Why study South African 
theatre?” by showing, through ethnography, the utility of theatre for studies of race, of kinship, 
of political economy, of pedagogy, of ethics, and of epistemologies of expertise. Theatre, I argue, 
has the power to illuminate these issues and others not only because it holds a mirror to them, but 
because it changes and configures them in an empirically observable way. Theatre, in other 
words, has agency in the world—a proposition that requires further explication below.  
 
 Theatre’s Agency: Research Design and Methodology  
As an anthropological study of theatre, this dissertation is in dialogue with the 
anthropology of art more broadly, especially studies that proceed from the assumption that art 
can be an agent of social change. In the last twenty years, the anthropology of art has developed 
significant momentum, especially to the extent that it has moved away from its earlier impulses 
to focus exclusively on extending western aesthetic categories, formulating alternative aesthetic 
frameworks, or engaging in cross cultural aesthetic comparisons. There is nothing particularly 
wrong with these aims in themselves, but the anthropology of art can be (and is) more ambitious 
than this. The anthropologists to which I am most indebted are those who have worked to show, 
in all of its complexity, the ability for art to act on the world in an empirically observable way. 
Many of these anthropologists engage the intersections of art and politics, showing how, among 
other things, art can be a form of direct action or protest (Askew 2003); how art gives shape to 
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social movements (Adams 2002; Santino 1999); and the role of art in the production of 
alternative citizenships (Chaffee 1993; Fernandes 2003; Lee 2013).6   
While artworks remain ethnographically significant for the facets of culture to which 
their form and design might attest, their importance encompasses much more than this. It also 
includes the social relationships into which they are thrust and the varying ways in which they 
circulate (sometimes quite far afield from their original centers of production—see Marcus and 
Myers 1995). Art has a power beyond mere representation or aesthetic pleasure that is 
undeniable; it certainly cannot be reduced to its semiotics alone (Eves 2009; Gell 1998). 
Anthropologists of art are at their best when they show, as concretely as possible, how this is so. 
Such is my intention for South African theatre as well, situated as it is in a history of protest and 
in a post-Mandela moment, both of which are inescapably political.  
Many of the anthropologists of art to which I am indebted are equally indebted to—or at 
the very least, thinking and writing consistently with—the work of Alred Gell, whose 
anthropological theory of art is among the most robust and programmatic theories of art the 
discipline has to offer. For Gell, any anthropology of art worth its salt must take the sociality of 
art as its primary point of the departure, examining and engaging the social world in which a 
work of art resides. Art exerts agency in the world, Gell argues, and for that reason it is a 
“system of action, intended to change the world rather than encode symbolic propositions about 
it” (1999, 6). Gell does not predicate agency in the well-worn sense of a capacity to resist some 
or another hegemony, but by virtue of the fact that artworks are able to initiate “causal sequences 
of a particular type, that is, events caused by acts of mind or will or intention, rather than the 
                                                          
6 If media like television shows, films, broadcasts, and recordings are also counted as “art,” the reach of this 
engagement is expanded exponentially. See Abu-Lughod (2005), Ginsburg (2002), Hirschkind (2006), Howe 
(2008), and Turner (1992) for a few select examples of what is truly an enormous body of literature.   
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mere concatenation of physical events” (1999, 16). Though the genesis of agency always resides 
in a work’s creator, the agency exerted by an artwork once in circulation can, of course, be quite 
different than the original intention of the artist. Whatever the trajectory a  work of art takes, and 
however interpreted, artworks can be agents, in much the same way that people or animals or 
other objects can be7: they can initiate and produce action in the world.    
Gell’s arguments about the agency of art undeniably breathe life into this study. At the 
same time, there are at least two reasons for leaving Gell’s broader theory behind. First, Gell’s 
focus is entirely on the agency of visual art: objects like shields and statues, paintings and 
sculptures—in short, “real, physical things, unique and identifiable, not performances, readings, 
reproductions, etc” (1998, 13). Gell wants to theorize the agency of artworks qua objects, and his 
dismissal of performative art is a handy way of restricting the conversation “because the 
difficulties can [only] be surmounted one at time” (1998, 13). The difficulty to which he refers is 
ontological in nature: what kind of thing, exactly, is a work of theatre, and how can we point to 
it? Its existence cannot be found in the script alone (and which copy of the script at any rate?) 
because a work of theatre is, at a bare minimum, also found its performance. Theatre is of a 
different order of existence than the works that Gell wished to examine, and it—along with 
music and literature—were summarily banished from his study.   
Another reason this study cannot fully proceed from Gell’s theoretical assumptions (even 
while ascribing to his broader commitments about art’s agency in the world) has to do with some 
of the implications of his theorization of agency. Gell’s account seems to necessitate, in every 
case, the presence of at least two entities: an “agent” and a “patient” (1998, 21-22). An exertion 
                                                          
7 Gell’s theorization of agency has an obvious parallel to Actor-Network Theory (Latour 2005), though he never 
mentions it explicitly. Whether this is the result of his untimely death in 1997 (prior to ANT’s growing prominence 
in anthropological work) is unclear. At the very least, one can surmise he would have found analytic purchase there.   
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of agency, that is, always involves an agent acting upon a patient in some way, and this 
relationship for Gell is never anything smaller than a dyad. There is some complexity to agent-
patient relationships in Gell’s theory: the artist acts (as agent) upon the artwork (as patient) 
during its manufacture, but later the artwork itself can be an agent that acts upon other patients, 
most often the audience of the work. Presumably, then, one could be an agent in one moment and 
a patient the next. Agents and patients, however, are always discreet. Secondly, Gell assumes 
that artworks are always manufactured for someone other than the artist. Whether they go to a 
patron or a broader public, being made by an artist is only the first in a series of transactional 
lives that will be led by an art piece. This movement is never cyclical or circular; once an 
artwork leaves its place of origin (for Gell at least), it does not return, at least not in the same 
form it left.  
This dissertation proceeds from a rejection of these assumptions. There are reasons for 
believing, as the ethnography that follows will illustrate, that an agent and a patient can be the 
same entity,8 reasons for believing that an artist can be a patient of his or her own artwork, and 
reasons for believing that works of art do not have to leave their place of origin to exert agency. 
Making these theoretical moves also allows for a solution to a problem that has plagued studies 
of theatre in anthropology. It is a question about the agency of works of theatre in particular, and 
it is to that question—and its implications for my methodology and research design—that I turn 
next. 
                                                          
8 I specifically have in mind autopoesis—the work of shaping the self. In such cases, the agent and the patient can be 
the same. Though of course other agents can be involved, this does not always have to be the case.   
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Finding Social Change Behind the Scenes   
Like anthropologists of art more broadly, anthropologists of theatre have recognized that 
theatre, as a work of art, also has agency: it acts in the world as a catalyst for social and cultural 
change (Beeman 2011; Turner 1988), it can create new forms of political identity and 
community (Kondo 1997), and even transform consciousness itself (Schechner 1985). Claims of 
the transformative potential of theatre abound, but as often as such claims are made, they are 
rarely substantiated in any robust way. Theatre’s agency—including its ability to precipitate any 
significant social or culture change—has to be accepted at face value, though the empirical 
evidence is often missing or weak. What exactly does it mean for instance, to claim that 
“successful performance represents the accomplishment of cultural representation resulting in 
transformations in society” (Beeman 2011, 3)?  It is unclear how such transformation can be 
validated empirically, and what research methodologies are available to assess how individuals 
or groups could be transformed in tangible ways by performance. 
Some compelling strategies for studying theatre’s agency in a more robustly empirical 
way come from studies of audience reception. Studies of reception have offered useful 
conceptual and methodological tools in anthropology more broadly, particularly within media 
anthropology (e.g. Abu-Lughod 2005; Spitulnik 2002), and similar approaches in theatre have 
indeed produced some tangible, empirically-grounded experience. The most successful and 
convincing of these attempts is Karin Barber’s research on Nigerian theatre (2000). Barber 
shows that it is not only possible to situate works of theatre in a broader social and cultural 
context, but to meaningfully study how audiences respond to the lessons they contain (in her 
case, the plays were quite didactic). It is clear, when reading Barber, that works of theatre do 
indeed impact audiences in observable ways.  
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At the same time, as I have argued elsewhere (Vlachos 2016), approaches to theatre 
through audience reception run afoul of two significant problems: one methodological and one 
conceptual. Performances are ephemeral events, and any impact they may have had is likely to 
fade in the years, months, days, or even hours after a performance. Observations of an audience 
during a performance and interviews conducted immediately after may offer some ethnographic 
insight, but they are not an adequate basis for a sustained long-term ethnographic study of 
theatre. Conceptually speaking, it is hard to parse any impact that theatre might have from the 
ways in which a particular audience member might be shaped and influenced outside of the 
theatre experience. This difficulty is present in media studies as well. Discussing television in 
Egypt, Ginsburg, Abu-Lughod, and Larkin argue that “even those viewers most involved with 
television participate in other social institutions and engage in other practices, most notably of 
contemporary religious groups, that powerfully reorient subjectivity” (2002, 14). This is also true 
of theatre. Unlike a television show, most audiences will only see a performance once, while 
engaging in other activities on a repeated and daily basis. The “other social institutions” 
mentioned by Ginsburg, Abu-Lughod, and Larkin point to a problem of overdetermination: if an 
individual learns that drug use or xenophobia is bad at school, from his or her parents, or as part 
of a national campaign, for example, how can one compellingly argue that a theatrical 
performance has played a significant role in shaping his or her opinion? The causality is weak at 
best.  
To work around this methodological and conceptual impasse, I found it necessary to 
study “a social crossroads of performers, participants, styles, categories, materials, and occasions 
of performance”—what Coplan calls “performance culture” (Coplan 1985, 4)—rather than 
simply focusing on performances as isolated events. As I did so, I privileged a focus on the 
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artists themselves and the broad range of activities in which they participated that stretched 
beyond performance: rehearsals, production meetings, informal gatherings, and daily life. 
Observations of these contexts—along with interviews of the artists—allowed me to probe more 
deeply the ways in which theatre acts as a catalyst and agent for change. The performance of 
theatre is only the tip of a much larger iceburg (Fabian 1990),9 and there is a wealth of avenues 
for observation when one turns an analytic gaze toward artists rather than their audiences. This is 
not to say that audiences are unimportant—they certainly make plenty of appearances in this 
dissertation. But the artists themselves are changed by the practice of theatre in far more tangible 
ways. Theatre, that is, exerts agency over the artists who create it, and not only in moments of 
performance where they get to embody other lifestyles and personalities but in processes of 
production as well. Mental and physical exercises, phases of intense contemplation, and the care 
of others are found in moments behind the scenes when no audience is watching. It is all a part of 
theatre, and collectively allows for a more robustly empirical examination of theatre’s potential 
to be ethically and politically transformative.  
These theoretical and methodological orientations are situated at the edge of a nascent 
shift in anthropological studies of theatre. A recent volume by Flynn and Tinius (2015), which 
focuses specifically on political performance, proceeds from similar assumptions about the 
ethnographic value of rehearsals (Tinius 2015) and the need for a shift in how transformation is 
conceptualized in performance more broadly. Transformation, for the scholars in this volume, is 
rooted in what Flynn and Tinius call “relational reflexivity,” a term that indexes the 
contemplative and reflexive work that takes place in the context of the publics that are gathered 
                                                          
9 Fabian’s (1990) conception of what counts as “performance” is quite a bit wider than mine, operating as he was in 
dialogue with figures like Victor Turner (1988) as well as performance studies more broadly. Nonetheless, the 
methodology at play in Power and Performance, which privileges a range of contexts beyond performance events 
themselves, undeniably shapes my approach.   
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through the creation and performance of theatre. While contributing to further momentum in this 
productive and exciting new line of anthropological inquiry, this dissertation also extends it, 
bringing theatre to bear on a broader range of historic and contemporary conversations in 
anthropology including kinship, race, political economy, and expertise in addition to politics. 
Performance Studies?  
As an ethnographic study of South African theatre artists, this dissertation addresses 
theatre qua theatre and performance qua performance. The language of performance is not 
harnessed in any significant way as a theoretical framework for the analysis of political events, 
social movements, or rituals. Such analyses have been conducted in the context of South Africa 
multiple times already, especially with regard to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (e.g. Cole 2010; Goodman 2006). The language of performance (and in particular, 
Turner’s “social drama”), does provide a useful framework for studying the TRC as a 
performance, calling attention to the symbols, metaphors, and moments of high drama that 
helped a nation process the trauma of apartheid. Frameworks drawn from performance studies 
might be useful for examining more recent events as well: the significance of a handshake 
between Presidents Raul Castro and Barrack Obama at Nelson Mandela’s memorial service; the 
deployment of the grotesque as a rhetorical strategy through the application of feces to a statue of 
John Cecil Rhodes at the University of Cape Town; the powerful images of religious resistance 
to state power that unfolded as a Catholic priest took a rubber bullet to the face while offering 
shelter to protesting university students (Whittles 2016).   
Performance studies, for many of my interlocutors in the Department of Drama at the 
UCKAR, has been revolutionary for the study of theatre in theatre departments themselves. After 
decades of having to study theatre as just another genre of literature, performance studies opened 
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a vast range of new possibilities (Finestone-Praeg 2011), allowing theatre scholars to pay 
attention to bodies and forms of movement in ways they hadn’t before. The strong 
anthropological streak in performance studies, among other things, allowed for a more concrete 
focus on raced bodies, gendered bodies, and classed bodies within moments of performance 
itself. I was unaware of the extent to which figures like Victor Turner and Richard Schechner 
were now commonplace in academic drama departments, to an extent that (at the UCKAR, at 
least) students were growing bored with them, having heard about “liminality” enough times that 
subsequent mentions (some from me) produced a visible glaze in their eye.    
In keeping with a healthy sense of disciplinary chauvinism, it will suffice to say that 
anthropology, via performance studies, has enriched studies of performance outside the 
discipline, urging a more intensive focus on issues of embodiment and the visible evidence of 
culture at work in performance. At the same time, the danger of performance studies, when 
imported back into anthropology, is an overly reductive approach that drains artistic 
performance of any of its significance. Victor Turner (to whom any anthropological scholar of 
theatre is indebted on some level) is especially guilty of this reductive tendency. His 
Anthropology of Performance spends far more time discussing “social performance” (of which 
the “social drama” is the most weighty category) rather than what he calls “cultural 
performance” (which would include theatre). Cultural performance is given a reduction to a kind 
of social performance by Turner’s argument that “the major genres of cultural performance 
(from ritual to theatre and film) and narration (from myth to the novel) not only originate in the 
social drama, but also continue to draw meaning and force from the social drama” (1988, 94). 
Despite his argument that cultural performances “may themselves be active agencies of change,” 
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(1988, 24) there is little discussion of what this process might look like—which, in part, leads to 
the empirical, methodological, and conceptual problems discussed above.  
This dissertation is invested in the idea that there is something singular about South 
African theatre itself as a point of ethnographic focus and that practices of theatre are worth 
looking at in their own right as part of an ethnographic study. Etic as well as emic 
understandings of performance play a role in my analysis of performances as well as rehearsals 
and the various exercises that support them. But performance is far more than a metaphor here—
theatre itself casts light on the broader social and cultural facets of a post-Mandela South Africa, 
and theatre itself is a tool for crafting and shaping the kind of self that one hopes to become.  
 
The Anthropology of Ethics 
The questions with which this dissertation is fundamentally concerned—those of shaping 
the self and others in a post-Mandela South Africa—participate in a stream of anthropological 
scholarship that has called the discipline to take ethics and ethical life more seriously. In contrast 
to earlier anthropological and sociological accounts that reduce ethical life to the machinations of 
social structure (e.g. Durkheim 1953), anthropologists working in the anthropology of ethics 
(sometimes called moral anthropology) have argued that “the ethical dimension of social life—
the fact that everyday conduct is constitutively pervaded by reflective evaluation—is irreducible” 
(Laidlaw 2014, 45), and that ethics is a worthwhile object of analysis in its own right. The 
theoretical and philosophical precedents of this steadily burgeoning stream of scholarship are 
diverse, drawing from figures like Aristotle, Foucault, Heidegger, Levinas, Kant, Alasdair 
McIntyre, and Nietzsche. The avenues for exploring ethical life are just as diverse: studies of 
how and why humans work to become one or another kind of subject have enriched analyses of 
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language (Sidnell 2010), religion (Laidlaw 1995, 2014; Robbins 2004), postcolonial 
development (Pandian 2011), and psychiatric care (Davis 2012) among other traditional and 
contemporary concerns of anthropology. 
My analysis of South African theatre and ethics in a post-Mandela South Africa relies on 
theoretical frameworks that bear a distinctly Foucauldian stamp. In The Use of Pleasure, 
Foucault’s inquiry into the history of sexuality takes a genealogical turn to examine “how, for 
centuries, Western man had been brought to recognize himself as a subject of desire” (1985, 6). 
This project, which would lead Foucault to a study of ancient Greek ethics (and eventually 
Roman ethics in The Care of the Self) brought him to the questions of “how, why, and in what 
forms was sexuality constituted as a moral domain? Why this ethical concern that was so 
persistent despite its varying forms and intensity? Why this ‘problematization?’” (1985, 10). For 
Foucault, this ultimately became a study of the “arts of existence,” the means by which 
individuals performed the work of transformation on themselves to order their existence in 
certain estimable and aesthetically valuable ways. The analytic framework that Foucault 
develops to probe the domain of ethics is fourfold, focusing on 1) the ethical “substance;” the 
part of the self that is the object of ethical work or transformation, 2) the desired end of ethical 
work on the self, or telos, 3) the “mode of subjectivation,” which Foucault describes elsewhere 
as “the way in which people are invited or incited to recognize their moral obligations” (1997a, 
264), and 4) askēsis, the form of training or exercise that facilitates the work of ethics on the self. 
Using this fourfold analytic, Foucault investigates the cultivation of the self and the ways in 
which practices of ethical formation came to bear on questions of sexuality.  
Foucault’s analytic framework has been taken up and refined by anthropologists studying 
ethics, particularly Faubion (2001a, 2010, 2011, 2012) and Laidlaw (1995, 2002, 2014). In his 
23 
 
 
reworking of Foucault, Faubion (2010) argues for a more explicit emphasis on the mode of 
ethical judgment, which includes ethical valuation—a stipulation of who or what is the recipient 
of ethical regard and consideration—as well as justification—“the apparatus of the defense of 
ethical evaluations and ethically marked decisions” (2010, 116). Greater attention to the mode of 
ethical judgment allows for a deeper analysis of the specificity of the semiotics of normative 
criteria from one context to another, and also allows for an analysis of the dynamics between 
these criteria and the ethical subject who utilizes them as part of a singular ecology. Put more 
simply, attention to the mode of judgment allows the anthropologist of ethics to probe the ways 
in which ethical subjects constitute—and are constituted by—normative criteria rather than 
assuming that ethics is always or everywhere the same thing (2010, 69-70). 
Adding a greater analytic emphasis on ethical pedagogy, Faubion also posits the category 
of “the mode of the determination of subjectivation” to Foucault’s framework. This category 
further breaks down into two areas of attention: recruitment, which describes “the conditions that 
encourage and compel an actor toward becoming and being an ethical subject of a qualitatively 
distinguishable sort,” and selection, the ways in which a subject is assigned the task of becoming 
one or another type of ethical subject (2011, 60). The telos of ethical activity for Foucault, 
broadly speaking, is the occupancy by the actor of a particular “subject position” (2010, 4). One 
does not, for instance, become an expert in something overnight. He or she goes through 
countless hours of training, practice, and whatever else may be required to acquire expertise and 
thus occupy the subject position of “expert.” Individuals come to occupy a particular subject 
position through what Foucault calls “technologies of the self,” which “permit individuals to 
effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own 
bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to 
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attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (Foucault 1997b, 
225). Even as one makes use of technologies of self to occupy a particular subject position, one 
does not do so alone. “It is one thing to be born a son or daughter, an aristocrat or commoner,” 
Faubion argues, but “it is another thing, and something always requiring the services of the 
pedagogue, to develop the competencies required to be good at being a son or a daughter, an 
aristocrat or even a commoner as the case may be” (2011, 61). In examining the processes 
through which an individual works toward a particular subject position, pedagogy thus occupies 
a central role.  
The virtue of a Foucauldian framework of analysis for ethics in the context of South 
African theatre is, among other things, its easy fit with emic artistic conceptions of what theatre 
is and how artists describe the benefits they derive from it. Time and again, I heard artists speak 
of who they are and who they hope to become, and of the ways that theatre acts as a powerful 
avenue to achieve these hopes. Such projects of self-fashioning are underpinned by a variety of 
exercises (which Foucault calls askēsis) for both body and mind; part of an aesthetic process that 
is integral to the production of theatre. My South African interlocutors—as artists and as human 
beings—actively wrestled with the implications, the freedoms, and the constraints of the subject 
positions that they hoped to occupy, and the subject positions they hoped to help others occupy 
as well. This framework was not at odds with local understandings of ethics or artistic processes, 
but enriched and came alongside them. In chapter two, for example, I bring this framework 
alongside the figure of the malume—the “mother’s-brother” made famous as a term of kinship 
by Radcliffe-Brown—to show how, through teaching theatre to children, two men actively 
worked to embody this subject position despite the constraints they labored under.    
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Ethics, for Foucault and those who have extended his framework, is a domain of “the 
development of one or another competent and conscious exercise of the practice of freedom” 
(Faubion 2011, 36). I take seriously the challenge to extend and broaden anthropological 
conversations and theorizations of freedom (Laidlaw 2014), and for that reason, freedom and 
constraint both play central roles in the account of ethical life that unfolds throughout the 
dissertation. They feature most centrally in the work that artists choose to conduct on themselves 
and the obstacles (whether structural or interpersonal) that arise as they do so.  
A condition of radical and absolute constraint marks one border of the ethical domain 
(Faubion 2011). Radical freedom—a complete absence of any constraint—marks another border. 
Empirically speaking, we are not likely to find anyone or any group possessing such freedom. At 
a bare minimum, ethics are undertaken with the cultural materials available at hand, in 
conversation with local moral frameworks and the constraints of social structure. Ethical life 
more broadly falls in the terrain between these two borders, and the characters in this study are 
situated in various locales there. No one in South Africa or elsewhere can truly be whoever they 
want, doing whatever they want whenever they want, but some can be more and do more than 
others, and can do so at a time and place of their choosing. On one level, then, a study of ethics 
provides a way of examining the privilege, with regard to ethical life, that white South Africans 
continue to enjoy, and the constraints that black South Africans continue to wrestle with. But 
there is far more complexity to the dynamics of freedom and constraint, as the chapters that 
follow will establish. 
Following Foucauldian frameworks of ethics means taking the characteristics of freedom 
and constraint as open ethnographic questions, for neither are the same in all times and all places. 
I do not set out (and did not set out in the field) with the assumption that “liberal,” “anti-liberal,” 
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“Western,” or “non-Western” conceptions of freedom were or are operative. Nor is 
“metaphysical freedom” given priority over more social and tangible forms of freedom. In the 
field, I asked instead what freedom meant emically and in situ to the artists I studied, and I do 
my best to honor that same impulse here. The meaning of freedom itself is one of the 
fundamental questions of a post-Mandela South Africa, and for that reason it was not surprising 
that my interlocutors’ understandings of freedom varied widely—much more, I suspect, than 
they would have twenty or thirty years ago.  
In a similar way, constraint emerges in all of its complexity in the ethnography that 
follows. At times, it is abstract, impersonal, institutional, or structural. In other cases, it comes 
from intimate relations of kinship and community. It is insurmountable in some places, and in 
others simply merits inventive forms of workaround. It is exacerbated by racial dynamics—for 
both white and black South Africans. On the whole, it plays a constitutive role in shaping ethical 
possibilities in a post-Mandela South Africa. 
South Africa’s history and present are deeply animated by themes of ethics, freedom, and 
constraint. They are not “just under the surface” but are often in plain sight, discussed openly, 
accepted or rejected through local and national conversations. Apartheid, at its core, was about 
much more than generating and facilitating the movement of cheap labor to the industrial and 
urban cores of South Africa: it was also a fully-fledged model of human capabilities and human 
flourishing10 that posited differing ethical teleologies based on race (and in its practical 
                                                          
10 While the phrases “human capabilities” and “human flourishing” evoke the work of both Amartya Sen (1999) and 
Martha Nussbaum (1988), I do not mean here to suggest that apartheid was an extension or application of their 
ideas, which would be both inaccurate and anachronistic. I use the words “capabilities” and “flourishing” here 
because they capture something of the moral essence of apartheid: the idea that black South Africans ought not to 
aspire to a life beyond their alleged aptitudes; and that doing so would only confuse and frustrate them. Introducing 
the Bantu Education Act of 1953, for example, Hendrik Verwoerd argued that: “The Bantu must be guided to serve 
his community in all respects. There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms 
of labour…For that reason it is of no avail to him to receive a training which has as its aim absorption in the 
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implementation, sought to prevent most of the population from undertaking the work of ethics 
for themselves). Post-apartheid nation-building projects like the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and the Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance were put forward as alternative moral 
frameworks after apartheid’s demise, simultaneously promoting a set of Afrocentric virtues like 
Ubuntu and nonracial conceptions of citizenship and belonging (Bongmba 2006; Herewitz 
2003). At the same time, the persistence of constraints of varying kinds—economic, racial, 
structural, political, kin-based—make these projects increasingly frustrating, untenable and 
undesirable. What emerges in their place are more diffuse understandings of freedom, leading to 
more diffuse possibilities for shaping and forming the self. This is the story of ethics that unfolds 
through the dissertation.  
 
Fieldsites and Characters  
The fieldwork for this dissertation was conducted from October 2013 to September of 
2014, along with two months of preliminary research in the summer of 2012, and was based 
primarily at two fieldsites. The first was Dobsonville, a residential neighborhood of Soweto in 
Guateng province, where I conducted research for approximately six months. Along with 
Dobsonville, I interacted with a number of artists in and around the Johannesburg metropolitan 
area, including the nearby townships of Alexandra (which bordered Johannesburg) and 
Katlehong (some 30 kilometers Southeast of Johannesburg). The bulk of my time, however, was 
spent in Dobsonville, where I interviewed, observed, and sometimes even performed alongside 
members of the Khulumani Forum Theatre Group, described in chapters one and two. For three 
                                                          
European community while he cannot and will not be absorbed there. Up until now he has been subjected to a 
school system which drew him away from his own community and practically misled him by showing him the green 
pasture of the European but still not allow him to graze there” (quoted in Feinstein 2005, 159).      
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months (the bulk of one academic semester), I was embedded at a second primary fieldsite 
within the Department of Drama at the University Currently Known as Rhodes, where I attended 
lectures (and gave a few of my own), observed rehearsals and performances, and interviewed 
students and faculty. The two primary fieldsites—one in Soweto, one in Grahamstown; one in a 
context marked by what many would call “community theatre,” the other an elite and nationally 
recognized theatre department—allowed me to probe a range of different attitudes and 
approaches to theatre, as well as a range of attitudes and approaches to shaping the self. 
Observations of the National Arts Festival in Grahamstown—a yearly event that draws theatre 
artists from all over the country and elsewhere—brings together these diverse approaches to art 
and ethics, and served as a more ephemeral third fieldsite. 
 
Like a series of short plays, each of the chapters in this study focus narrowly on one or 
two theatre artists to tell stories that examine different facets of ethical life in South Africa. My 
focus on specific persons, broadly speaking, reflects an ethnographic commitment to 
contextualizing larger social structures, histories, and processes through the lived experiences of 
the people embedded in them. As a study of ethics in particular, it also reflects commitment to a 
“first-person perspective” in discussions of ethics (Mattingly 2014) that privileges the subjective 
and intersubjective facets of ethical life, in contrast to ethics understood deontologically (and 
thus impersonally) as a series of rules, codes, or duties.  
My discussions of ethics in the chapters that follow are neither abstract nor particularly 
prescriptive but focus on the concrete and the embodied. At the same time, the constraints and 
freedoms encountered throughout this work involve larger histories and structures. The 
characters are nodal points through which the workings of structure, history, politics, constraint, 
and freedom unfold through ethical life. In this sense, my focus on a smaller number of persons 
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also shares something of a theatrical impulse: to use characters that tell stories with themes that 
have a relevance that transcends any particular person.  
My focus on specific actors is also underpinned by a theme of pedagogy that threads its 
way throughout the work. It attempts, on one level, to honor the pedagogical role that my 
interlocutors played in teaching me about life in South Africa, and what it means to live well 
there. The framing of their words and actions is undeniably my own, but the lessons they taught 
me are undeniably theirs. At the same time, several figures in the work are also chosen for their 
status as exemplars (Humphrey 1997) who model particular forms of living and being in the 
world. Much of what they exemplify is worthy of esteem; yet there is, as I learned from one 
interlocutor, a certain power in the study of negative exemplars—an impulse I follow in chapter 
five. Collectively, they are compelling pedagogues whose voices should not be obscured by 
abstraction to broader levels of scope. 
 
The Chapters that Follow  
The first chapter of the dissertation takes up varying orientations to and understandings of 
politics among theatre artists in South Africa. Taking as a point of departure a question posed 
somewhat insensitively by a Norwegian visitor to Soweto—“why do you keep voting for the 
ANC?—I trace the history of Black Consciousness theatre into the present through a study of the 
Khulumani Forum Theatre Group (KFTG).11 The members of KFTG, I argue, understand 
freedom and constraint in ways that only involve a sideways glance at politics. Although they 
participate in a lineage of theatre that is manifestly political in its origins (Theatre of the 
                                                          
11 In a similar way, Johannes Fabian was inspired to conduct the ethnographic project that would result in Power 
and Performance after hearing the phrase “le pouvoir se mange entire (power is eaten whole)” in casual 
conversation (Fabian 1990, 3).  
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Oppressed), they also bear the legacies of the Theatre of Black Consciousness, for which the 
work of ethics was central. Unlike their Black Consciousness predecessors, however, they do not 
seek the transformation of their audiences but instead their own self-transformation—it is 
through this avenue, I argue, that freedom is found for them. The second part of the chapter 
transitions to a radically different context to examine practices of Physical Theatre through the 
First Physical Theatre Company, housed in the department of drama at the UCKAR. Like KFTG, 
the First Physical Theatre Company eschews conventional understandings of politics. In this 
context, they do so in favor of a more “intimate revolt” that opens new spaces of freedom for the 
body. In examining this approach to politics, I also probe the limitations of Physical Theatre as a 
genre that, at this point, remains mostly white and elite. Both forms of theatre, I argue, suggest 
that conceptions of “the political” are undergoing a shift for artists and South Africans more 
broadly.  
Continuing my comparative use of two fieldsites, chapter two presents two case studies 
of kinship and political economy in the context of the theatre industry. Theatre, I argue, is 
marked by kin-based relationships that substantively shape the ways in which artists relate to 
each other and to the communities they hope to help. At the same time, competition for 
government funding of theatre, a process marked by corruption and nepotism, puts immense 
pressure on these forms of kinship. In the first case I examine, the strain of living out the role of 
malume (the mother’s brother) led to the dissolution of a children’s theatre program, as the 
search for funding pushed two men to increasingly present themselves as entrepreneurs rather 
than as artists and community development workers. As they did so, the original impetus for 
their project—grounded in fostering kinship—became increasingly obscured. The second case 
analyzes a white South African who played the role of “mother” to a community theatre 
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company in Grahamstown. The sense of frustration and exhaustion that she came under while 
playing this role showcases what I call “ethical fatigue”: a state of resignation characterized by 
tenacious clinging to a role that seems to make one a worse person rather than a better one. 
These examples, I argue, show that in a post-Mandela South Africa, kinship is constituted by 
forms of constraint that bear an uncanny resemblance to South Africa’s colonial and apartheid 
past. Entanglements between past and present complicate the idea that South Africa is a “new” 
country after apartheid. Significant forms of constraint—economic, political, and cultural—
weigh heavily on projects that would seek to create new forms of family.   
Chapter three puts epistemology and expertise in dialog with freedom and constraint in 
an institutional, academic setting. Agon: Conflict and Catharsis by Athina Vahla was a theatre 
production that cast a local boxer and his coach in the central roles. Their training activities and 
exercises were choreographed artistically, and became a ground for reflection on themes of 
power, discipline, and the shaping of self. As a theatrical study of boxing using real boxers, 
Agon was intended to break epistemic and institutional barriers to become a broader 
interdisciplinary study of the work’s central themes. But institutional constraints at the UCKAR 
meant that the event itself was poorly attended, and the panel discussions meant to be part of the 
work played to mostly empty rooms. Drawing on my observations and participation in the work, 
I examine how institutional and professional boundaries work to police forms of thinking that 
seek to cross disciplinary and racial borders, and reflect on the implications of this fact with 
regard to student protests that are currently unfolding across the country.  
In the fourth chapter, I take up the question of pedagogy in spaces of theatre. Post-
Mandela South Africa has seen the surprising emergence of counter-pedagogues: teachers who 
deny they are teaching and instead strive to cede control of the learning environment to students. 
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This counter-pedagogy, I argue, emerges out of the dual legacies of white paternalism on the one 
hand, and the more recent emergence of “top-down” political structures led by corrupt and 
nepotistic black elites. My examination of pedagogy unfolds through a study of two teachers, 
both located in Grahamstown. The first, who is white, draws on a model of pedagogy shaped in 
the context of a totalitarian Europe and the French student uprisings of 1968. His style is 
counter-pedagogical to the extent that it cedes control of the learning environment to students 
after a set of minimalist instructions, and in this way, allows students to engage in their own 
forms of exploration and contemplation. The second pedagogue, who is black, denies that he is a 
teacher and does not want to be seen as a role model. His form of counter-pedagogy is rooted in 
a view of freedom that denies the reality of any constraint: he claims to be self-made, answers to 
no one, and claims no mentors. I situate his counter-pedagogical stance in the broader context of 
education in South Africa, which in recent years has been a site of protest as South African 
students fight to reject a past grounded in racialism and hierarchy.  
The fifth and final chapter of the dissertation engages the subject of whiteness in South 
Africa through an analysis of the Exhibit series by white South African artist Brett Bailey. 
Exhibit A and Exhibit B were re-creations of the nineteenth century “ethnographic exhibitions,” 
where individuals were brought from remote corners of the world to the centers of Europe to be 
put on display as exotic specimens. Bailey’s recreation of these “human zoos” cast black actors 
as specimens on display, and despite his stated antiracist intentions, the work provoked intense 
controversy when it traveled outside of South Africa. I examine the debates surrounding the 
Exhibit series with attention to how understandings of Bailey and his antiracist whiteness 
continually change as the work travels. Far from being monolithic, I argue, white antiracist 
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subject positions do not travel well—a fact that has significance not only for Bailey but for the 
discipline of anthropology as well. 
Throughout the dissertation, dialectics of freedom and constraint reveal the historical 
entanglements and contradictory impulses at the heart of South African ethical life. I conclude 
that apartheid and colonial legacies continue to shape the ways that South Africans shape 
themselves and care for others. At the same time, I argue that these forms of constraint, in the 
context of a post-Mandela South Africa, give rise to new subjectivities, new forms of freedom, 
and new ways of answering the question of what it means to live a good life. South Africa 
continues to be site where subjects across the racial and class spectrum pursue the conscious 
exercise of freedom, the understandings of which are constantly in flux. 
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Chapter 1 
Aesthetics in Black and White: 
Politics, Ethics, and Freedom in Post-Mandela South Africa. 
  
Introduction; or, “Why Keep Voting for Them?” 
Dobsonville is a fairly large neighborhood of Soweto, situated to the west of Orlando, the 
township suburb that Nelson Mandela once called home. Much of Dobsonville, and Extension 
Three in particular, is lined with brick houses in neat and orderly rows; not the “matchbox” 
houses of the apartheid era, but rather the slightly larger RDP houses of the early post-apartheid 
years. These houses lend a suburban and even middle-class air to Extension Three where I spent 
most of my time, a stone’s throw from the more congested streets and corrugated iron domiciles 
of Zola township. Extension Three is as flat and dusty as any part of Soweto, but the streets 
where I spent much of my time were—apart from the locked and walled gates around many 
houses—not unlike an American suburb. The street that many of my informants called home was 
a short walk from sprawling parks, a vibrant community center, and a strip mall—complete with 
a Cell Phone Repair Shop, a grocery store, and several clothing boutiques. 
On a warm afternoon in November, the side room of Umthombo Wolwazi Hall in 
Extension Three was unusually full. A group of white Norwegian teenagers had come streaming 
out of two large white tour vans just minutes before, part of a cultural exchange that would 
facilitate discussion between Norwegian and South African youth around common areas of 
concern. The South African youth, under the banner of the Khulumani Forum Theatre Group 
(hereafter KFTG), were excited to introduce the Theatre of the Oppressed to their Norwegian 
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counterparts, and also hoped to learn strategies from the Norwegians about how to resolve issues 
they might have in common.  
After the requisite 
introductions and some 
icebreaking games, the 
discussions began in earnest 
with an introduction to Forum 
Theatre by Sam, who had 
been designated a 
representative of the group 
from Soweto. Forum Theatre, 
he explained, is a part of the 
Theatre of the Oppressed, which comes from the work of Augusto Boal in Brazil. As part of the 
Theatre of the Oppressed, Forum Theatre engages oppression at multiple levels, both visible and 
invisible, wherever it is found and in whatever capacity. In its relentless interrogation of 
oppression, Forum Theatre invites members of the audience to come on stage and change the 
course of a scene being depicted, empowering people to recognize and fight their own 
oppression. In doing so, it turns “spectators” into “spect-actors” (Boal 2008, xxi), making 
audiences active agents of change rather than passive consumers. Sam’s explanation of Forum 
Theatre was received with polite but slightly bored attention by the Norwegian youth. It seemed 
they had not heard of it or of Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed before, although they seemed 
impressed with Sam’s claim that Khulumani was the only group in South Africa practicing 
Icebreaking and introductions between Norwegian teens and the 
Khulumani Forum Theatre Group. November, 2013.    
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Forum Theatre.12 Once Sam’s introduction was over, the Norwegians were free to ask any 
questions they wanted.  
The group’s chaperone, a middle-aged white man, began questioning the South African 
youth about oppression. “Do you still feel oppressed,” he wondered, “even though apartheid 
ended nineteen years ago?” Answers to this question—and the forms of oppression identified—
were varied. Sam replied immediately that he in particular did not feel oppressed, but he was 
quickly admonished by Nondi, another leader of the group, to let others talk. Some felt oppressed 
because the only black South Africans who benefitted from the end of apartheid were black 
politicians and business elites. Others found oppression in more nebulous places: through mass 
media, which made the youth emulate Euro-American culture rather than South African culture, 
or through issues like teenage pregnancy and drug use. Not much has changed, Nondi argued by 
way of summary, for South African youth since the end of apartheid.  
Continuing his line of questioning, the Norwegian man got slightly more pointed: “How 
do the youth make themselves agents of change? You have to take it upon yourselves. We’re 
oppressing ourselves by not doing anything about it,” he philosophized. Continuing to dominate 
the conversation, he worked his way to the topic of the upcoming elections and the question of 
why black South Africans continue to feel the need to vote for the ANC. “If they haven’t made 
your lives any better, why keep voting for them? Your vote is your power, and you can remove 
them from office if they’re not helping you. Isn’t that the problem? That you continue to vote for 
them?” Though the conversation would take various other twists and turns, including a brief 
excursus into the problems faced by Norwegian youth—too many choices about what to do with 
                                                          
12 The claim that KFTG is the only Forum Theatre group in South Africa is false (I did encounter others), though 
they may have been the only Forum Theatre group in Soweto. 
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one’s life, too little trust of others—the leader’s interrogation continued. Blind faith in tradition 
and elders, according to him, seemed to be the sole cause of continued support for the ANC. If 
youth simply stopped voting for them, things would get better.  
I found the Norwegian man to be incredibly obnoxious, particularly in his presumption 
that he had singlehandedly arrived at a solution for oppression among youth in Soweto. He made 
it sound so easy—just stop voting ANC—as though it had never occurred to anyone before he 
arrived in South Africa. More fundamentally, he had missed the point of their diverse answers to 
the question of oppression, only one of which had mentioned (and indirectly at that) the ruling 
ANC. The issue of oppression could not be so easily reduced to this sphere of politics, nor could 
the promise of freedom.  
His naivety makes, in retrospect, a certain amount of sense. During apartheid, art had 
been explicitly identified as “a weapon of struggle” (Peffer 2009, 79), a declaration that was less 
a prescription for artists than a recognition of an orientation toward politics that theatre artists 
had already had for years. Within black theatre circles, the criteria of a work’s “relevance” to 
current social and political struggles meant increasing boredom and frustration with artists that 
refused to reckon with the realities of apartheid, and increasing condemnations of artists who 
imagined that art and politics could be neatly separated (Kavanagh 1984, 2016). And while it is 
true that after apartheid, many artists felt like “a boxer in the ring without an opponent” (van 
Heerden 2011, 95), it is also true that the tradition of Protest Theatre continues to thrive—theatre 
stalwarts like Mike van Graan now condemn the excesses and greed of the ANC and the failures 
of promised reconciliation. In the context of KFTG in particular, it makes sense to anticipate that 
a group aligning themselves with the Theatre of the Oppressed—a tradition deeply critical of 
entrenched power structures and deeply committed to the radical democratization of the public 
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sphere—would cast more than a sideways glance at the electoral politics of the day. To frame the 
white group leader’s reaction more charitably, one might say that discourses of freedom and 
constraint seemed, confusingly for him, to be operative on a terrain to which they did not seem to 
belong.  
This chapter is an attempt to make sense of this moment, and more broadly, to trace some 
of the aesthetic contours of a post-Mandela South Africa through an ethnographic examination of 
South African theatre. The theatre of post-Mandela South Africa is, I argue, undeniably political. 
At the same time, artistic orientations to the political—and artistic conceptions of the political 
itself—continue to mutate and shift. Art is no longer a weapon of struggle. Rather, it is a weapon 
of struggles, and these unfold simultaneously on a number of disparate planes that, at any given 
moment, might not have anything to do with who currently holds a particular office. 
Contemporary South African theatre, I argue, problematizes a more intimate form of politics 
concerned with the self and the body. The revolutions that it proposes are not merely 
metaphorical but are active processes of work and ethical concern. Paradoxically, these politics 
are not primarily aimed at audiences. They manifest themselves most powerfully in moments of 
production, behind the scenes, before audiences can heap either praise or scorn upon a finished 
product.   
 The first part of this chapter ruminates more deeply on the original mystery—why the 
sideways or passing glance at politics?—with an examination of black aesthetics and the ways in 
which it is taken up by the members of KFTG. Their politics, I argue, constitute a shift from the 
politics of apartheid to the governance of the self—a stance that is simultaneously rooted in 
philosophies of Black Consciousness while moving beyond it in crucial ways. But these aesthetic 
politics are not the sole province of so-called “township” or “community” theatre, designations 
39 
 
 
which are often used pejoratively to index a hackneyed or lackluster approach to theatre 
production and performance. They are also found in elite spaces of theatre, where mostly white 
(and a few select black) artists train in techniques of more European origin. For that reason I 
examine, in the second part of the chapter, the proposed revolts of Physical Theatre, a genre that 
is primarily white and primarily elite both in its production and its consumption. Both of these 
groups mediate the dialectics of freedom and constraint on terrains that would be recognizable to 
apartheid-era artists, though their aesthetics and politics are the product of a post-Mandela South 
Africa.  
 
Black Consciousness, Black Aesthetics   
The history of Black Consciousness as a philosophical, political, and religious movement 
is well-known. Forged by black South African university students who had grown weary of the 
complacent liberalism of their white peers in student government—particularly in the white 
insistence that student life was separate from both race and national politics—it was a radical 
withdrawal of blacks from white political discourses into spaces of black self-affirmation 
(Magaziner 2012). For Steve Biko, the movement’s most visible leader and philosopher, Black 
Consciousness as a movement “takes cognizance of the deliberateness of God's plan in creating 
black people black. It seeks to infuse the black community with a new-found pride in 
themselves, their efforts, their value systems, their culture, their religion and their outlook to life” 
(Biko 1987, 49). Drawing on Fanonian psychoanalysis, Biko articulated an ethics of freedom that 
had as its starting point freedom for the black psyche; it was “less about explicit resistance to 
apartheid and more about fundamental ethical questions regarding how one should live in service 
of the future” (Magaziner 2012, 9). These questions were to be worked out by black South 
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Africans in black organizations on behalf of other blacks. It was a rejection not only of Bantu 
education13 but also of the paternalism of liberal whiteness. 
As a philosophy, a political movement, and a theological intervention, Black 
Consciousness was a rigorously “contextual” movement: both pragmatically and theoretically, it 
drew impetus from the daily struggles of black South Africans living under apartheid, from 
indigenous religious and philosophical traditions, and from liberatory movements across Africa 
and abroad with a special focus for its relevance to the South African condition.14 The merger 
between lived black experience and black liberatory philosophies would bring with it a number 
of seismic intellectual shifts, particularly in theology, where the movement arguably had its 
greatest theoretical and scholarly traction.15  
The “Black” in Black Consciousness had a broad definition: “those who are by law or 
tradition politically, economically and socially discriminated against as a group in the South 
African society and identifying themselves as a unit in the struggle towards the realisation of 
their aspirations” (Biko 1987, 48). This could, and did, encompass Indians and “coloured”16 
South Africans as black. At the same time, being black was not necessarily a matter of 
pigmentation but instead, for Biko and others, “a reflection of a mental attitude” (1987, 48). 
                                                          
13 The Bantu Education Act of 1953 stipulated a system of racial segregation in schooling. Primary, secondary, and 
tertiary institutions were designated for the exclusive use of particular groups and segregated. Unsurprisingly, 
education for Black South Africans was oriented toward their participation in heavy manual and domestic labor. 
Paradoxically, “Blacks only” universities would also become the birthplace of Black Consciousness philosophy (see 
Magaziner 2012).   
14 Biko’s writings (1978), for instance, draw not only on Fannon but also Black American intellectuals like W.E.B. 
Du Bois and James Baldwin.   
15 The “Kairos Document,” for instance, drew on Black Theology to critique both “State Theology,” and “Church 
Theology,” condemning the Reformed Church’s endorsement of apartheid and calling on Christians to commit to 
the work of liberation (see Villa-Vicencio 1986).      
16 “Coloured” was a nebulous apartheid-era racial designation that indexed South Africans who were not identifiably 
white, black, Indian, or Chinese. Although some “coloured” South Africans are of South Asian decent, the category 
was also applicable to bi-racial South Africans. I use the term in quotes here out of deference to coloured South 
Africans who opt to problematize the arbitrary (though not insignificant) nature of their racial position under 
apartheid. 
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African, Indian, or “coloured” South Africans who were hopelessly subservient to the command 
and paternalism of whites were designated by Black Consciousness activists as “non-white” 
rather than “black” in the movement, a distinction that indexed a failure of mental self-liberation. 
Blackness was earned through ethical work on the self, culminating in an affirmation of oneself 
and one’s community.  
Given the well-trodden history of Black Consciousness and its influence on South 
Africa’s intellectual and spiritual history, scholarship on the aesthetics of Black Consciousness is 
fairly sparse, especially where theatre is concerned. This is certainly not because Black 
Consciousness failed to have implications for art in general and theatre in particular. Plays like 
Sizwe Bansi is Dead were and are repeatedly praised as paragons of a truly Black Theatre that 
evinced the liberatory ethic and liberatory consciousness that Biko strove for.17 Yet aesthetics 
never quite received the same formalization and programmatic articulation that philosophy and 
theology did.  
The reasons why Black Consciousness birthed Black Theology and not also a 
programmatic Black Aesthetics are perhaps overdetermined. Biko, who had written at length on 
theology and other topics, noted only in passing that “the adoption of black theatre and drama is 
one such important innovation we need to encourage and to develop” (1985, 96). The articulation 
of a liberatory theatre would be the task, then, of others.18 But the theatre of Black 
Consciousness was suppressed by apartheid authorities almost as quickly as it was produced. For 
example, Shezi, a play produced by the Durban-based People’s Experimental Theatre, was 
repeatedly banned, their equipment confiscated, and their artists charged under the terrorism act 
                                                          
17 See Barrios 2008 and Kavanagh 2016.  
18 Coplan (1985) points out that the African National Theatre was working out this liberatory and radical theatre as 
early as 1939 (1985:204), though the group did not last long.  
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(Barrios 2008; Larlham 1985). Township authorities, acting as an added local layer of 
censorship, could demand review of scripts before plays were performed and deny the use of 
performance halls, which were an extreme scarcity at any rate (Kavanagh 2016, 245). 
Performance events of any kind, in fact, were completely forbidden at various points when the 
townships were flaring with acts of open resistance, as in the Soweto uprisings (Coplan 1985). 
Working under the threat of a ban or worse, artists wrote few explicitly political scripts (many 
works were improvised), and articulations of the aesthetics of Black Consciousness were 
scattered and fragmented at best.   
Scholars of Black Theatre in South Africa have had to patch together, in retrospect, the 
aesthetics of the movement using a few surviving scripts, scattered reviews, and material from 
the pages of S’ketsh, the sole black publication devoted exclusively to the criticism and 
development of Black Theatre. For Kavanagh (1985, 2016), who founded and maintained 
editorship of S’ketsh for five of its seven issues, “the theatre of Black Consciousness followed 
the same pattern as the strategy that the movement had evolved for the resistance of cultural 
domination and liberation in general—withdrawal from association with whites, the creation of 
new structures and the conscientization of black people” (1985, 164). This is a fairly broad 
generalization to be sure, and much more tidy than the reality—the Black Theatre movement was 
characterized by a wealth of debates and approaches to theatre making with only occasional hints 
at a consenus position on any particular debate.  
The Black Theatre movement’s orientation to whiteness is a case in point. Much like the 
broader student movement, the impulse to sever ties with white patrons, white directors, and 
white artists was certainly present for some. Those who chose to collaborate with white artists 
and/or directors could be labeled as “schizophrenics,” “guinea pigs,” or even as “non-whites” 
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(Kavanagh 1985, 163). Other artists did not find it necessary to completely sever ties with white 
artists. “Black Consciousness is not a matter of kicking the whiteman in the pants,” Adam Small 
argued, but more a matter of “not having our thoughts determined by the whiteman anymore” 
(Kavangh 2016, 58). Some also chose to remain linked to whites for strategic reasons. An 
unsigned “Note on Black Theatre” in S’ketsh made the case that “there is still a lot we have to 
steal from the white man. The white man has to be used until such time as we are ready to break 
off completely from ‘white exploitation’…Let us use him while he uses us” (Kavanagh 2016, 
10). Even the question of performing Black Theatre for white audiences was an open one.  
Despite the heterodoxy on this and other issues, common points of agreement on Black 
Aesthetics did emerge in the pages of S’ketsh and in the work of black playwrights. 
Aesthetically, Black Theatre “makes no prescription about form, other than that function should 
determine form (Kavanagh 1985, 166). There was certainly an ideal way to present Black 
Theatre: the movement celebrated and frequently called for a return to indigenous performance 
forms, particularly those that faithfully re-created the traditional kraal and other sacred spaces 
where indigenous performances have historically unfolded.19 This ideal form, however, was also 
acknowledged as somewhat impractical and unfeasible given the constraints of township theatre 
halls and the difficulty of touring a work that called for intensive stage construction (Kavanagh 
1985, 167). Most of the time—and in the more celebrated works like Sizwe Bansi, the theatre of 
Black Consciousness was a “theatre of the dispossessed” in which artists worked with minimal 
props and staging, emphasizing movement and gesture instead (Barrios 2008, 42).  
                                                          
19 Some S’ketsh articles, for example, included full of diagrams and drawings of indigenous forms of performance 
and staging. See Kavanagh 2016:114-15. 
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While aesthetic form was less prescribed and often contingent on the vicissitudes of 
available resources, function—what a work should set out to accomplish rhetorically—was much 
more clearly defined in the movement. The function of theatre, for the theatre of Black 
Consciousness, was the psychological liberation of the black mind, which occurs through an 
affirmation of the black self and community. This “aesthetics of self-affirmation” meant that “the 
artist’s responsibility lies upon the reconstruction of distorted images to show the more diverse 
and complex gamut of characters and characteristics that are a reflection of life, such as change 
and movement, and not static stereotypes” (Barrios 2008, 49). This aesthetic, of course, 
presupposes an artist who is already liberated. “The playwrights have to be proud of their 
blackness first, then become playwrights”—only after doing so can they properly respond to the 
“moral duty to create theatre that depicts the people’s struggle in terms of black awareness and to 
instill in them a sense of pride,” thus liberating their consciousness (Kavanagh 1985, 171). A 
truly Black Theatre would be the product of a truly black (rather than “non-white”) mind, and 
would affirm positive images of blackness rather than harmful stereotypes, continually pushing 
toward affirmations of blackness.  
The importance of this aesthetic principle is apparent in the increasing boredom, 
throughout the 1970s in particular, with the “Township Musical.” Many of these productions 
were light-hearted affairs that included singing and dancing with little or no overt political 
content. Gibson Kente, often recognized as the “father of township theatre” was thus taken to 
task not only for his failure to interface with S’ketsh and other black media outlets but also for 
the failure of some of his plays to have anything of relevance to say to black South Africans 
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(Kavangh 2016).20 Mainstream township musicals like the wildly successful Ipi Tombi often 
only served to portray happy and dancing natives for the delight of white audiences rather than 
for black empowerment, harming the image of black South Africans at home and also abroad. 
“Thank goodness Sizwe Bansi was in London shortly afterwards to correct the false impression 
that blacks in South Africa can only sing and dance,” one S’ketsh reviewer argued (Kavangh 
2016, 145). Even when works in this genre did have some political relevance, the genre itself 
was becoming boring and losing its utility in the work of liberation.21 Black theatre critics and 
intellectuals thus increasingly came to distinguish not only black from “non-white” artists, but 
also between properly Black Theatre and “theatre presented by blacks”: “the former is 
committed to the creation of a revolutionary mood and sees black liberation as a priority. The 
latter does not” (Kavanagh 1985, 163).     
The theatre of Black Consciousness, then, functioned as a mode of subjectivation,22 
drawing black South Africans into an ethics of affirmation and providing a justification for those 
ethics through theatre. Its ultimate aim was the liberation of black conscious thought from its 
enslavement to white domination, primarily through celebrations of blackness and the awakening 
of the truly black political mind. Both of these objectives were accomplished in moments of 
                                                          
20 In response to this criticism, and especially after the commercial success of Sizwe Bansi is Dead, Kente did 
produce subsequent shows that ventured to comment more explicitly on politics, though his attitude to political 
theatre remained ambivalent (particularly after his arrest) See Coplan 1985.  
21 In the Winter 1975 issue of S’ketch, one artist devised a drinking game that would challenge contestants to guess 
what township musical production a particular photo was from. Such a game would be hard because they all looked 
exactly the same. “You won’t miss the old reliable trademarks,” he argues: “the rude, tough-talking cop, the slick, 
two-faced preacher, the rubbish bin and a raggedly-dressed man eating from it, a coffin and the ever present 
cemetery sequence with the agape singers, grouped in different incongruous poses, faces contorted in faked agony, 
mouths screwed to unbelievable shapes, eyes bulging almost out of their sockets, hands stiffly and tightly clasped, 
some held appealingly, heads lifted to the sky in prayers and the eyes looking up to the ceiling…If you have seen 
one show in Soweto, you have seen them all!” (Kavanagh 2016:219).   
22 Foucault explains the “mode of subjectivation” as “the way in which the individual establishes his relation to the 
rule and recognizes himself as obliged to put it into practice” (1985:27). Ideally, the theatre of Black Consciousness 
was aimed at such a purpose, getting people to recognize and actively work against their own psychological 
enslavement through the radical affirmation of blackness. 
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performance, and these performances required crafting by artists who were themselves liberated. 
The commitment to a liberated form of consciousness and detraction from this ideal in 
performance marked the boundaries of Black Consciousness as an aesthetic. 
Aesthetics of the self in Soweto 
 The months I spent alongside KFTG revealed a group that bears the legacy of Black 
Theatre in Soweto. In many ways, they worked as a group to carry that legacy forward by 
striving to raise awareness on important issues within their communities and neighborhoods. 
They wanted to empower the residents of their neighborhoods with knowledge of how to access 
government services, devised pieces about the reintegration of convicts after prison, and 
constantly spoke out against xenophobia. At the same time, the governance of self frequently 
overrode the governance of others; it was a telos toward which the members of KFTG were 
constantly striving.   
The core of Forum Theatre 
training and every subsequent 
rehearsal included physical 
and mental exercises as well as 
intensive discussions. In 
addition to complex forms of 
stretching, the group began 
each session with a series of 
games that were designed to 
build group cohesion, mental 
stamina, and spatial awareness. Group members might, for instance, face each other in pairs and 
Tshepo meditating intensively in preparation for a rehearsal. January, 
2014. 
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mirror each other’s movements, or walk together in a straight line with their eyes closed. These 
exercises were joined to a regimen of study and analysis: any topic being addressed by the group, 
whether xenophobia or domestic violence, would include a series of discussions among members 
of the group and research into local news stories. Forum Theatre, for the group, involved 
continual training for both body and mind, and their art form involved not only physical but also 
philosophical exertion.  
These exercises, games, and conversations were what the group talked about most often 
as they reflected on the ways that theatre had shaped them. I consistently heard compelling 
stories of a before and after, narratives of a past broken or incomplete self that had been made 
more whole or that had transcended, to some degree, a set of imperfections. “At the time the 
forum theatre training was about to start,” one man told me, “I lost it by that time. Lost my 
character, lost so many things…I got, from the first day, the satisfaction that I had wanted for a 
long, long time.” Forum theatre had altered his once introverted nature: “I would never greet a 
stranger. It was within me that I would never talk to or greet a stranger. Even when I go to shop 
and they say ‘hey, can I help you?’ I would say no. Not because I didn’t want them to help me, 
but because I was not open to the social life. So I started to be open to social life. Within a week, 
we were like brothers and sisters. It made me motivated.” This was a common narrative thread 
among members of the group. Another man told me he used to be “too shy” and “ask too many 
questions: ‘is it perfect? Is it right? Is it suitable?’” The man who trained him in forum theatre 
told him: “No. You are good as you are. As long as you gather information, and become a better 
person every day by learning.” This brand of theatre had awakened the members of KFTG to 
their own confidence and potential. 
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For other members of the group, forum theatre had been a crucial awakening to the ways 
in which they oppress others. One member of the group, who regularly depicts “the oppressor” in 
the group’s productions, told me that it caused him to realize that he acted oppressively toward 
the women in his life. “If I felt like beating a woman I used to do that. Since I am doing this 
thing, that is a change. Because the questions I get from the audience are tough ones. When I 
respond to them, I have to respond in character but the person responding is the real me. Then I 
realize…this is not good.” Playing a variety of characters not only taught the men about 
themselves but helped them become more empathetic than before, and more conscious of what 
oppression looks like.  
In the language of Black Consciousness, Forum Theatre was making them more fully 
aware of the complex forms of oppression they suffered and afflicted on others; more caring 
toward their community, who they hoped to help, educate, and mentor; more proud of 
themselves and more eager to keep learning and growing. Beyond their training in the original 
workshops, none of these benefits were bestowed on them. They were hard fought and earned 
through substantive work on themselves.  
As they continued to engage issues of oppression and worked to expand their own 
knowledge, working to raise the consciousness of others would be the next logical step in the 
trajectory of Black Consciousness aesthetics. To an extent, the group certainly embarked down 
this path. Numerous performances, many of them occurring outside with few props or scenery, 
played in various parts of Soweto. For International Women’s Day in March of 2013, for 
example, the group gathered at Park Station Bridge in central Johannesburg for a performance 
that depicted domestic abuse. Passersby stopped to watch the show and comment on the images 
the actors were depicting, and were invited to re-arrange the bodies of the actors in ways that 
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changed the scene. The group also conducted a series of performances on the importance of 
voting on behalf of the Independent Electoral Commission in 2014, and gave various 
presentations through the Drama For Life program at University of Witwatersrand. 
Such performances were, however, sparse. Logistical difficulties—primarily having to do 
with funding to transport group members from far-flung corners of Soweto—made consistent 
performances difficult. Plans for appearances and performances could not get traction, and the 
membership of the group dwindled. The group I met once I arrived in 2013 was substantively 
smaller than the same group a year ago. Yet this lack of performance momentum didn’t seem to 
matter much to the group’s core members. Forum Theatre, for them, was certainly not a vehicle 
to riches or fame. But I found a stronger claim to be true as well: contact with the public through 
performance (to whatever end) was subordinate to what performance did for themselves as 
artists. Theatre is, for them, a technology of the self—a means through which members strive 
toward the subject positions they hope to embody. This processes does involve performing for 
others. But favorable audience reception—or having any audience at all, for that matter—seemed 
almost incidental.  
Just over a week after the death of Nelson Mandela, for instance, I joined members of 
KFTG on Vilakazi Street outside of Nelson Mandela’s former residence—now a historical 
monument and tourist attraction. There, the group hoped to commemorate Madiba’s23 legacy 
with a series of performances that would pay tribute to him and call attention to current sources 
of oppression facing ordinary black South Africans. While the group had originally intended to 
perform early in the evening, their performance did not begin in earnest until after nine. The hour 
was late, in more ways than one—the street was empty of the constant stream of mourners and 
                                                          
23 Nelson Mandela’s clan name; a term of endearment and affection. 
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celebrants that had flooded Vilakazi Street for the last week, and the departure of media lighting 
some days before had brought the street back to the much dimmer glow of a few street lights. 
Foot traffic had been reduced to residents and the occasional tourist frequenting the shebeens 
(informal, unlicensed taverns) and restaurants that line the street.  
The group did its best to adjust to the darkness, and I joined them in creating a series of 
images that would depict, in turn, an image of violent xenophobia, followed by a gathering 
around the body of Nelson Mandela and a quiet hymn in tribute to him. One man, acting as the 
facilitator, attempted to draw audiences in and begin dialogue and conversations on the images, 
inviting, as usual, people to join or change the images they were seeing. But the attention of 
weekend revelers was hard to come by. Indeed, only two women stopped to engage our group, 
and only then to try and determine how I, as a white person, found himself in Soweto on a 
weekend night. One of them promptly lost interest to answer a call on her cell phone. The other 
politely listened to the facilitator’s explanation, but seemed uninterested in participating or 
dialoging about the image of violence we were trying to portray.  
I remember vividly the frustration I felt that day: the sense that the performance was a 
day late and a dollar (or rand) short. Had the group done this same performance a week before, 
or even four days before, and several hours earlier in the day, there would have been a 
completely different crowd with a much more receptive attitude. They likely could have 
generated some really interesting conversations and attention for their work. Instead, I felt, we 
were performing in the dark to an audience more interested in drinking. The performance, in my 
mind, was not at all a successful one. 
The members of the group felt differently, and were not at all fazed by the lack of any 
audience participation. “We are artists,” one of them told me, “we have to get out there and 
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perform.” They we happy that they had done so, and felt they had done well. Far more important 
than any visible impact on the public was the occurrence of the performance in the first place, 
and their virtuosity in performing. Those were reasons for celebrating. We did so into the late 
hours of the night, as the once-liminal spaces of Vilakazi Street and Nelson Mandela’s house 
continued to cede ground to typical weekend activities.  
Outside of rehearsals and the occasional performance, members of the group poured 
significant time and creative energy into pedagogical activities—particularly training others in 
the principles and techniques of Forum Theatre in local schools and, at one point, a nearby 
prison. They might perform for purposes of demonstration, but many of these visits would spend 
far more time on the kinds of games and exercises that the group regularly practices in 
rehearsals. Rather than delivering a performance, they wanted to deliver a method of self-
cultivation. 
The members of KFTG understand themselves to be artists. They pride themselves in 
identifying as such, and consistently work to be better at it. Yet KFTG’s brand of theatre 
constitutes an odd aesthetic indeed: not at all commercially viable, and not primarily aimed at 
audiences. Theatre production (processes of devising plays and rehearsing) is where they feel 
most connected to the ways in which Forum Theatre as an art form makes a tangible difference 
in their lives. Performance is not the primary mode through which the group works toward 
liberating others, but instead via pedagogy, through which they impart a set of exercises and 
techniques for forming and shaping the self. Performances do happen and audiences do matter, 
but only to an extent. They are further opportunities to work toward the more robust occupation 
of an artistic identity.  
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These artists, of course, find themselves in a political environment that is substantively 
different than the Black Consciousness artists of the apartheid era. Bannings and arrests do not 
loom over them for performing, and oppression is no longer the province of a system of legally 
instituted white supremacy but something more nebulous and multifaceted; something that 
unfolds in a variety of scenarios for a variety of reasons. Oppression can take the form of a 
husband beating his wife, a township resident attacking an African migrant, from Euro-American 
standards of beauty and taste that put pressure on the youth to give up their “South African 
culture,” or from local (ANC) leaders who need to be held accountable. Oppression, if anything, 
has not gone away but has become much more diffuse in a post-Mandela South Africa.  
“Isn’t that the problem? That you continue voting for them?”  
To respond to the Norwegian group leader in a word, no. Or in two words: not 
necessarily. The supposition that the ANC could potentially operate an oppressive political 
regime is not mistaken. Indeed, members of KFTG were not unaware of problems like 
corruption, nepotism, and the failure to deliver basic municipal services in some areas—we 
talked about these issues often. It is also not mistaken to assume that electoral politics can be one 
mechanism of dissent to give voice to those who feel a sense of oppression. The ascendance of 
the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party and the recent loss of ANC municipal control of 
nearby Johannesburg are two examples, although the governance of the newly elected 
Democratic Alliance party in that city remains to be seen. The fundamental errors of the 
Norwegian team leader were in his reduction of oppression to the sphere of (conventional) 
politics, and in his reduction of freedom to the civic exercise of voting. Electoral politics are 
important to be sure, but are far from the only or even the most important terrain on which the 
dialectics of freedom and constraint unfold.  
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The freedoms that the group seeks are as diverse as the constraints they encounter, for if 
oppression comes in many guises, so does the state of having transcended that oppression. One 
constraint with which multiple members of KFTG have had to reckon is the expectation of 
gainful employment. Multiple men in the group, that is, had been subjected to varying levels of 
censure and disappointment from families who feel they were failing to provide income. “This 
thing that you are doing is wasting your time,” one man recalls his father saying. “You should be 
working there in my company. By now, you would be in a position that would give you a better 
salary.” He had not only passed up a job in his father’s company but also at a local grocery store. 
“I had to go with what I love, which is art,” he argued. But he and other members of the group 
were continually pressured by their families. “Because I’m not getting any income now, they see 
me as no one,” another member of the group told me. “In order for older people to listen—
especially those who come from the oppression of apartheid—they don’t understand. I have to 
have money for them to be impressed or to appreciate what I’m trying to say to them. So I have 
to have money. I’m trying, but I have to be stubborn for my own sake. To stick to what I believe 
and what I love. Not to divert and go look for a job.” Another man quit his job in the stockroom 
of a grocery store after two weeks. “After I quit that job, I got more pressure. More pressure and 
more pressure. It was like I felt the craziness within me every time I woke. I could feel really 
lonely—an outcast. People could tell me I’m nobody, even today.” Situated in the midst of a 
terrain marked by high unemployment, many members of the group had repeatedly shunned 
regular and steady jobs.  
Yet all three of these men were far from lazy or shiftless. They regularly pieced together 
labor-intensive odd jobs—construction one day, gardening the next, followed perhaps by some 
car repair or house painting. They labored as much as they had to in order to clear space for the 
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real work of contemplation and, above all, their chosen art form of Forum Theatre. The time and 
space to do this work and the forms of activism that attended it were among the chief freedoms 
sought by the group.    
Knowledge—consistently articulated by members of the group as “information”—
indexed another domain of freedom and constraint. The cultivation of information is the exercise 
of a social freedom in that it is found in dialogue with others and used in the service of helping 
others. “I question because I want to know and have information so I can live my life and help 
other people. When I know what to do and have the information, being in the state of a relaxed 
person, I can help others,” one man told me. “You cannot teach a person something that you 
don’t know. The way you present your thing, it must be really presentable. That gives me the 
pleasure of changing and upgrading in life—trying to get to new standards, getting more 
information and trying to implement new strategies,” another said. Lack of information is a 
serious constraint: over and over again, I would hear of a piece of information members of the 
group lacked, or about the information they felt their community lacked. For example, one group 
member told me, “people must know where to get bursaries (scholarships). Because the 
government has bursaries, but people don’t know about such things. They finish school and they 
end up not doing anything. So if we have information, we could set up an information desk to 
help the community in our ward. If maybe a student finished matric, they could apply for a 
bursary and they know what to give to us, you know, all that stuff.” The possession of this 
information—which came through diligent study in a wide range of books, conversations with 
others, and the tutelage of wise pedagogues, found its aesthetic expression through the group’s 
forum theatre activities where they would impart their information to others. 
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Only rarely did the group discuss freedom or oppression as a matter of either local or 
national politics, though on one occasion, shortly after the death of Nelson Mandela, the group 
engaged in a spirited discussion of Mandela’s legacy. Although he had “fought for freedom,” 
some of them argued, he did not do so alone, and did not secure complete freedom for black 
South Africans at any rate. This freedom would find only limited articulation in the group’s 
activities; there did not seem to exist a deficiency to the extent that the group registered the 
political atmosphere as oppressive. In terms of local and national politics, the group stressed the 
importance of voting and of “keeping local leaders accountable,” but these virtues were not 
approached as matters of protest or agitation.  
Ultimately, the members of KFTG sought the freedom to imagine, occupy, and cultivate 
a particular subject position. The subject position in question is artist, although not of the kind 
that is oriented toward the public consumption of their product. The aesthetics of self they 
practice utilizes one art form—theatre—in the service of cultivation of self. Far from a self-help 
form of navel-gazing, this ideal self is a self that draws others into community, teaching and 
giving “information” about how to live life and how to move through an uncertain terrain. The 
constant rehearsals are rehearsals for life, and teaching others to rehearse in a similar way is 
secondary only to the work of forming the self. In this sense, KFTG leaves the theatre of Black 
Consciousness behind, or more accurately, pauses at the step of affirmation of self that the 
theatre of Black Consciousness takes for granted in the artist. The exercise of freedom in the 
shaping of an ethical self is the constant artistic project.   
This aesthetics of self transcends theatre. In Katlehong, a township approximately fifty 
kilometers Southeast of Soweto, I also saw it at work among students who were learning how to 
paint. Charlicks, their mentor and teacher, was a man deeply steeped in South Africa’s political 
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struggle, a former ANC guerilla fighter who had gone into exile with his comrades to fight from 
the other side of the border in Botswana. He had witnessed and fought against apartheid agents 
both at home and abroad. He had the perfect struggle pedigree. But he also felt like something 
was still missing, all these years after Mandela and the ANC had been governing the country. 
There still needed to be “an RDP for the mind.”24 His own art was a process of reconstructing 
and developing himself, and his pedagogy was a journey of doing the same for others, constantly 
incorporating lessons about how to live well as part of his artistic training regimen. The students 
of which he spoke most proudly weren’t necessarily those who had mastered painting 
techniques; they were those who proved most responsible, most diligent, most hardworking and 
most self-motivated.  
These shifts toward a politics of self-governance overlap and enfold the history that came 
before them. They are productively entangled in philosophies that demand artists play a role in 
the liberation of black consciousness, and respond to this demand through pedagogy. It would 
thus be simplistic and reductive to see the aesthetic politics of black artists like KFTG and 
Charlicks as a shift away from more communitarian concerns, the trampling of an indigenous 
ethic by an insidious neoliberal conception of the self. As the Comaroffs argue, the “praxis of 
self-construction” had long been a part of South African conceptions of personhood (2012, 55); 
the Tswana self was in a constant state of becoming, a process that always unfolded alongside 
and in relation to others. If anything, the shift toward an aesthetics of the government of self is a 
shift back toward, or a reclaiming of, these traditions. The liberation of their own consciousness, 
                                                          
24 South Africa’s “Reconstruction and Development Programme” was a sweeping economic policy framework 
enacted by the ANC in 1994 after apartheid, aimed at de-segregating and de-racializing the economy among other 
things. The RDP did bring some benefits to many Black South Africans—many of my informants, for instance, 
lived in houses provided through the RDP. Charlicks’s assertion of the need for an “RDP for the mind” suggests the 
need for further epistemic and ethical revolution.  
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and the spaces that need to be cleared for that work of liberation, are ongoing even as they help 
others.  
KFTG participates in a broader aesthetics of freedom that transcends Forum Theatre and 
reaches beyond Soweto. It is also at play in elite spaces, where training and technique form part 
of a broader professionalization in the course of an undergraduate degree. In these spaces, a 
much different process of liberation unfolds. As in Soweto, it also casts a sideways glance at 
conventional politics. It does so to focus on the liberation of bodies in particular, and aims at a 
new perceptual politics that would overthrow dominant conceptions of the body in movement. It 
is to this (primarily white) space, 970 kilometers to the South of Soweto, that I turn next.  
 
Revolting Bodies: The Aesthetics and Politics of Physical Theatre   
Bodies in Motion at The University Currently Known as Rhodes  
 Prior to being in Grahamstown as an anthropologist, my visits there had revolved around 
the annual National Arts Festival, the largest arts festival in the Southern hemisphere and second 
only to Edinburgh globally. The National Arts Festival, which typically lasts ten days in late 
June and early July, is a time when the town is buzzing with liminoid spaces of theatre, dance, 
music, and visual art. Churches become restaurants, restaurants become gallery spaces, gallery 
spaces become venues for performance, and well over 200,000 people descend on the city, easily 
doubling its normal population. The surge of energy and excitement floods the streets with 
people, whether during the day or at night, regardless of the cold winter weather.  
 Outside of festival season, there is an understated vibrancy to Grahamstown; a pulse that 
beats, in many ways, around the infrastructure of the UCKAR and its seasons. People flow in 
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and out of High Street with the tides of the academic day, and coffee shops are filled with 
pensive and worried faces as exams draw near. On the weekends, the bars are filled with students 
and a few stalwart locals, and it was typical of a weekend night to hear any number of 80s rock 
ballads being drunkenly slurred out from the balcony of taverns like the Rat and Parrot. That, of 
course, is the weekend. Grahamstown is an undeniably more quiet city than the burgeoning 
metropolis of Johannesburg that I left as I transitioned to a new site.  
 My primary activities in Grahamstown were all related, directly or indirectly, to the 
Department of Drama where I embedded myself as an ethnographic researcher. I attended 
workshops and lectures, gave one or two of my own, interviewed faculty and students, and 
frequently observed rehearsals and performances in varying stages of production. It was at 
Rhodes Drama that I would encounter, primarily through interviews with Juanita Finestone-
Praeg (head of the department and artistic director of First Physical Theatre Company) and 
observations of her students, the practice of physical theatre: a hybrid of dance and theatre that 
seeks to radically reconfigure conceptions of the body in movement. 
 My ethnographic encounters with physical theatre at the UCKAR and the fieldnotes 
derived from them are, in retrospect, confounding and inadequate for the production of anything 
that would approach “thick description.” I never attempted to characterize, record, or describe 
the movements that I was seeing in rehearsals, nor did I pay much attention to how they were 
constructed or how they were put together. The primary reason for this profound absence of data 
is that I had not been exposed to physical theatre in any depth prior to visiting the UCKAR. 
When I first attended rehearsals and then performances of Hunger, directed by the UCKAR alum 
Acty Tang, the choreography I saw had no immediate meaning to me. I generally could not 
determine whether movements were executed with skill or horribly botched, or whether a 
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particular actor was a novice or in a more accelerated position relative to the skills he or she was 
deploying. Movement simply happened; it unfolded with a rapidity that resisted my attempts at 
description, especially given the fact that different movements unfolded between different pairs 
of actors throughout the staging area.   
All that I took with me from rehearsals were descriptions of the social environment of the 
rehearsal space. I focused on the director, Acty Tang, who was soft-spoken but confident about 
his vision, and the ways in which he attempted to realize that vision through the movements of 
the students. I also closely watched the students as they worked with Tang and with each other. 
My notes included the interactions between a pair of students who I knew to be romantically 
involved with each other, and the ways that they lovingly touched and tugged at each other’s 
clothing. Of their choreographic steps, which included moments of jumping toward and away 
from each other, I could only 
surmise the depiction of a kind 
of back and forth dynamic that 
seems in turns antagonistic and 
loving. I was left with little or 
no description of actual 
physical movements, or the 
ways that different movements 
of the body are ordered into a 
particular syntax to make a 
series of embodied statements. My notes don’t seem to do much work. My photographs are 
blurry and indeterminate.  
Rehearsals for Hunger at the UCKAR, May 2014 
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 I was unprepared to understand the aesthetics or politics of physical theatre at the time. 
There is nonetheless something appropriate about my pronounced lack of data on the movements 
of physical theatre. Supposing I had filmed parts of a performance or rehearsal and watched it 
studiously frame by frame, I still do not know that I would have gotten anything of relevance. 
“The group jogs in a circle with their knees slightly bent, their heads looking down, their palms 
to the ground,” I might write, or “one woman takes a slouching step outward, grabs her partner’s 
shirt, and quickly turns away.” These statements in themselves would not communicate anything 
important, especially when the genre itself occupies, as one informant told me, “that place where 
language has failed and the body steps in.” Physical theatre is a non-cognitive theatre; its 
performative currency is not mimesis but affect.   
In what follows, I draw on ethnographic encounters with physical theatre at the UCKAR 
to present this genre as a particularly corporeal form of artistic expertise that works to center the 
body rather than the mind as the locus of creativity and action. I approach Physical Theatre 
through the lens of expertise (Abbot 1988; Boyer 2005, 2008, 2010) partly to focus on the 
historical constitution of Physical Theatre in South Africa as an artistic profession and as a mode 
of research, both of which are activities through which some of my primary interlocutors at 
UCKAR drew their salary and worked toward degrees. At the same time, there are compelling 
analytic reasons for thinking about physical theatre through the lens of embodied expertise. In 
his work on journalists in Germany, Boyer (2005) argues that attention to embodied expertise 
productively complicates easy distinctions between physical and mental forms of labor. 
Intellectuals—and the anthropologists who study them—often construe expertise as a 
disembodied act, and think of the body as a passive instrument or conduit of mental labor. In 
moments of anxiety, however, the body emerges as a site of “alternative media for the expression 
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of critical knowledge of social relations” (2005, 244).25 The expertise of Physical Theatre is 
compelling for the ways in which it proceeds from the opposite direction, privileging the body as 
the primary site of meaning and critical knowledge. At the same time, as I show throughout, 
many of the anxieties of Physical Theatre practitioners come not through embodied moments, 
but instead in the attempt to frame the significance of Physical Theatre in cognitive terms to 
others.   
The object of Physical Theatre’s expertise—its form of work and its epistemic 
jurisdiction26—consists partly in the cultivation of embodied knowledge through movement. 
More specifically, it stresses the development of excellence in bodily articulation and expression, 
without explicit reference to spoken dialogue, in ways that allow it to become a critical form of 
commentary about the world. This articulation of Physical Theatre’s expertise is admittedly 
provisional and sketchy, but will become more clear through the rest of the section. Importantly, 
Physical Theatre’s constitution as a mode of artistic expertise in South Africa came in the closing 
years of apartheid. Its impetus is deconstructive, and the objects of its deconstruction are the 
bodily residues of apartheid: not only the conceptions of race, gender, sexuality that were 
predicated of bodies, but their entanglement with aesthetic judgements of beauty, delicacy, 
frailty, and strength. There is an ethical project at the core of Physical Theatre’s particular form 
of expertise, and this ethics also mediates a particular relationship to the political.    
 
                                                          
25 See also Marcus and Holmes 2005.  
26  Here I follow Abbot (1988), who delineates domains of expertise in terms of epistemic jurisdiction. This 
conception also figures centrally in chapter three.   
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South African Physical Theatre Expertise  
 Physical Theatre is less of a genre than an umbrella term that covers a wide range of 
performance-based practices, from dance, theatre, clowning, and mime among others. Its 
precedents and lineages are legion: Physical Theatre has been traced to the theatre of Jacques 
Lecoq in France as well as Grotowski and Artaud, but also located in the rituals of ancient 
Greece and Japanese Butoh (Murray and Keefe 2007). While generally scholars who dare to 
offer a definition do so only in the broadest of terms, the physical of Physical Theatre does 
furnish some clues about the features such diverse practices share. Robyn Sassen (2015), for 
instance, argues that “when two men evoke a natural birth onstage armed only with a 
watermelon, in such a way that all the blood, drama, and trauma of this biological event become 
indelibly seared into an audience’s collective memory, that is physical theatre” (Sassen 2015, 
77). While Murray and Keefe (2007) find the concept to be overused, nebulous, and difficult to 
characterize, they likewise take note of Physical Theatre as “a distancing strategy from a range of 
theatre practices that are…outmoded and laboriously word based. To be physical is to be sexy,” 
they comment wryly, “and to resist the dead hand of an overly intellectual or cerebral approach 
to theatre making” (2007, 13). Callery (2001), meanwhile, offers a more precise (but still quite 
broad) definition: Physical Theatre “is theatre where the primary means of creation occurs 
through the body rather than through the mind. In other words, the somatic impulse is privileged 
over the cerebral in the making process” (2001, 4). This challenge to the dominance of verbally-
driven theatre is what makes Physical Theatre physical (Coetzee and Munroe 2010, 11); its 
narratives and their significance stem from the movements of bodies rather than the spoken word 
and are to be felt by audiences rather than rationalized.   
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 Physical Theatre can be distinguished more concretely by its processes of production. 
Most scholars indeed seem to agree that “the key line of distinction between the range and nature 
of physical actions within text-based theatre, and those forms we might with some confidence 
label as ‘physical theatre,’ lies around notions of authorship, authority and the creative role of the 
actor/performer” (Murray and Keefe 2007, 17). While Physical Theatre does not preclude the use 
of a text or script, works are, more often than not, “devised” by groups of actors and a director 
working together to generate or interpret content. A thoroughgoing deconstruction of the 
“passive, ‘docile’ body awaiting the instructions of the teacher-choreographer-god” (Finestone-
Praeg 2011, 37), Physical Theatre is thus marked by democratized processes of artistic 
production and conception.  
 South African Physical Theatre as practiced at UCKAR and other South African 
universities is a more concrete domain of expertise with a more defined historical trajectory and 
more discernable features. Among its chief progenitors is Gary Gordon, whose training includes 
a Cecchetti Ballet qualification and a Masters in choreography from the prestigious Laban Centre 
for Movement and Dance in London. Gordon “brought the latest European physical theatre style 
with him” as he founded the First Physical Theatre Company at the UCKAR in 1993 (Sichel 
2010, 42). Gordon and First Physical’s brand of Physical Theatre, a collision between avant-
garde theatre and avant-garde dance, was certainly the dominant form of Physical Theatre at the 
UCKAR during my fieldwork. At its inception during the years of transition from apartheid, First 
Physical and similar companies staged revolutions in theatre and dance that would stretch the 
64 
 
 
boundaries of both in South Africa, and wrestle with newly available freedoms in the aesthetics 
and production of performance.27  
 For both Juanita (Finestone-Praeg 2011) and Gary Gordon (Frege 1995), Physical 
Theatre is, in the questions that it poses, an intensely political genre. Like KFTG, though, its 
politics sit at arm’s length from conventional political questions of governance, parties, elections, 
and “service delivery.” Drawing on Kristeva (2002), Kershaw (1999), and others, Juanita makes 
the case for Physical Theatre as an “intimate revolt” that “continually rehearses its freedom from 
the perceptual politics of traditional dance representations. In this way,” she argues, “it 
continually performs difference; liberating difference and opening up a space for difference to 
revolt; to perpetually be revolting” (Finestone-Praeg 2011, 22). This revolt, for Juanita and Gary 
Gordon, is simultaneously aesthetic and political, carrying the possibility for newfound freedoms 
for bodies, perception, and representation more broadly. It had, and continues to have, 
implications for performance as well as artistic production.   
 A key intervention of Physical Theatre was the inauguration of a shift in the bodily 
politics of dance, primarily around the ideal body and shape of the dancer. The aesthetics of 
dance in South Africa had previously rested on the virtuosity, delicacy, and fragility of the (thin) 
white female body, moving in prescribed classical Western form and carried by the strength of 
the male dancer (Sichel 2011). In response to these fragile/feminine and strong/masculine bodies, 
Physical Theatre in South Africa, according to Juanita, brought about:  
                                                          
27 Other streams of physical theatre are certainly present in South Africa and the UCKAR in particular: the 
descendants of Lecoq’s Theatre de Complicité—Sylvaine Strike, Jennie Reznek from the Magnet, Andrew 
Buckland, and Rob Murray and others are frequently included within this tradition as well. 
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“A subversion of the official ideal of the dancing body. For one, the ages of the 
performers has ranged from 18 to 75 years of age, contesting the dominant expectation of 
the dancing body as young, nubile and mobile. Furthermore, there is often no distinction 
between the vocabulary of the male and female dancers: both genders are capable of an 
athletic flexibility and strength, both are seasoned in the art of lifting and catching” 
(Finestone 1995:71). 
This subversion of gender roles in dance was an integral part of Physical Theatre’s impetus. Gary 
Gordon agrees with Juanita that the intervention was not only directed at ideals around female 
bodies but also male ones: “They see our treatment of women in particular as quite different,” he 
noted of responses to First Physical Theatre company, “although I think it’s our treatment of 
women and men, because as much as women do the supporting and sharing of weight, the 
carrying, they have another kind of strength and that’s what we’ve been investigating. In the 
same way you’re also allowing men to be sensitive, vulnerable, and delicate” (Frege 1995, 99). 
In contrast, then, to the petite female dancer being hoisted and carried by masculine strength, 
Gordon’s choreography in particular would turn this dynamic on its head, making women icons 
of strength and showcasing male vulnerability. 
 Some of Gordon’s works, Shattered Windows in particular, would work to completely 
efface gender within the spectacle of performance. As I sat with Juanita in her office, she 
remembered her performance in the work, the range of body types in the performance, and the 
mixed reception it got from audiences:  
“I recall when we performed it for the first time—I think it was in ‘94—I think people 
just thought we were this bunch of Amazons from hell. The men and women all looked 
the same. We all had this long hair with clay, these black, distressed dresses, Gary always 
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went with a very unusual look. Really veering strongly away from the unison core, all 
dancers must look like dancers. We had tall people, short people, big people, small 
people, men and women, you couldn’t tell who was who. I remember that first Dance 
Umbrella [festival] we went to, the horror and people going ‘What are they doing?’” 
“Nostalgia” would not be the right word to use for Juanita’s memories of performing in 
Shattered Windows. She has performed in the work three times, each performance coming years 
apart. Of her most recent performance in 2003, she writes that her “39 year old body again 
revisited this site of questioning—although this time I knew that if I did one of those Gordon 
polar bear dives through one of the empty doorways, I would be permanently shattered.” This 
didn’t stop her from doing so, she goes on to say. “The gender confusion of dancers in 
decomposing dresses worn by both male and female performers … long hair, bald heads and 
exposed body parts smeared with wet clay which gradually flaked off leaving in its wake an 
ashen trail of dust on the nice clean floors of the theatres we performed in,” continues to raise a 
significant question for her: “is this dancing?” (2011, 25).  
 To declare that Shattered Windows is indeed dancing is part of what Juanita has in mind 
by the “bodily revolt” of Physical Theatre. Her reflections on Shattered Windows point not only 
to Physical Theatre’s revolt toward the politics of gender but also more broadly at its politics of 
representation. The indeterminacy of immediate and obvious meaning and its “insistence on 
experimenting with traditional narrative structures” (Finestone-Praeg 2011, 37) causes no small 
amount of confusion and annoyance for many audience members. Juanita writes that she is 
“often confronted by people who find Physical Theatre obscure and want to know…what does it 
mean?” to which she responds: “when you listen to a Beethoven string quartet, do you ask 
yourself: But what does it mean? Of course not. That would be inappropriate; a fundamental 
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confusion of sorts. A confusion that assumes that all art should respond to the criteria of logical, 
rational and even narrative structure of meaning” (2011, 26). As I interviewed Juanita, she 
explained further: “You don’t always have to know what everything means in a logical, linear 
way, you know? Just allow yourself, in the same way that you would allow music, to penetrate 
and infiltrate you at many levels. Allow the body to just speak.”  
 The body in Physical Theatre does speak, if one listens in the right sorts of ways. Hunger, 
for example, was an intensely political work, and much of the content, Acty Tang admits in the 
program, comes from his reading of South African headlines while abroad. Stories of the 
Marikana Massacre28 and the Nkandla scandal in particular were apparent through contrasting 
scenes of mass death and grotesque luxury. Not that any of this comes out in a straightforward 
way. It is a work of protest with no verbal polemics (and little verbal content in general) and, in 
the end, not even necessarily about South Africa as such. “I’m sure that each audience member 
can readily substitute [South African events] for recent images from different countries,” Tang 
argues in the program. As I saw Hunger unfold across two performances, bodies told me of 
anger, despair, reckless abandon, austerity and excess against the backdrop of a society in turns 
spurning and embracing its elites. Elaborate costuming, staging, and music added layers of 
meaning, but the presence established by bodies moving on stage was how the meaning fully 
emerged.  
 
                                                          
28 On August 16, 2012, the South African Police Service fatally shot thirty-four striking miners, and wounded 
seventy-eight more in an event that has since been labeled “the Marikana Massacre.” The massacre has been likened 
to other (apartheid-era) instances of state violence, including massacres at Sharpeville in 1961 and Soweto in 1976. 
Of course, it is now the ANC rather than the National Party wielding the coercive force of the state.     
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 In addition to subverting representational forms of dance and theatre, Physical Theatre is 
also a revolt against the politics of production that would situate the choreographer or director as 
the sole authority. It is, in many ways, a fitting post-apartheid performance form: after decades of 
the state speaking on behalf of bodies, categorizing them, classifying them, excluding or 
including them, inscribing history and memory onto their surfaces and interiors (Fassin 2008), 
Physical Theatre’s processes of production allow each artist to devise their own bodily 
contributions and shape the work within a collective. “Sometimes you have a script, but how you 
manifest that is a devised process,” Juanita told me. Physical Theatre’s devised processes of 
production mean that “each performer express[es] personal and experiential knowledge through 
the moving body,” (Sassen 2015, 90), and this knowledge issues from each performer’s own 
personal history, “intimate idiosyncrasies and bodily gestures” (Finestone-Praeg 2011, 37). 
Training in Physical Theatre is not about learning prescribed forms but learning how to research 
one’s own body and movements in order to contribute to processes of devising, creation, and 
ultimately, performance. 
 Physical Theatre and its attendant forms of production, pedagogy, and professionalization 
thus open the floodgates, allowing a full range of bodies and personalities to participate in its 
unconventional forms of dancing. A series of what Anton Krueger (2011) calls “experiments in 
freedom,” Physical Theatre agitates consistently for the freedom to chart new aesthetic terrains 
and imagine and inhabit new subject positions through performance. This form of freedom draws 
unconventional students to the UCKAR’s department of drama, one of whom is named Ester.    
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Ester is Awkward  
Ester is not a “good” dancer. Her movements do not 
have grace and flow; they are not aesthetically beautiful. 
The sequences she choreographs and directs with her casts 
are bizarre. The performances she directed on the UCKAR 
campus and in Grahamstown more broadly provoked 
mostly confusion and laughter. Ester is, in a word, 
awkward. Yet I don’t think she would mind my saying so, 
primarily because this (bodily) awkwardness is a key part 
of her signature style. While not a dancer in any 
conventional sense, Ester carved out a space for herself as a 
Master’s (and now PhD) student studying dance and 
choreography at in the department. Ester worked hard to be 
awkward; to excel at it. She was reflexive about this awkwardness, and speculated on it at length 
in ways that are deeply philosophical. Through the subversion and deconstruction of dance, I saw 
her design and perform work that would open up spaces of freedom for herself, other performers, 
and audiences, living out the kind of bodily revolt that Juanita champions as part of the legacy of 
Physical Theatre at the UCKAR.  
 As a student at the UCKAR, Ester has charted a winding and uneven trajectory through 
the years, punctuated by moments of uncertainty about herself and, ultimately, a return to the 
dynamics of her own bodily forms of movement. As she moved through the undergraduate 
program, Ester became increasingly interested in dance and physical theatre, but remembers 
being a miserable dancer. She was continuously put in the back row during workshops where no 
Ester taking pictures to promote a series 
of public performances. May, 2014. 
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one would be distracted by her complete lack of bodily precision, and wasn’t cast in anything she 
auditioned for. She persisted nonetheless, and went on to take an additional honors year to focus 
on dance more intensively. 
 Ester is convinced that the drama department at the UCKAR is the only program that 
would allow her to pursue dance in spite of her deficiencies as a dancer. While other students had 
backgrounds in ballet, or at the very least, some form of contemporary dance, Ester had come to 
the program as an actor. “Somebody like me with no dance experience and no dance training 
would never have been allowed into an honors choreography course. It’s just unheard of,” she 
explained. Nonetheless, in an audition before the faculty, she managed to convince them that 
there was something worthwhile and interesting about the types of questions she could pose with 
her body:    
“I based my choreography audition on “Where’s Waldo?” I borrowed stripy clothes from 
friends and did a dance on what happens to Waldo when the book is closed. The dancing 
wasn’t so great, but what they liked was the idea. They were like, ‘this is funny, and 
you’re doing a weird and interesting thing.’ Lots of people were doing heart-wrenching 
serious things, and they said ‘it’s nice to sometimes see something funny.’ And that’s the 
big thing that they said to me after the audition: ‘there’s something interesting happening. 
It’s funny because of rhythm and because your body is a little bit awkward in some of the 
dancing. But it’s really funny.’ And they were like, ‘we certainly think you should be in 
choreography because there’s something interesting there.’” 
The cultivation of this humorous and interesting aesthetics of the awkward was her task as an 
honors student, the reason she was admitted into the choreography program. 
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 Developing this style and choreographing it were not always easy for Ester, and she 
required some pushing from faculty at times. For a period of time after beginning the honors 
course in choreography, Ester began to veer away from humor, feeling that she needed to make 
more serious choreography. She increasingly choreographed “serious things, thinking I must be 
serious and have a serious theme,” and feeling pressure to be a more conventional 
choreographer. It didn’t go well for her. “I had showings that were disasters,” she said. “It was 
horrible and horrible and horrible and horrible.” Eventually, Ester told me, Juanita intervened, 
telling her that she was moving in the wrong direction. Juanita recalled this conversation as a 
pivotal one for Ester: “it has been very interesting with Ester. The difference between last year 
and this year. I remember at the end of last year saying ‘just go back to your own body. You did 
interesting things last year, but I can intuit that they are not your choreographic strength. The 
place that I saw as an undergrad; those little sparks. That wit. The way is to go back to your own 
body.’” While lots of other dancing teachers would have expected “big, incredible dancing” from 
students, Ester felt gratitude that Juanita has encouraged her to play to her strengths.  
Ester clearly took Juanita’s advice: the performances and showings I observed were 
evidence of her growing confidence in her careful deconstructions of dance. Unwilling to be 
contained in traditional spaces of performance, Ester, during the time I spent with her, was 
determined to invade public spaces with spontaneous explosions of performance that were, in 
turns, confusing and humorous for audiences.   
One afternoon, I accompanied Ester and other students from the department to witness a 
“flash mob” performance that would take place unannounced just outside the library. We 
marched a few blocks over from the drama building, and at the appointed time, Ester cued the 
music: a slow, whimsical, and pensive classical piece, driven by piano and violins. The song 
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grew louder, and 
students passing by 
began to look on with 
confusion as the 
ensemble of dancers 
took their place. They 
began dancing—not 
slowly or gracefully, 
but instead with a 
violence and sexual 
energy that would be far 
more appropriate for a dance club: thrusting hips, bent knees, arms above their heads. Their 
movements were not, in any obvious sense, the products of careful technique and training. “Is 
this drama or something? What’s going on?” one man asked. Others simply looked on with mild 
disgust. It wasn’t even good dancing, and didn’t sync up with the music anyway. Gradually, 
though, students began to enjoy and laugh at the incongruity of the music with the ridiculous and 
hyperbolically sexualized dance moves. They applauded wildly as the music abruptly stopped 
and the cast marched off in unison, not saying anything to anyone and marching back to the 
drama building. 
In her awkwardness and the awkwardness she drew out of her collaborators in this 
performance and others, Ester pushed the limits of dance and choreography. She also hoped to 
challenge the boundaries of where and when performance could occur, and subvert the aura of 
polite theatre etiquette that haunts traditional spaces of performance. In a theatre space, she 
Moves like this were characteristic of Ester's choreographic style. May, 2014. 
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explained, it’s expected that the audience will be quiet, polite, and composed. As a performer, 
“you are pretty safe and can do whatever you want. You can scream at them, you can throw 
things at them, you can ignore them, and they’re always just going to sit and take it.” By 
contrast, public performances of the kind she was carrying out unfold in a radically different 
space. Here, “the audience can keep talking if they want. And they can laugh at you. And they 
can take out their phones and film it… They haven’t come into our territory; we are out in the 
public world where they are in charge. And they could actually go ‘this sucks’ in the middle of 
your dance. Because they can do whatever they want.” This, of course, makes it harder for 
performers, Ester explained. They have to work harder to earn attention and any kind of positive 
response, which is never guaranteed.  
 Such performances, then, are a revolt on multiple fronts: against conventions of what 
choreographed movement should look like, against spaces of complacency for performers, and 
against structures of constraint for audiences. More fundamentally, these environments of risk 
and bodily vulnerability are the staging ground of an ethics of freedom for Ester; the places 
where she finds the challenges that push her toward a greater sense of “presence” as a performer. 
They produce “a different kind of energy” and force higher levels of commitment. As she told 
me about her first public performance at the National Arts Festival, in which she was supposed 
to generate publicity for a larger performance, Ester remembered how her and another student: 
“Were like, in these weird nighties. It was so cold, and we had bare feet. It was a bunch of 
drunk dudes and some school kids who are like ‘what are you doing, crazy baby?’ And it was 
so hard. We were not allowed to talk. So we had bottles of water and we were like blowing in 
them and making sounds and doing some of the dancing that we do in the piece and running 
after people. And it was so scary. But you are so aware and so in character—because you 
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can’t do that if you’re not in character. Friends would try and talk to you…If you’re not 
100% in character, then the thing falls apart. You’re just so exposed. So it was very scary, 
but there was something really cool about that. I think that’s my interest in bringing some of 
this performance stuff into the public. That idea that you’re so scared as a performer but that 
that’s a good thing. It brings out something else. And I think I saw in the cast that it brings 
out a different kind of commitment.”  
Cultivating this performative commitment for herself and her cast was the reason behind her 
public performances on campus and, ultimately, in a local sports bar one weekend. She reveled 
in putting her body and her ideas about dance and choreography into the world, not enveloped in 
the safety of the department where they could be understood within the context of what Lehmann 
(2006) calls “post-dramatic theatre” but out on the streets and in pubs where she ran the risk of 
being openly mocked and not taken seriously. With the awkwardness of her body (and other 
bodies) on full display, she found the freedom to continually develop as a rather unconventional 
choreographer.  
Physical Theatre and (White?) Political Aesthetics      
 Ester’s ethics of vulnerability and awkwardness and her trajectory as an artist are, 
ultimately, the unique product of drama at the UCKAR, part of a series of small revolts the 
department gives rise to on a regular basis. These revolts are obviously not political in any 
conventional sense. Even Hunger, which did venture to comment in its own ethereal way on 
predicaments of power in South Africa and elsewhere, left meaning as an open question of 
reception—it could plausibly be about South Africa, but it could plausibly be about someplace 
else. Physical Theatre’s politics of revolt take place largely in the realm of aesthetics: issues of 
production, representation, and reception. 
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 These revolts, at the same time, cannot help but carry implications that ripple outward. 
The work of making space for new bodies, new forms of movement, and new forms of 
knowledge rooted in the body are exactly what Juanita, drawing on Kershaw, has in mind by 
“radical performance.” Truly radical performance, Kershaw argues, does not merely involve 
transgression against but also the opening of spaces for new things, ultimately working toward 
the “freedom to create currently unimaginable forms of association and action—the transgressive 
or transcendent sense of the radical” (1999, 18). Bodies that once wouldn’t be allowed to access 
the sphere of dance performance are legitimized, and the possibilities of movement and 
articulation with these bodies have been radically extended across a range of ability. There is 
certainly a space within the UCKAR for students with strong backgrounds in dance to master 
choreographic technique and subtly extend established lineages through new, sophisticated 
explorations in movement, like a jazz musician learning the rules in order to bend them. There is 
also room, though, for an Ester. More of a punk rocker than a jazz musician, her aesthetics 
constitute an assault on choreographic conventions, and her body demands recognition—ideally 
as a way of thinking through the power dynamics she works to deconstruct—but even if only to 
laugh at her.  
 The lack of any formalized and institutional “South African Physical Theatre” 
aesthetic—which is exactly what opens space for those like Ester—is deliberate. It is also where 
Physical Theatre most concretely interfaces with South African politics, and more specifically, 
the history of apartheid. The necessity of agitating against a national dance aesthetic was indeed 
the thrust of Juanita’s Master’s thesis, which argued that an uncritical attempt at creating a 
“national” dance aesthetic after apartheid would run the serious risk of reproducing the 
foundational logics upon which apartheid-era aesthetics was premised: absolute knowledge of 
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bodies and prescriptions of the artistic forms they ought to take (1995, iii). Gary Gordon is 
similarly hesitant to seek out, identify, or construct a particular form as the dominant “South 
African” flavor of Physical Theatre. “I know people are looking for a South African aesthetic,” 
he admits. “I don’t know what it is. Is it me as a white South African or is it Boyzie Cekwana 
who’s a black man in ballet?...I, myself, as a choreographer, wouldn’t strive to be South 
African—you can also be quite fascist!” (1995, 101). The only constant features are those found 
in pedagogical processes and in production, which always aim at eliciting the contributions of 
each artist on their own terms.  
 For all its revolutionary discourse and democratizing impulses, there is, nonetheless, 
something undeniably white about South African Physical Theatre. This is not to say that all 
Physical Theatre artists are white, but that its normative aesthetics and the institutions that house 
them are recognizably white. Various passing comments in scholarly literature seem to 
substantiate this whiteness. Sichell (2010), for instance, notes that Shattered Windows, “which 
grabbed wider attention at the 1994 FNB Dance Umbrella, just weeks before the first democratic 
elections, was an outpouring of white angst and desperation to survive against the looming 
catastrophic odds” (Sichell 2010, 42, emphasis mine). It would be far too reductive and 
uncharitable to read in Sichell the suggestion that Shattered Windows was primarily a work about 
the white will to survive in a now hostile and apocalyptic post-apartheid landscape. Her 
comments are nonetheless interesting for the way they suggest that, racially speaking, Shattered 
Windows may not have accomplished the erasures of identity that Juanita recalled. A comment 
from Sassen’s (2015) explication of South African Physical Theatre is, while likely 
unintentional, interesting for similar reasons: “A number of key names are emerging with 
alacrity and a fierce sense of muscularity on the theatre circuit,” she writes. “They are white, they 
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are aggressively creative, they are fueled by enthusiasm for everything from Shakespeare to Paul 
Callico, and they are making important new Physical Theatre” (Sassen 2015, 82, emphasis 
mine). The whiteness of Physical Theatre floats just under the surface in these and other critical 
reviews. 
 Beyond scattered remarks that (intentionally or unintentionally) expose the whiteness of 
Physical Theatre, its whiteness is apparent for a number of other reasons. Its lineages, by and 
large, stem from European dance and avant-garde theatre traditions: one needs facility in Artaud 
and Grotowski, Lecoq and Lehmann to fully comprehend its interventions. It is created almost 
exclusively at elite (and formerly racially restricted) universities like the UCKAR and the 
University of Cape Town. Its audiences, by and large, are comprised of those who possess what 
Antrobus and Snowball (2010) call “omnivorous” taste (2010, 338): they are more highly 
educated, have higher than average income with higher-status jobs, and are more likely to 
appreciate Physical Theatre’s eclectic forms of presentation.29  
 There is an institutional whiteness to Physical Theatre that comes from its constitution as 
a form of artistic expertise and research, its situatedness within a broader intellectual division of 
labor in a historically white university (the UCKAR), its particular aesthetic lineage, and the 
direction from which it poses questions of South Africa’s apartheid past. This institutional 
whiteness does somewhat blunt its radical edge and democratizing potential. The subversion of 
the dancing body has indeed opened many doors, but artists may still need to walk through them 
into elite spaces of training and professionalization to learn the theory and technique that 
                                                          
29 These traits, of course, are not exclusive to white South Africans. But other studies by Antrobus and Snowball 
(e.g. 2006) have identified whites as the dominant racial demographic at the National Arts Festival (at 69%). White 
South Africans remain the dominant demographic of those with higher socioeconomic status and education levels 
more broadly, so we might expect to see whites as the dominant demographic within what Antrobus and Snowball 
call “omnivorous” consumers.   
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underpin its forms of bodily movement before critics begin to take notice of them. For now, elite 
and primarily white spaces remain the home for both training in and criticism of Physical 
Theatre.    
The Department of Drama at the UCKAR, for its part, does much to encourage and 
mentor its black and “coloured” students. One student in particular, Push, came to Rhodes on a 
bursary (scholarship), having been trained initially through workshops and public classes 
facilitated by the 
department. She has 
flourished at the 
UCKAR as a dancer, 
and, during my time 
there, delivered a 
stunning piece from 
atop Grahamstown’s 
“mountain of sins”: a 
hilltop rich with 
historical and 
spiritual significance for local Xhosa. It was here that the Xhosa assembled against the British in 
battle, and it is here today that religious groups continue to gather on the grounds to perform 
rituals. Push’s piece was deeply steeped in ritual and in a bloody colonial history. Herbs burned 
atop four separate fires, and ropes covered the ground, evoking the suicidal hangings of 
desperate Xhosa as the British closed in. Though other student performances would take place 
outside the university’s theatre spaces, the mountain of sins had a charged energy that demanded 
Push performing on the Mountain of Sins. May 2014. 
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recognition. “I feel like I’m invading someone else’s space,” one white woman told me. Not 
invading, perhaps—invited would be more accurate, as we were there to support Push—but the 
charged energy of the space was itself a challenge to the comfortable white spaces of the theatre.  
 Push continues to make visually stunning physical theatre. More recently, she created and 
performed Xeno, a careful deconstruction of xenophobia that critically questions notions of the 
foreign and the other through movement, text, and sound. The fuller integration of African 
bodies, cultural forms, and aesthetics is happening in Physical Theatre, albeit slowly, and still, it 
seems, unrecognized by those who currently write of the history and present of Physical Theatre 
in South Africa. The racial component of Physical Theatre’s revolt is ongoing. Like post-
Mandela South Africa more broadly, many nonwhite bodies are still fighting for freedom.    
Conclusion: The Ethics and Aesthetics of Process      
 I am fully aware that South African critics and artists may take issue with the ways in 
which I have racially characterized Physical Theatre. Were they anthropologists, they might 
accuse me of trying to “Crapanzano” them, a verb which derives from the pejorative 
characterizations that Crapanzano’s (1985) white informants (some of them academics) feel they 
received at his hands (Scheper-Hughes 2007). And I welcome arguments that prove me wrong, 
demonstrating that South African Physical Theatre, on both institutional and popular levels, truly 
is a genre that represents South African bodies and forms of movement in all of their fractured 
diversity.  
 My analysis here is not necessarily meant to critique South African whiteness more 
broadly, or the whiteness of elite theatre institutions in particular, although it does do both of 
those things. Supposing Physical Theatre is as white as I make it out to be, it makes the parallels 
80 
 
 
with black theatre groups like KFTG all the more interesting. They are from radically different 
sides of racial, economic, and aesthetic spectra. One is set in the bustling metropolitan locales of 
Soweto and Johannesburg, the other in a more rural and isolated university town. Nonetheless, 
the technologies of performance, for both KFTG and Physical Theatre at the UCKAR, are ethical 
ones. Both forms of theatre aim, in their own ways, at making these technologies of self 
available to others, democratizing performance and subverting the safe and hallowed space of the 
theatre. Each of them eschew conventional politics in favor of more intimate revolts toward the 
construction of new selves. They both work toward a teleology of the self through processes of 
artistic production, continually posing questions of self and others about what freedom means 
more than twenty years after the end of apartheid.  
The processual aesthetics of KFTG, First Physical Theatre Company, Charlicks, and a 
host of others is continuing to take shape in post-Mandela South Africa, a country for which 
“process” is indeed a fitting metaphor. Post-Mandela South Africa is processing, in more ways 
than one: processing the death of Mandela, and the status of his vision for a “new South Africa;” 
processing race, which continues to have implications for the kind of life one can imagine and 
enact; processing class, which more recently has led to the closure of multiple universities as 
students agitate for affordable or free university education; processing questions of ethics: how 
one ought to live in the entanglements of past that continues to haunt and fold in on the present. 
South Africa is processing, and South Africans have an uncanny reflexivity about this 
processing.  
To say that South Africa is processing is not the same as saying that it is developing. 
Development has a teleology that terminates somewhere, often in the ascription of “modernity” 
from those outside of places where “development” takes place (Ferguson 2006). Development 
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has a logic underpinned by technocratic epistemologies of expertise, which often work at odds 
with local understandings of need and progress (Rottenberg 2009). Development has an ethics 
that mutates and warps indigenous understandings of self (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997; 
Pandian 2012). Development in this sense is indeed taking place in South Africa, but to call 
South Africa a “developing” country is at odds with its status as Africa’s largest economy and 
the variety of ways in which, as the Comaroffs (2012) note, Euro-America is in fact evolving 
toward Africa. 
Processing does not presuppose momentum in any particular direction. It is circular and 
cyclical; a series of folds of past upon present; a web of entanglements (Mbembe 2001). The 
processing I have described here is also dialectical (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, 1997): the 
object that emerges from process is the product of a dialectic between what was and is and what 
could be. The self that emerges from an ethical process is the product of a dialectic between 
constraint and freedom. Theatre, in South Africa, not only gives representational form and 
content to this process but actively mediates its movement through moments of searching, 
creating, and becoming. The anthropologist, if lucky, can catch a glimpse of one iteration before 
the process continues.     
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Chapter 2 
Making Ends Meet: 
Kinship, Ethics, and Political Economy in South African Theatre 
 
  
Kinship Then and Now 
Cultural contact and the changing shape of South African society (and indeed, whether 
South Africa was a society at all)30 were central concerns of early-to-mid twentieth century 
British social anthropology in South Africa (Hunter 1936; Kridge 1936; Schapera 1928, 1933, 
1941). It seemed imperative—particularly prior to apartheid—to assess the impact of colonial 
contact on indigenous African ways of living and being in the world and to take stock of the 
revolution that modernity had wrought on South Africa (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, 1995). 
Of the British social anthropologists who studied the “phenomenon of change” in South Africa, 
Isaac Schapera was among the most exhaustive. Married Life in an African Tribe (1941) was 
written for a popular audience (although it still carried the social capital of a celebratory 
introduction by Malinowski) and was built upon a career forged in the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate. The work was, in many ways, a definitive statement that things had indeed changed 
a good deal for black South Africans as the result of contact with Europeans.  
 
                                                          
30 Within South African anthropology more generally, there was fierce debate about whether South Africa was a 
society at all. Kuper (2005) presents a comprehensive overview of the “Single Society” thesis advanced by William 
Miller Macmillan (1929, 1975), which found agreement in the work of Radcliffe-Brown, Schapera, Hunter, and a 
number of other South African social anthropologists. Afrikaner volkekundiges, committed as they were to the idea 
of separate cultures and groups, could never endorse such a position. Whether South Africa is a single society, for 
many of my informants, is again an open question. The broad relevance of the question is, I argue, another feature of 
a post-Mandela South Africa.   
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Schapera’s primary concern was the toll that colonial contact had taken on kinship. While 
social institutions built around kinship had not completely dissolved, he found that the family 
unit had lost much of its traditional role as the mediator of religion, economics, and sexuality. 
The greatest changes, Schapera argued, were economic ones. Families, once self-sustaining 
economic units, had begun to split apart like never before as family members increasingly left 
their reserves in the Bechuanaland Protectorate to seek work in cities and on farms. Whether it 
was to pay the steadily growing taxes levied by the colonial British administration or to be able 
to buy luxury goods that could not be produced at home, making ends meet increasingly required 
more family members to leave home to seek paid employment.  
South Africa’s history of labor migration is well known and continues to be an 
anthropological ground zero for studies of sexuality (Akileswaran and Lurrie 2010), HIV/AIDS 
(Hunter 2006), violence (Sichone 2008), and ritual (White 2001). Yet even before apartheid’s 
installation, Schapera was perceptive enough to notice the strain that economic changes were 
placing on African forms of kinship. Family members—male or female, young or old—were 
leaving homes on the rural reserves in droves, greatly reducing the number of kin available to 
work the land and maintain property. Families grew more disparate from each other, and one 
could not count on the assistance of a father, son, uncle, or aunt in the same sorts of ways as 
before. 
Post-Mandela South Africa, like the postcolony more generally, is a time of 
entanglements; simultaneous trajectories of progression and regression that are not the result of 
rupture but rather continuity (Comaroff and Comaroff 1995, 2010; Mbembe 2001). Kinship 
remains a “besieged domain of moral life and cultivated personhood,” (White 2001:458), 
particularly as the prospects of employment have greatly diminished since the end of apartheid 
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(Niehaus 2014). Parents still leave children with grandparents to work, either locally or further 
afield, and it is common for fathers to live separately from their children, even if in the same 
town. Among my black South African interlocutors there was a spectrum of ambivalence 
regarding family—some never saw their fathers and mothers and did not live with them, some 
spoke regularly with fathers who lived separately from the family and only provided token 
support, some had left their families altogether. It is thus understandable why other intimations 
of kinship—sending the youngest of a friend group on a beer run; the friendly address of “baba,” 
“sisi” or “auntie” to older adults—plays such an important role.  
This chapter examines the entanglements between kinship, political economy, and South 
African theatre. There are compelling reasons for examining kinship in this context. First and 
foremost, theatre is a space of community, characterized by alliances and bonds that have all the 
characteristics of kinship. Even where not explicitly identified as kinship relations (e.g. referring 
and relating to someone formally as ‘father’) or near-kinship relations (e.g. “the cast are like my 
brothers and sisters”), many of the artists I engaged in my fieldwork were kin to each other in 
substantive ways. They spent time living together, growing together, shaping themselves and 
their group together, and learning together what it means to be, among other things, a 
professional artist. Theater, then, is a space in which kinship is taken extremely seriously and as 
something that is morally binding.  
Second—and consistent with one of the broader arguments of this work as a whole—the 
theatre industry is an economic, social, cultural, and political microcosm of South Africa. It is 
subject to the same tensions over issues of race, class, gender, and ethnicity. Economically, it is 
supported to a significant extent through government agencies, and the money is distributed by 
networks of politically-connected bureaucrats with the same susceptibility to nepotism and 
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corruption as any of their counterparts in the Department of Home Affairs or the Department of 
Basic Education. The stakes are admittedly smaller in terms of who is impacted by resource 
distribution, which makes the theatre industry, at least until this dissertation, relatively 
understudied. Yet the instantiations of broader cultural and social trends that could safely be 
called features of a post-Mandela South Africa are just as apparent in the theatre industry as they 
are anywhere, and perhaps more so. Artists are as reflexive a bunch as any anthropologist could 
hope to find, and broader racial, cultural, and political dynamics play themselves out not only 
onstage but behind the scenes.  
Alongside Schapera’s seminal analysis and more current analyses of kinship and political 
economy in South Africa (e.g. White 2001), the analysis I undertake in this chapter also draws 
precedent from critical reworkings of kinship that question distinctions between biological and 
social forms of kinship (Carsten 2004; Franklin 2001; Rodgers 2010; Strathern 1992) as well as 
accounts that fundamentally question the gulf between “fictive” kinship and kinship proper. For 
the latter accounts in particular, adoption has emerged as a process and act that unsettles not only 
classic anthropological approaches to kinship, but also their fundamentally Western and 
heteronormative bases (Carsten 2004; Howell 2001, 2006; McKee 2016; Weismantel 1995). Far 
from being an anomaly or exception that proves the rule, adoption demanded and continues to 
demand a re-tooling of conceptual frameworks for understanding and discussing kinship within 
anthropology. 
My affinity with these accounts has partly to do with the fact that the cases of kinship I 
discuss share certain features of adoption, though they differ qualitatively in interesting ways as 
well. More importantly, these examinations of kinship have been helpful in illuminating the 
crucial facets of ethical work that attend forms of kinship not rooted in consanguinity. Adoption 
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involves deliberate and conscientious processes of subjectivation that shape and transform both 
the adopter and the adoptee, expressed through a variety of rituals and symbolic actions (Howell 
2006). Forms of kinship rooted in adoption are established and sustained through long periods of 
consistent and deliberate care (Carsten 2004; Weston 1991), and can carry with them 
expectations of normative permanence (Faubion 2001b) that are just as binding as any form of 
kinship. They are entangled in dynamics of race and political economies, which constrain and 
also open up possibilities for new forms of kinship (Weismantel 1995). These forms of kinship, 
in short, are rich grounds for studies of ethics.  
In what follows, I examine two cases of kinship strained by economics. The first case is 
patrilineal in nature, urban in its setting, and ends at the barrel of a gun. The strain of living out 
the role of malume (the mother’s brother) in Soweto, I argue, led to the dissolution of a 
children’s theatre program, as the search for funding pushed two men to increasingly present 
themselves as entrepreneurs and small business owners. As they did so, the original impetus for 
their project—grounded in kinship and non-instrumental aesthetic aspirations—became more 
and more obscured. The second case—a confluence of matriarchy, race, aesthetics, and 
economics—showcases what I will call “ethical fatigue”: a state of resignation characterized by 
tenacious clinging to a subject position that seems to make one a worse person rather than a 
better one. Kinship, I argue, is ethically taxing and exhausting. Something keeps this particular 
mother doing her job. Something, I suggest toward the end of the chapter, keeps many South 
Africans engaged despite ethical fatigue. 
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The Mother’s Brother in Dobsonville, Soweto  
When I arrived in Dobsonville Extension Three in mid-October 2013, I was excited and 
ready to observe Forum Theatre performances by the Khulumani Forum Theatre Group (KFTG). 
During preliminary fieldwork in 2012, I found KFTG to be a hard-working and dedicated group 
of artists who took their training, rehearsal, and performance seriously. KFTG crafted 
performances that spoke to relevant issues in their community, while at the same time using 
forum theatre as a space for shaping themselves as individuals and as a broader ethical collective. 
The group was, in many ways, perfect for an investigation of how the aesthetic and the ethical 
converge in projects of self-formation, which was what I had set out to study.  
Upon my return to Dobsonville, I was thus rather surprised to learn that KFTG had been 
reduced to only two or three stalwart members from an original group of around fifteen. The 
group had lost crucial funding that had previously provided a small daily stipend as well as 
transportation money for the members to go to and from rehearsals. The latter was particularly 
important: the members of KFTG were from disparate and far-flung corners of Soweto, and 
would not be able to travel to rehearsals and performances without some assistance. The group’s 
future was uncertain with their funding gone; while they sought nonprofit status to be able to 
receive donations, they weren’t operating at nearly the same level they once were.  
The performance that I ended up seeing was indeed Forum Theatre, but was performed 
by children who were part of a group called Dobsonville Artistic Youth (DAY). The children 
(most of whom were from eight to twelve years old, although some were much younger) had 
created their own show, with the help of their mentors, and had chosen domestic violence as the 
subject they wanted to pursue and present to their community. The performance was indeed a 
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violent one. The husband and father relentlessly beat his wife and children, talked down to them, 
and dominated over them. In keeping with the principles of Forum Theatre, the play was 
performed in its entirety one time, which took approximately fifteen minutes. A discussion with 
the audience (who were also mostly children) followed the performance, and the facilitator asked 
them what ought to be changed about the work. When the children of the audience didn’t 
contribute much, a few of the adults stepped in and suggested changes instead. “The wife should 
fight back,” one woman said, and she was invited on stage to act out this alternative scenario. 
The children in the audience, watching attentively, began learning the types of engagement 
expected from a Forum Theatre performance as the adults began a complex discussion of 
domestic abuse and what responses might be appropriate. The performance, the result of many 
rehearsals and a lot of hard work for the children of DAY, was largely a success.  
DAY, I found out subsequently, is an after-school arts-enrichment program that teaches 
children theatre and dance after school each day and tutors them with homework assignments. At 
the same time, DAY is more than merely an after-school program. With its emphasis on Theatre 
of the Oppressed and mentorship for children, DAY is also a pedagogical space of moral and 
ethical formation, for the children and the adults who work with them. Formed with the goal of 
providing a safe space for children to flourish both morally and intellectually, it was an 
organization that allowed the two men who ran the project to form bonds of kinship with their 
young charges.  
Bonginkosi, one of the founders of DAY (and also a member of KFTG) began his work 
in theatre pedagogy by mentoring and training adults, but found them stubborn and difficult to 
work with. At the same time, he saw a pronounced lack of theatre that was be appropriate for 
smaller children to watch. He wanted to create a safe space “where children can be happy and 
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learn,” whether through watching theatre that spoke to their experience or creating this theatre 
themselves. To this end, Bonginkosi and another man, Tshepo, formed DAY with the assistance 
of a mentor.  
As they dreamed of expanding, Bonginkosi and Tshepo drafted an ambitious five-year 
plan for their organization. For year one, the goal was simply to get the project up and running, 
followed by registration as a nonprofit organization the second year. The plan for year three was 
to get funding “so we can understand the money and business in the project,” while year four 
would focus on “jumping bodies over to the suburbs” and growing the organization outside of 
Soweto. By the fifth year, they hoped, all of the artists and children in the organization “would 
have made a platform for their lives so that they are somewhere now.” While this last goal is 
quite nebulous, it seems to refer to a longer-term goal of upward mobility for their participants. 
Tshepo would later point out that while “we couldn’t make a platform for any of the children, 
we’ve given them a tool, something that they’ve never had.” The “platform for their lives” is 
thus not a literal stage for productions, but a metaphorical platform upon which the members 
might make some movement to “somewhere” better than their current conditions. The five-year 
plan is ambitious in itself, but Tshepo’s horizon for working with DAY was indeed quite a bit 
broader than that. He planned to give himself twenty years to devote to carrying out the work, 
and wanted to raise children as though they were his own family, from the crèche until he saw 
them returning to the neighborhood as successful and happy individuals. 
DAY was thus an organization whose aims handily exceeded the scope of the 2–3 years 
of funding that most projects receive, and that exceeded even its own five-year plan. Even so, the 
telos of the project, at its most idealistic, remained constricted to its immediate locale. DAY was 
not merely an arts-enrichment activity, but a long-term investment in mentoring that would only 
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culminate when the children, grown and having moved on to greater success, returned to the 
neighborhood for visits.  
Bonginkosi and Tshepo’s conception of their pedagogical role went beyond that of a 
teacher or a provider of services to that of a mulume—an uncle who provides mentoring, support, 
and advice throughout a child’s life. Anthropologists, of course, are quite familiar with the term 
malume, the “mother’s brother” who was the subject of a much celebrated (and much contested) 
account from A.R. Radcliffe-Brown (1924). Radcliffe-Brown engaged in lengthy analysis of the 
position of malume and other kinship terms, primarily to refute Junod’s (1913) claim that 
BaThonga of East Africa had, at some stage, a kinship system rooted in matriarchy. While 
Radcliffe-Brown’s objections to Junod were roundly criticized31  his work on kinship in this 
seminal talk and elsewhere (e.g. Radcliffe-Brown 1940) nonetheless testify to the importance of 
the malume; it is not only a “joking relationship” but also a bond characterized by affection, 
assistance, and not a little indulgence.  
Mulume is a title that Tshepo in particular sought to embody, as he told me that “we have 
a system that all male participants in the project are mulumes.” In Dobsonville, of course, 
malume can be a term of respect for any older male; consanguity is not required. But Tshepo 
wanted something more formal than this honorary designation: for him, a malume plays a critical 
role as a moral pedagogue. Tshepo wanted to ensure that children leave the program with a sense 
of self-control and a moral “backbone.” Too many children, he told me, are doing “nasty things” 
                                                          
31 See Kuper 1976 for a tidy summary of this debate and its trajectories. According to Kuper, Radcliffe-Brown’s 
arguments were completely undermined by subsequent arguments from Junod and other BaThonga ethnographers 
even before broader “well known theoretical objections” were published (1976:11). Radcliffe-Brown’s accounts 
have not particularly stood the test of time—I point to him merely as someone who helped popularize the category 
of malume within the discipline more broadly. ‘Malume’ constituted, in any case, a meaningful local term in my 
fieldwork context.   
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in the streets that break his heart; getting into trouble with the law and doing drugs. Even without 
getting into such trouble, the sheer boredom of having nothing to do was oppressive in itself, as I 
heard both from children and the men I got to know in Dobsonville.  
Tshepo also wanted children to have a mentor because he had never had one and had 
started “late” in life. Mentoring children when they were younger would give them an advantage, 
particularly as they continue to grow into professional artists and make money. As Tshepo 
explained, “most artists in South Africa, they have been cheated because of a lack of education, 
an understanding of themselves and where they are going; they get money but they don’t know 
how to use it, someone becomes rich, then tomorrow they’re broke. If I teach these children from 
a young age, automatically the future artists are going to be the best.” Fully expecting his pupils 
to become artists, part of Tshepo’s pedagogy would thus ideally include lessons in how to be 
responsible with money. 
Bonginkosi and Tshepo’s aspirations to act as malumes contrasted in many ways with 
their other kin-based relationships. Both men, at various points, had been placed under a good 
deal of scrutiny by their families. Being an artist is not a job that brings home a lot of money or 
groceries, and the failure to provide economically to their respective households put them at odds 
with their mothers and fathers. Both men pulled in money from day jobs in construction or 
gardening; jobs done part-time to subsidize the arts work they actually wanted to do. In terms of 
their own families, they were not particularly successful and important and were certainly not 
providers. Their ambitions to act as malumes went beyond economics and into aesthetics: they 
certainly wanted to mentor and help the children grow in ways that were morally commendable. 
They also wanted the children to experience the joys of art and theatre.  
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Kinship terms like malume, Faubion (2001b) argues, qualify the self as a subject through 
its relation to others and also qualify others through their relation to the self. They shape the self 
into a particular kind of subject that relates to others in particular ways. At the same time, these 
terms, Faubion argues, are terms “of being, not of doing. They can and of course often do come 
with scripts or rulebooks attached. Yet the normativity of kinship is just that: definitive not of 
being kin but rather of being a good or a bad kinsperson” (2001b, 11-12). More immediate 
familial pressures to prove themselves successful and the dedication they had to their adopted 
charges drove Bonginkosi and Tshepo to work hard at the goal of being good malumes. At times, 
they were great ones. Other times, they failed by their own metrics. Examining these failures 
more closely illuminates some of the constraints on kinship that are the product of a uniquely 
post-Mandela South Africa.  
For Bonginkosi and Tshepo, being a good malume in the context of DAY meant serving 
as good role models, instructing the children on how to dance, sing, and act, and tutoring them 
with homework. At the same time, financial constraints weighed heavily upon this work. The 
men needed money to transport the children to and from events, rent rehearsal spaces, and, 
whenever possible, provide something to eat for the children, many of whom did not have food 
at home. Having a theatre project like DAY funded, however, requires a performance of a 
different sort—a demonstration of political connections, good standing in the community, and 
properly entrepreneurial intentions. Attempts to raise funding for DAY would lead the men to 
present a much different face of the organization, and would require them to engage in 
transactions that were at odds with their roles as malumes. Ultimately, the demands of the 
funding world would also set the two men against each other and lead to the dissolution of the 
group.  
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In accordance with their goals for year three—to see the organization receive funding of 
some kind—Bonginkosi and Tshepo appealed to a number of local businesses and organizations 
in Soweto. As they did so, they consistently positioned themselves as community development-
oriented activists, pedagogues, and men in good standing with local political structures. To this 
end, they attended a 
meeting with their 
local ward councilor 
not wearing business 
suits or formal attire of 
any kind but instead 
more eclectic regalia: 
Bonginkosi donned 
track pants with an 
ANC polo-style shirt 
that celebrated the history of ANC presidents since the party’s inception. Tshepo donned a bright 
red jumpsuit emblazoned with the logos of various newspapers, although the top was 
conspicuously left open to reveal a t shirt bearing homage to the now posthumous Nelson 
Mandela. While Bonginkosi and Tshepo did not explicitly acknowledge the political positioning 
of these outfits, their sartorial choices were nonetheless deliberate ones: had they worn more 
formal attire, Bonginkosi told me, the men would run the risk of being seen as “less authentic,” 
as they do not wear suits and ties on a regular basis. They thus needed to “be themselves,” as 
artists and community activists, although they needed to do so in a way that appropriately 
recognized existing political structures.  
Bonginkosi and Tshepo outside Dobonsville Civic Centre, January 2014 
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For better or worse, in my capacity as a researcher I became part of the group’s push for 
local legitimacy in their quest for kinship. In contrast to many anthropological accounts of 
kinship through adoption (e.g. Howell 2006; Weismantel 1995), Bonginkosi and Tshepo, more 
often than not, sought to be adopted as malumes rather than adopt the children into their care, 
visiting wary parents and convincing them that they could provide a valuable service for their 
children. As I visited the homes of the children they taught and mentored, Bonginkosi and 
Tshepo explained that I was a researcher who was interested in the work they were doing with 
the children—an explanation, I was told, that bolstered their local reputation. I also went, on 
several occasions, to meet Tshepo’s father. Tshepo told me that his father’s attitude about his 
work as an artist has changed now that Tshepo has drawn the attention of a white researcher—
and an American one at that. On other occasions, at their urging, I inquired at businesses like 
Pick N’ Pay (a South African grocery chain) about the status of requests for funding. My 
position in these encounters was to be an embodiment of social and cultural capital for the group, 
and a visible sign of international attention for their work. I accepted this role as a reasonable 
benefit that the men might derive from my presence as a researcher. Although I felt 
uncomfortable as an anthropologist speaking on their behalf, I did so at their request.    
It was in this capacity that I came to the civic center with Bonginkosi and Tshepo to meet 
the municipal councilor. I explained my project to her, and after exchanging business cards, she 
turned to the work of helping Bonginkosi and Tshepo with a letter of endorsement that they 
could attach to requests for funding assistance that would go to local businesses. While she 
would not directly contact businesses to solicit donations on their behalf, she did try to mentor 
them in the content of their letter of solicitation, telling them, for instance, that they need to make 
it clear that they are going anywhere and everywhere asking for donations.   
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After our meeting with the councilor, and after learning the letter (to be drafted by an 
administrator) would not be ready for some time, we proceeded next door to speak with Lerato, a 
“community development worker” for the ward, to see if there were any avenues of funding 
available for DAY’s project. In the meeting with Lerato, Bonginkosi and Tshepo pitched the 
project not as part of a five-year plan, but instead as something quite a bit more restricted: they 
needed funds to cater an “after school snack” for their students, many of whom do not have 
anything to eat at home. The ability to provide such food would be a major incentive to attend a 
series of forum theatre workshops they wanted to begin with their students. In response, Lerato 
handed them some applications to another local nonprofit, with the caveat that the men would 
need to determine if each child in the program was actually eligible to receive assistance from 
the program. Since DAY has multiple locations throughout Soweto, it seems that a number of the 
children will indeed be closed off from these resources, presumably because they could get them 
in their own wards. “My focus is on Dobsonville,” she told them, and in particular on ward forty-
seven. Beyond that, the only help she could offer them was advice: “Go out and sell your 
project,” she exhorted them. She told them to go to stores like Woolworth’s and PEP for 
donations, and to build up their resume and write a detailed report on all their activities. “I can’t 
give you anything,” she concluded.  
In their capacity as local activists running an after-school arts program, Bonginkosi and 
Tshepo thus drew on what resources they could to raise smaller pockets of funding for DAY. 
They received some mentoring and direction from community officials, but the message from the 
ward councilor and community development worker seemed to be that they would need to make 
appeals for funding to local businesses rather than local government bodies. To “sell their 
project,” the men would need to continue building their local profile and resume. It was only 
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after doing so that they could reasonably hope for funding. Rather than waiting to build this 
profile, however, Bonginkosi and Tshepo rhetorically performed it in their applications to 
government.   
Attempts to solicit governmental agencies for funding would transform the 
organization—at least on paper—into something that often seemed quite at odds with the daily 
work of the group and their work of acting as malumes. The ability to receive tax-exempt 
donations from individuals and funding bodies (whether public or private) requires registration 
as a nonprofit organization, and the group officially registered as an NPO in 2010. To do so, they 
had to complete an “Application For Registration by a Nonprofit Organisation” and submit it to 
the Department of Social Development. As part of the application requirements, DAY submitted 
a detailed constitution that carefully outlines the positions of each member of the executive and 
their responsibilities, along with detailed policies for the group’s finances and how meetings 
would be structured.  
While the organization has a number of officers and executives listed in its constitution, 
DAY was, in reality, a project spearheaded almost entirely by Bonginkosi, Tshepo, and their 
friend Nthabiseng—who is nowhere mentioned in the constitution but who nonetheless played a 
role in accounting for the finances of the group. The smaller scale of the organization meant that, 
in reality, all three would play a heterodox series of roles, the most important of which was the 
task of actually working with the children. The relatively small scope of their project and the 
paucity of other individuals who wanted to do the work of the organization with them meant that 
any number of roles were either truncated or collapsed into each other. Bonginkosi, as 
chairperson, was thus acknowledged as the visionary and the “brains” behind the organization, 
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and Tshepo, by his own admission, was Bonginkosi’s “mouthpiece.” In addition, both men 
worked to facilitate the work at the centers as teachers.  
As part of their attempts to secure larger amounts of funding, DAY developed a business 
plan that they have submitted in various iterations to a number of different private and public 
organizations. The business plan itself reveals much about the way the two men work to position 
themselves as arts entrepreneurs in the current funding climate and the interventions they feel 
will get traction with government funding bodies. The plan stresses that the leadership of the 
group has “acquired small business management qualifications to balance available skills with 
business knowledge,” and in particular can boast expertise in “H.R. management, commerce, and 
information technology, skills which contribute to DAY’s potential for growth and business 
innovation.” In the business plan, the men transcend the role of artists—presenting themselves 
instead as job creators who seek to bring full time employment to artists as part of the work of 
the organization. “The key role,” they argue in the business plan, is “creating employment 
opportunities through partnering with professional artists and organizers in our communities to 
increase [the] capacity of professional arts practitioners.” The bulk of their business plan, in fact, 
is given over to detailing how these jobs will be created. After-school tutoring, mentoring, and 
arts activities—the original impetus for the project—became sublimated in the proposal as one of 
many “services” provided by the organization to their “customers” (which includes parents, 
NGOs, churches, schools, government, business, and individuals).  A “market analysis” section 
of the business plan also makes clear that the key intervention is targeting unemployment, 
specifically by training unemployed youth (a category that could apply to anyone under the age 
of forty or so) in events management and planning. The funding applications and accompanying 
business plan were projects of a much different scope that went well beyond the work that DAY 
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actually engaged in as an after schools arts enrichment endeavor. These documents represent a 
transformation of their more nebulous aesthetic and moral projects into an endeavor that was 
purely instrumental and—to the extent possible—of sound utilitarian calculation. More 
fundamentally, their applications were an attempt to participate in more national imaginaries of 
South Africa’s neoliberal political economy: job creation by small business owners that will 
empower the community.  
While Bonginkosi and Tshepo positioned their organization as a small business that 
would create jobs for unemployed youth in the arts and culture industry, the realities of doing 
business at a more national level would require them to make compromises that they were not 
willing to make. Bonginkosi and Tshepo were not connected to officials at any of the 
government funding agencies even in an indirect way. In a nepotistic climate where 
administrators often award funding to friends or family members (or use friends and family 
members as proxies for their own projects to be funded), Bonginkosi and Tshepo were at a 
distinct disadvantage for not having the right connections. These connections, I learned from 
Bonginkosi, could be purchased in a way through exchanges of money that are firmly embedded 
in networks of patron-client relationships. When I asked him whether he was confident that DAY 
would receive funding from his applications, he told me he was not, but requested the recorder 
be stopped so he could tell me why. 
Eventually, though, Bonginkosi was willing to talk more candidly (and with the recorder 
on) about the way he perceives the process of seeking funding. After discussing applications that 
had been rejected by one organization on grounds that seemed dubious and arbitrary to him, 
Bonginkosi continued: 
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“Another time, they said: ‘okay, you are being funded. But come to the offices.’ When 
you go to the offices, they say: ‘Okay, we understand. Re-draft the budget.’ They give 
you the contact of the accountant that they want. The accountant tells you ‘no, you don’t 
have to pay me. You will pay me when the funds go through.’ So when the funds go 
through, they take their money, the guys who gave you the number of the accountant take 
his money, and the money that is left is yours for the organization. When you are drafting 
the budget and everything, you are drafting it for the project. You never thought that they 
would need that money that they are talking about now. So that puts you already in a 
situation where you are only going to get funds once, and you are never again in your life 
going to get funds. I’ve been investing all my life in this. I cannot just take this risk and 
get 200,000 and then my life is over. All that I was working for, it’s over. It would be 
better if I was the child of a politician studying HR somewhere, and then I do this 
application, I get the funds, and then next time I don’t get the funds I don’t care because I 
have money. It’s not my career. It’s not what I’m doing. So it becomes a problem for 
people who are really interested in the industry…If you don’t want to pay bribes, they 
will wait until you want to pay it. This is their attitude. They give you a letter saying you 
are funded for 500,000. They know that you would go crazy because you want that 
500,000.” 
For Bonginkosi, funding is accepted along with an implicit agreement that money will be 
distributed to various individuals and bodies that are, at best, tangentially connected to the 
project itself. Officials in the department that granted funds to the project will take money—not 
always from the artist—but perhaps from someone else who will materially benefit from the 
artist’s relationship to the state. The remaining funds are available for the project for which it 
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was intended. The problem (that Bonginkosi feels will guarantee that funds will never be given 
again) is that all the money must be accounted for. Bonginkosi explicitly recognizes himself as 
someone who is not connected in the right sorts of ways. As someone who is not “the child of a 
politician” with a steady office job, failure to successfully navigate this complex world of 
payments to officials and their associates means that one’s future prospects of working with 
government seem dim. It was, simply put, a game that ran counter to his aspirations as an 
exemplary figure for the children. 
This is a story I would hear multiple times from other interlocutors at varying levels of 
complexity. One easy work-around, I learned, is to form an umbrella company or organization 
that includes smaller subsidiaries. The funding earmarked for smaller companies within the 
umbrella is what actually goes to paying these hidden costs of connection. Bonginkosi seemed 
unwilling to risk participation in these networks, which he feared would result in his life being 
“over” and his work destroyed. Paying these types of bribes never guarantees admission into 
more permanent relationships either: “South African Revenue Services, after ten years they 
revise again the taxes for all organizations. Most people get arrested after ten years. So these 
guys will not be there—those who you paid bribes to. After ten years, they will not be there, and 
you will be there alone,” Bonginkosi told me. 
Paradoxically, as the men did what they thought was best commensurate with their 
positions as good role models and responsible malumes, they grew more distant from funding. 
There was a constant sense of hesitation and procrastination around applications for funding, 
which cannot be dismissed as mere laziness. The applications, after all, were always 
acknowledged as important and one of the few ways to get money from their organization. If it 
was hard to “sell their project” on a local level without a profile and more robust local 
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connections, it felt impossible to pay the necessary tributes in order to receive funding in their 
capacity as entrepreneurs. There is, of course, nothing wrong with emphasizing the more 
entrepreneurial aspects of their project and diminishing the original impetus of the project. The 
larger problem was the threat posed by administering the money in the sorts of ways required, 
while simultaneously staying out of trouble and being a good role model.   
  The conflict generated by their non-instrumental aspirations and the completely 
instrumental logics of state in which they needed to participate would ultimately split the two 
men apart and lead to the dissolution of DAY. When I last spoke with Bonginkosi, he told me he 
had not seen Tshepo at all for the last six months—which is all the more surprising given the fact 
that they live right around the corner from one another. Tshepo had done something 
“unacceptable,” Bonginkosi told me. Specifically, Tshepo had threated Bonginkosi with a gun, 
accusing him, along with an associate, of stealing twelve million rand (nearly one million 
dollars) from a fund earmarked for DAY’s use. Bonginkosi had no idea what Tshepo was talking 
about, and would have found the accusation laughable if it weren’t for the gun at his head. “What 
money was Tshepo talking about?” Bonginkosi wondered, and from what application? Where 
did this money come from? Bonginkosi was eventually able to convince Tshepo that he did not 
have any such sum of money, but rumors about it persist in their neighborhood. People still come 
up to Bonginkosi asking about the money, to which he replies: “What money? Do I look like I 
have money?” DAY is officially dissolved, and Bonginkosi has begun an applied drama degree 
at University of the Witwatersrand.  
Bonginkosi and Tshepo had a vision for working with children. They wanted to create a 
space where children could be happy and learn. They wanted to mentor children, train them, and 
watch them grow into successful adults. They sought recognition and validation as malumes, and 
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worked hard to be good ones. Getting funding for DAY, however, ran counter to their desire for 
authenticity and honesty. Their friendship ultimately ended over the issue of funding, as one man 
accused another of theft and corruption—accusations that, oddly enough, seemed to be par for 
the course in the world of arts funding.  
Economics, and in particular, the task of providing for one’s kin, continues to take a 
heavy toll on kinship in a post-Mandela South Africa. At the same time, there is a racial dynamic 
at play in funding for theatre as well. Bonginkosi told me that things worked very differently for 
white applicants. “If you’re white,” he told me, “you either get funded or you don’t.” My work 
with an organization run by a white South African woman would bear this out to some degree, 
and more importantly, tells a parallel story of the political economy of theatre as a space of 
frayed and decaying kinship.   
 
Ethical Fatigue and Motherhood in Grahamstown 
If anything can be said with certainty about post-Mandela South Africa, it is that many 
South Africans are growing weary of working to build a “new” country. Grand moral projects 
like reconciliation and the formation of a nonracial Rainbow Nation are losing legitimacy and 
momentum, particularly after the absence of Mandela from public life. Many South Africans feel 
a sense of fatigue with the work of occupying subject positions that have not conferred the 
esteem of others or a better material life. “Let’s get that reconciliation!” a man in Soweto told 
me, with sarcasm in his voice. “I can’t reconcile when I have nothing. You’ve taken all my 
things, then you tell me ‘let’s reconcile.’ What am I reconciling? I can’t reconcile while you are 
taking all of my things to yourself.” Kinship too is exhausting work. In the Eastern Cape, where 
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unemployment can be as high as 30 percent, being a mother is especially hard. Women are 
increasingly the sole economic providers for their families, whether through domestic service or 
other forms of labor. Economic hardship, as many anthropologists have pointed out, has always 
taken a heavy toll on kinship in South Africa. In this section, however, I am concerned with a 
different kind of maternalism. It is a conferred and anointed form of maternalism, but not any 
less demanding (and perhaps more so) for that reason. It is not the maternalism of Allison Jill 
King’s madams (2012), marked by condescension and infantilizing toward a teleology of cheap 
household labor. Even so, it is a form of white maternalism all the same. It steadily crumbles 
under the weight of expectations in an economic context colored by corruption and nepotism. 
The mother in this case remains in the position that people expect her to remain in and drudges 
on, for reasons that are hard to decipher and for an unknown duration of time.  
Mama J 
Andrew and Janet Buckland, both jointly and as individuals, are a force to be reckoned 
with in South African theatre. Both are well known in Grahamstown and on a more national 
level, and Andrew in particular has been an artistic trailblazer in Physical Theatre, receiving a 
number of accolades and awards for the virtuosity of his own comedic blend of clowning and 
mime. In Grahamstown, Janet is widely known as “Mama J,” for her role as artistic director of 
UBOM!32, a theatre company attached to the drama department, and as an artist with expertise in 
directing and dance. These roles, and her work in the broader community through dance 
programs like Amaphiko, have endeared her to many people.  
                                                          
32 Reading a draft of this chapter, Janet made sure to note that the correct spelling of UBOM! (which is not an 
acronym) includes an exclamation point. I honor this spelling throughout.  
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Throughout my time among the theatre artists of the UCKAR, both Andrew and Janet 
occasioned a certain awe and respect from students, community artists, and other residents of 
Grahamstown. Drama students spoke beamingly when they recalled being praised by Andrew for 
something—his penchant for gentle but incisive criticism lent his praise additional legitimacy 
and felt like getting an award. On the other hand, Andrew was not afraid to mete out discipline 
when it was needed, particularly when cast members shirked their responsibilities. “Mama J,” 
was and is also held in very high regard; she is seen as a warm but also very direct administrator 
and mentor. I never saw Janet angry but people avoided making her so, and intra-cast problems 
with personal dynamics or payment issues would be dealt with in a way that did not involve 
escalating the issue to her attention. As Mama J, Janet was, and still is, the driving force behind 
UBOM! and much of its success, and she has stepped in at crucial points to take the reins from 
faltering resident directors or to iron out logistical problems.   
For purposes of this chapter, I will focus on the subject positions occupied by Janet, 
particularly her anointed position as “mama” to her students and especially the members of 
UBOM! theatre company. I focus 
on Janet as mother rather than 
Andrew in his role of “father” (a 
name also anointed on him) for at 
least two reasons. First, Janet 
played (and still plays) a very 
direct role in providing funds for 
UBOM! and other programs 
through applications to local and UBOM! office, March 2014 
105 
 
 
national funding bodies. Andrew, of course, provides mentoring, help, and advice to his students 
and UBOM! whether “on the floor,” in the classroom, or as productions travel to Cape Town and 
Johannesburg. But the title of “Mama J,” for Janet is apt in the sense that she is seen as 
responsible for securing financial resources for UBOM! and, for better or worse, seen as 
responsible for acts of nurture, care, and guidance. More importantly, during my time in 
Grahamstown, I saw more tangibly in Janet the strain that finances began to put on her kinship 
ties to her students and members of UBOM!. Frustrated by several unsuccessful funding 
applications and the corruption and nepotism she saw in the world of arts funding, she was 
getting tired of her motherly role in the organization and was eager to hand the reins over to 
someone else. Though she loved her UBOM! family very much, living into her role as Mama J, 
she told me, was beginning to make her a worse person and not a better one.   
Speaking to me about the inception of UBOM!, Janet remembered her excitement when 
the white paper on arts and culture (ANC 1996) mandated the creation of three professional 
companies for each province: a student company, a youth company, and adult company. These 
never materialized in the Eastern Cape, which has historically been one of the most economically 
marginalized provinces in the country. That marginalization, she found, extended to the realm of 
funding for art, as provinces like Guateng and the Western Cape typically receive the bulk of arts 
funding. Janet found Eastern Cape theatre to be, at this point, “abysmal.” “There was no 
innovation,” she recalled, and people would “find one piece and repeat it and repeat it.” Even if 
artists could be trained in Eastern Cape, they frequently migrated to Cape Town or Johannesburg 
in search of better opportunities. With these critical gaps in mind, Janet and Andrew founded 
UBOM! in 2003 with grants from two major arts funding agencies and had received steady 
funding from them for over a decade.  
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 UBOM! is, first and foremost, a professional theatre company that produces at least one 
piece for the National Arts Festival each year in addition to numerous other productions. Janet’s 
penchant for history (in which she earned a B.A. from the UCKAR) has colored many of the 
group’s productions; works like Thuthula: Heart of the Labyrinth (2003) and Kiss My Boot 
(2006) pay homage to indigenous figures and stories of the Eastern Cape as a way of preserving 
its heritage. Beyond its celebration of Eastern Cape history, the company has an emphasis on 
education that is well known; works like Sink or Swim (2010), Betty and the Yetti (2013), and the 
Wangai (2014) were all crafted with the aim of entertaining children and teaching them about the 
environment at the same time. The company also runs community outreach events, most notably 
the Makana Drama Development Festival, an event that brings a variety of local theatre groups 
together for performances and workshops. The focus of this festival, UBOM! states in one 
report, “is to provide entry level participants with a comprehensive introduction to play 
production, while stalwart participants are challenged in new areas.” (UBOM! 2010). Winners of 
this festival have a production sponsored by National Arts Festival.   
While UBOM! is thus quite active in producing theatre and opportunities for 
communities around Grahamstown and beyond, it is also an important space of cross-racial 
artistic collaboration for the members of the company. In previous years, it has been able to offer 
a one-year contract to a full-time company of 5–6 workshop performers/facilitators. More than 
half (and sometimes all) of these are local artists from the nearby township of Joza, while others 
are from the UCKAR or other drama programs. The company has always been intentionally 
multiracial, and themes of race and apartheid history have played a central role in many of the 
company’s productions. Janet recalled instances in which the company performed in more rural 
areas for children and adults who had never seen white and black South Africans working 
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together. “These kids in the rural areas, they thought [the actors] had to be from another country; 
they couldn’t possibly be from their own country because they were seeing this for the first 
time,” she remembered with pride. 
UBOM! has been widely recognized as a company for artistic excellence. The group won 
a Silver Standard Bank Ovation Award in 2010 for their production Breed, as well the Best 
Puppetry Manipulation Award from Handspring for their work on The Adventures of a Little 
Nobody (2010). In addition, Janet herself was awarded “woman of the year” by Pick N’ Pay. In 
general, UBOM! has a heavy media presence and is frequently covered in media like Grocott’s 
Mail and Cue, the official arts festival newspaper. 
When I arrived in Grahamstown at the beginning of April 2014 to study the drama 
department at the UCKAR, I found UBOM! in a financially precarious position. The company 
had been denied funding through its usual granters, and was forced to operate on a more skeletal 
budget. This meant, among other things, that UBOM! would not be able to employ a full-time 
cast with a year-long contract as it had done in years past. For the mostly white students at 
Rhodes who would have potentially been offered employment through UBOM!, there would be 
other opportunities to earn money: lecturing, tutoring, or grading exams. For the “professional 
artists” usually hired by UBOM! (many of them black actors with no academic attachment to the 
UCKAR), the loss of another opportunity for full-time work would carry more palpable 
consequences. Beyond the immediate loss of employment opportunities, Janet told me, were a 
host of other concerns: Would the company be able to continue subsidizing performances for 
children from the townships so they could afford to see theatre? Would they be able to return 
once again to extremely rural parts of the Eastern Cape to perform in kraals and communities 
that rarely experience theatre or cross-racial collaboration? The future was uncertain. 
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Fortunately, UBOM! had sufficient funds to hire a seasonal cast in order to create a 
production that would play to local schools and feature in the children’s program at the National 
Arts Festival. The Wangai, a script written by Andrew Buckland, was a Xhosa-language, Eastern 
Cape-flavored adaptation of Dr. Seuss’s The Lorax. UBOM! hired a cast of six and an assistant 
director from the pool of community artists with which UBOM! had had previous experience. In 
addition, UBOM! was commissioned by the university to create Unzip Your Knowledge, a work 
that dramatized an academic student handbook that dealt with issues like plagiarism and 
academic writing more generally. Although scaled back from their usual artistic output, UBOM! 
was not completely off the radar.   
Even so, as I interviewed Janet, she openly described her frustrations with the 
ambiguities, paradoxes, and politics of her attempts to get funding for the company, and a sense 
of resignation hung over much of our interview. “The pattern had been that we’d gotten support 
from [a particular granting agency],” she told me. “I was aghast because we were turned down 
twice. We were turned down once, and then they said ‘we’ve just given all these proposals a 
year’s funding, but the next proposal is three years.’ So they gave us another six months, and I 
put my life and soul into that business proposal. I need to show it to you, it nearly killed me. 
Because I thought, that’s just a glitch; we’re going to get money.” UBOM! did not, in fact, get 
funding from this application either. Amidst hearing rumors that UBOM! was turned down 
because its affiliation with the UCKAR would be a “tax problem” (which had never been an 
issue in the past), Janet had also heard that a member of the same granting agency had been 
securing funds for his own projects.33 “It’s made me so uncomfortable. It’s a bit nauseating. It’s 
                                                          
33 It also bears mentioning that the University Known as Rhodes has a widely-known reputation as a historically 
white university. During apartheid, Rhodes University (named, of course, for the colonial magnate and adventurer 
John Cecil Rhodes) was reserved for whites only, and recently the university, along with University of Cape Town, 
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also illuminating, the fact that I’m not fighting it, I haven’t gone to see him, I haven’t written a 
letter of appeal…So yeah, I’m kind of letting everything down a bit here,” she said. Janet, who 
described herself as “tired” and ready to hand over the reins of the organization to someone else, 
did not feel like contesting what she saw as nepotism within funding schemes. 
This nepotism indeed had colored other interactions with funding agencies for quite some 
time. Janet recalled being at a funding meeting with government officials in which one official 
wanted to put the Eastern Cape “on the map” for arts. The bureaucrats in attendance announced 
that they were forming a company to do just that. “You should be facilitating it, not running it 
yourself,” she remembers saying. The company was instituted nonetheless. “The council that 
dispenses the money to the companies spends most of their money on that company,” she told 
me. “They spend hundreds of thousands on that, and everybody else, if you apply correctly, you 
can get between ten and fifteen thousand [rand] for the year. Government tells them, ‘we want 
you to fund this company. We want this to happen now.’ What this company does, they have 
done since 1993 or 1994—[they have] repeated the same program every year. It’s like a tourist 
brochure that they bring alive.” Affiliation with the provincial government ensures that this 
company stays afloat with consistent funding.  
A second major source of funding for UBOM! had also opted not to fund the company 
for the 2014-2015 cycle, and the loss of this funding was even more frustrating. UBOM! had 
previously enjoyed a 1.2 million rand grant (approximately $97,000) from this source, and the 
money had been stretched over three years. But funds were slow to actually arrive and the 
                                                          
became the epicenter of struggles by black university students to remove monuments that paid tribute to South 
Africa’s colonial heritage. It thus came as no surprise to some research participants that the Eastern Cape Opera 
House, which boasted a more diverse management profile more in line with the oft-cited goal of “transformation” 
was chosen for funding rather than UBOM!, an organization that is, at least in its top leadership, run by a white 
South African.   
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university had advanced UBOM! the money in the meantime. This, according to Janet, did not 
make the funders happy, causing one of them to write her demanding an explanation for why the 
company had carried on with its project in the absence of its final installment of funding. “I was 
gobsmacked,” she said, expressing a sense of feeling punished: “you’re wrapped on the knuckles 
because you kept your project going. Because you kept the reputation of the [funder] good, you 
know? I’ve been to so many meetings where they get attacked. I’ve been the one person that’s 
said ‘sorry, I can’t complain. We’ve had a really good relationship with them.” The new project 
manager advised her to express these thoughts in a written appeal to the board, but it seems to 
Janet that UBOM!’s reputation with them may have been damaged—paradoxically, for 
continuing a project that the agency was very late in funding. 
Such dynamics around funding and the constant strain of drumming up new money for 
the organization was a process that Janet found altogether tiring, and couldn’t help but color her 
perception of herself as “mother” to the organization. When I asked how she felt she had grown 
as a person during her tenure as UBOM!’s director, she replied wearily:  
“I wish I could say I’ve grown. I wish I could say I’ve changed... I got a bit tired of 
everybody seeing me as ‘Mama J,’ as the big mama. I’m a bit like: give me a job and I’ll 
get on with it. I don’t need to be babied, and I kept on feeling that the company wanted 
mothering and nurturing and loving and I just—I might have been prepared to do that 
initially, but I got tired of that. So I don’t think I grew in a positive way. I think I grew in 
the sense that I wanted it to be more perfect, I wanted people to get on with their jobs. It’s 
a little bit like, ‘guys, I raised the money for you, I’ve created a bloody job for you. 
You’re in arts, you’re in theatre. You wake up in the morning and you warm up and you 
train and you act for the whole day! If somebody had done that for me, halleluiah! That’s 
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enough—get on with your job and do it properly!’…So I think I grew more obstinate. 
More pedantic. More looking for a strong resident director. Someone who was paid to be 
the father or the mother. To nurture and baby and discipline.” 
Janet thus sees herself as a financial provider rather than someone who engages in nurturing and 
“babying.” In this sense, she is not unlike some white South Africans who let the task of 
childcare fall to hired help. At the same time—and interestingly—Janet is also not unlike many 
black South African mothers—so exhausted from securing money to survive that energy does 
not remain for emotional nurturing (King 2012). 
There is a certain fatigue that attaches itself to projects that, while once a source of 
freedom, twist and turn into spaces of ethical decay and atrophy. Janet wished she could have 
grown and become a better person as the result of her work with UBOM!. What she expresses 
instead is a sense of ethical retrogression: according to her, she is a worse person now than when 
she started UBOM!. She has run out of patience for mothering, nurturing, babying, and 
disciplining people, roles that she once did not mind playing. Instead, she has become more 
demanding and asserts more strongly that people need to get on with the work and not wait for 
her guidance or approval. In this sense, kinship has gradually morphed into a constraint rather 
than a source of ethical freedom and movement; in Foucauldian terminology, a source of 
“subjection” rather than “subjectivation.” She certainly has her own expectations of what her role 
entails, but she is also entangled in the hopes and expectations of others, finding it exceedingly 
difficult to step away from them. The fact that she increasingly resents her role as provider, 
nurturer, and disciplinarian points to a sense of ethical stagnation. She is becoming someone she 
does not want to be, and at this point, would rather have someone else take her job. Yet she 
doesn’t know where to turn. 
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Janet’s frustrations with funding undoubtedly have played a role in this ethical fatigue. 
She expressed feeling nauseated by the culture of funding she consistently encountered and is 
tired of fighting with administrators who have a problem with the way she has been conducting 
business on behalf of UBOM!. The busy work of providing for her “children” in UBOM!—
financially and emotionally—has led to a general sense of resignation about her motherly role 
even as she dreams of moving away from Grahamstown to be nearer to her own family. 
Economics and the task of making ends meet has frayed the cords of kinship for her—not quite 
to the breaking point, because she still feels like no one else is willing or able to run UBOM! in 
her stead—but she feels worn out by her charge as artistic director. 
Agency, Responsibility, and Ethical Fatigue 
Janet’s ethical fatigue has much to do with her responsibilities and the extent to which 
she can meet them. It is the result of a conflict that revolves around judgments of responsibility 
and agency that are both internal and external to her. Laidlaw’s recent work on agency and 
responsibility (2010; 2014) is germane here, allowing not only for a deeper analysis of Janet’s 
situation but South Africa’s moral trajectory more broadly.  
Laidlaw undertakes an intervention into the troubled and theoretically sloppy history of 
agency in social theory by distinguishing between two different accounts of the concept, both of 
which are problematic for different reasons. One account, which traces its lineage through 
theories of practice advanced by Bourdieu (1977), Sahlins (1981), and others (though it reaches 
well beyond them), designates as agency “the creative and assertive capacities of individuals, as 
against the constraints of what are conceived as ‘larger’ structures” (2010, 143). On this account, 
for example, an individual is said to be exerting agency when he or she engages in acts of 
resistance, either subtle or overt, against broader social structures and forces. The problem for 
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Laidlaw and others (e.g. Mahmood 2005) is that this conception of agency “recognizes as 
efficacious only actions conducive toward certain ends and outcomes” (2010, 144), namely, 
values like liberation, empowerment, and equality. In so doing, this conception smuggles certain 
(western and liberal) values into understandings of agency, postulating a never-ending contest 
between human subjectivity and social structure, with plenty of accolades when the former 
prevails over the latter (2010, 145). 
A second account of agency discussed by Laidlaw issues from Actor-Network Theory (or 
ANT). For ANT, “the ascription of agency rests on the empirical question of whether in any 
particular network of relations an entity participates in an entirely transparent and predictable 
way in chains of cause and effect or whether it makes a discernable difference in how things go” 
(2010, 145). On this account, nonhuman and inanimate entities can identified as agents, so long 
as they play a role in causal explanations of why and how processes or events occur (Laidlaw 
gives the example of a laptop crashing just before a deadline as an instance of agency in this 
regard). While ANT does not carry the baggage of the moral assumptions smuggled by the 
previous account, it fails to recognize that explanations are interpretive, and that they take place 
in a moral universe populated by “our ongoing judgments about whose presence or absence, 
whose actions and omissions, whose words or silences, have contributed in which ways to things 
turning out as they are doing, and by our assigning responsibility accordingly” (2010, 146). 
Humans search, in other words, for specifically human agents to whom they can assign blame or 
praise, to an extent that explanations of a chain of events in everyday life, however complex, will 
rarely be satisfactory without them. 
Neglecting the ways in which responsibility is predicated is the key flaw for ANT, 
according to Laidlaw. At the same time, ANT allows for causal explanations that do not rest 
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entirely on interior motivations or the exercise of “free will.” Taking up the causal framework of 
ANT, along with moral theories that account for a variety of causes in the attribution of moral 
responsibility (e.g. Williams 1985), Laidlaw offers an amended conception of agency in which 
agency turns out to be “an aspect of the relational processes whereby stretches, phases, or stages 
of people’s ongoing conduct are interpreted as acts for which distinct agents (of varying shape 
and size) are accountable” (2010, 155).  
The salient theoretical implication from Laidlaw’s discussion is that responsibility—both 
in terms of the ways it is assigned and the moral weight it carries—is intimately connected to 
agency, such that “an augmentation to one’s agency is not necessarily an empowering or 
liberating experience” but instead carries increased responsibility “for particular happenings or 
states of affairs, and these may include states of affairs that they have rather limited capacity to 
influence” (2010, 162-163). A close examination of responsibility and how it unfolds in various 
social worlds has implications for understandings of agency—at the very least, it demands an 
account of agency that takes responsibility seriously. 
Conceptions of agency and responsibility illuminate the dynamics of Janet’s frustrations, 
and indeed play a role in explaining her sense of ethical fatigue. As Mama J, Janet bears 
responsibility for many things, whether or not she agrees that responsibility should be predicated 
on her. Her students, according to her, see her as being responsible for demonstrating care, 
nurture, and giving guidance—or in her more pejorative language, “babying.” While she denies 
these forms of responsibility, she does feel their weight, and feels the weight of the 
responsibilities she does accept—primarily that of seeking funding and administering UBOM! as 
a company. Meanwhile, funding agencies also see her as responsible for following bureaucratic 
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protocols, and hold her responsible for breeching those protocols—one of the reasons she found 
herself in trouble with them. 
There is undoubtedly some slippage in how I am using responsibility here. Laidlaw 
speaks of responsibility in terms of causal explanations that attach to moral judgments (for 
example, one person being responsible for stealing another’s wallet). I use responsibility not only 
in that sense but also in the sense of a duty, which is something that Laidlaw does not venture to 
do. There is good reason for invoking this sense of responsibility, however: it is assumed by 
Janet’s students that she has the ability to carry out these duties, and the fact that she has grown 
to resent some of them (especially the “babying”) suggests that they are not only expected, but 
that she will be, to some degree, viewed as cold and distant if she doesn’t perform them. There 
are moral judgments, that is, that attach themselves to responsibility in this sense as well. She is 
held to account—made responsible—for these duties, and also held responsible for the actions of 
which she is thought to be an agent. 
Janet, in her own accounting of her situation, does not posses agency. More importantly, 
she does not possess it in either the practice theory or the ANT formulations of the concept. She 
feels that fighting the obstacles to funding UBOM! is a losing battle, given the bureaucratic and 
structural forms of inertia that she is up against. Because of her institutional position, she is also 
forced to reckon with the emotional demands that come with her role as administrator and 
mentor-figure for UBOM!. She has no agency, in either case, in the face of structure. She is also, 
in her view, not much of an agent when it comes to ANT accounts of agency either: she is 
merely the terminus of a long causal chain of funding mechanisms, and the decision to deny 
UBOM! funding has less to do with her and more to do with the logics of government funding, 
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the caprice of particular bureaucrats, and the corruption of others who administer funds to 
themselves and those in their networks. 
Assumptions that she is responsible, however, are in turn assumptions of agency: 
assumptions that she’s not giving enough emotionally for reasons that are blameworthy; 
assumptions that she’s being duplicitous in having funding advanced by the university; 
assumptions that she has the power to change what she cannot in fact control. External 
assumptions of agency press inward, demanding that she accomplish what she does not feel 
herself capable of and pushing her to follow protocols that would have a detrimental effect on 
her work. Perhaps she has more power than she supposes, but it certainly does not feel that way 
to her. What makes her a “worse person” (an internal judgment) are the ways that she feels 
herself responding to these conflicting accounts of agency and responsibility. 
Janet became, because of her inescapable entanglements in these expectations, a different 
sort of Mama J—more distant, more pragmatic, more administrative. She remains Mama J so 
long as she occupies the space of artistic director of the company, which is for the foreseeable 
future because she hasn’t found anyone that she feels is willing or competent enough to train for 
the position long-term. Kinship often carries with it a state of normative permanence (Faubion 
2001b), and the expectation of others that she will remain Mama J keep her in place for now. 
That kinship can be exhausting is no surprise; it is common for people to get tired of 
being a mother or father, aunt or uncle. The ethical exhaustion faced by Janet, however, stands as 
something that is qualitatively different. Her comments point to a trajectory of ethical decay; she 
is becoming a worse person for her motherhood rather than a better one, but she cannot quit 
altogether. Conflicting accounts of responsibility and agency, coupled with her own dogged 
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persistence,s  leave her in a role that is esteemed by others but simultaneously draining. Janet’s 
sense of weariness shows a darker side of ethics—her conscious exercise of freedom—those 
things she undertakes to live into the subject position of “Mama,” paradoxically binds her to 
become a worse person. It is the albatross around her neck. 
It was and is hard to ascertain exactly what keeps Janet going in her role as Mama J. It is, 
in many ways, even harder to know what keeps South Africans trudging forward in recognition 
of their role in building a “new” South Africa—and understandable to the extent that they stop. 
Mandela is dead. Tutu will be dead before too long. Many South Africans too, are exhausted—
exhausted by the demands of reconciliation, by calls to “forget the past,” or alternately, by calls 
to wrestle with redefining whiteness in such a way that one can re-emerge worthy of receiving 
the esteem of racial others. Just how responsible (whether we are referring to duties or to actions, 
each of which are attended by moral judgments) are South Africans for South Africa’s current 
moral trajectory? To what extent can it be said that black South Africans have the agency to 
forgive, or that white South Africans have agency to transform racialized subjectivities? More 
broadly, what keeps anyone steadfast in subject positions characterized by Gordian knots of 
responsibility and agency, when there is little or no compulsion to remain? The answers to these 
questions are far from obvious. Yet the answers—and whether they keep South Africans working 
toward visions of a “new nation”—will define South Africa for the decades to come. 
Making Ends Meet  
Isaac Schapera, writing in 1941, went to great lengths to communicate the strain that 
European contact had placed on Bkgatla forms of kinship, although the wheels of that revolution, 
as two of his own students have pointed out, began turning much earlier than that (Comaroff and 
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Comarff 1991, 1995). In Schapera’s context where money was growing in its importance for 
exchange on the reserves, kin were increasingly less likely to help in times of financial distress. 
Schapera in fact argued that “the bonds of kinship are no longer so advantageous to all, and may 
even be found a burden by men whose occupations make them a suitable mark for the 
importunities of the needy” (1941, 137). The issue was not simply about needing money to buy 
European luxury goods, but also to pay one’s dues in the form of taxes and levies to a colonial 
administration and to participate in new forms of citizenship and personhood.  
A major facet of post-Mandela South Africa and its “suspended revolution” (Habib 2013) 
is the fact that political economy continues to place a crushing weight on kinship. An artist with 
whom my wife and I grew quite close told me about how she grew up working to provide for her 
younger siblings and her terminally ill mother, and she was (and likely still is) the sole financial 
provider for her family—a husband and two sons—as well as numerous extended family 
members that continue to seek her out for support. During one of our many conversations, she 
once told me that the only thing she really envied about white South Africans was the amount of 
wealth that they have. Connected to this wealth, for her, was a sense that there was no 
expectation of this wealth shared or distributed within a family. If a white woman leaves home 
and makes her own way in the world, it’s not necessarily up to her to support her other 
unemployed siblings or parents—it’s her life, her house, her money that she has earned. She, on 
the other hand, felt the constant strain of having to render assistance to family.  
Her observations about the economics of white kinship were astute in many ways. While 
capital of various kinds, as Bourdieu has shown very well, are reproduced through inheritance, 
through taste, and through habitus more generally, a white South African is not on the hook for 
supporting unemployed family members to nearly the same extent as a black South African 
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might be. Even so, in the context of the kinship I have been discussing, the responsibilities 
placed on Janet to provide financially and emotionally for her family (in the form of UBOM!) 
were quite taxing indeed. Her unwillingness to become imbricated in networks that she saw as 
corrupt and nepotistic (and the extent to which she found it futile to continue struggling against 
them), along with the strain and stress of cycles of funding applications, wore her out and left her 
with little enthusiasm for the role that people expected her to continue playing. The role of 
Mama J was itself already loaded with responsibilities that she was growing tired of. Janet has 
undoubtedly lived a different life as a white South African. Her weariness with the expectations 
of family, I would argue, was qualitatively quite similar to Black South African mothers in 
interesting ways.  
Bonginkosi and Tshepo likewise struggled to be good malumes, when playing that role 
for the children of their organization meant, among other things, dealings that could eventually 
get them into trouble. At the same time, raising funds outside of funding agencies and networks 
was difficult if not impossible without the right sorts of connections and business acumen. The 
suspicion that one man got ahead at the other’s expense (and the expense of the organization) 
broke a decades long friendship and dissolved the kinship they had formed with the children.  
The strains on kinship in both of these cases took an ethical toll. Janet came to resent the 
task of being a mother, and Bonginkosi and Tshepo might still informally play the role of 
malumes to neighborhood children, but no longer to the same extent. If theatre is a space of 
kinship, it is increasingly a space marked by these familial tensions, in the context of a nation 
that has only recently lost one of its fathers. 
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Chapter 3  
In the Ring:  
Epistemic Agon and Institutional Constraint in a South African University 
 
Dispatches from the University Currently Known as Rhodes  
The light of the flaming barricades was clouded by teargas, the air punctuated with the 
percussion of stun grenades and rubber bullets. South African Police Services (SAPS) were 
responding in force to another round of student protests in Grahamstown on October 19, 2016.  
Ten students were detained by SAPS, the latest in a burgeoning list of students at the UCKAR 
who have found themselves subject, with varying levels of injury, to tactics aimed at securing the 
university through heavy police presence. These arrests followed a pitched battle between 
student protestors and SAPS that ranged over much of the upper-campus. Sizwe Mabizela, the 
University’s Vice-Chancellor, was shaken but defiant: complaining of rampaging students and 
admitting that the university 
does not have the capacity 
to handle such protests, he 
relied on the State Security 
Agency34 and SAPS for 
help. Help (for Mabizela at 
least) had arrived indeed: a 
                                                          
34 South Africa’s domestic intelligence agency, the SSA was formed in 2009 to bring the National Intelligence 
Agency, the South African Secret Service, the South African National Academy of Intelligence, the National 
Communications Center, and COMSEC together into one department.   
Post to the UCKAR student Facebook page. 
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constant stream of videos documenting police beating and firing on students would continue to 
proliferate on Facebook and Twitter in the days that followed. 
“Fees Must Fall,” the uniquely South African hashtag and slogan of the current student 
protests, is a demand for completely free university education; a response to an all-too-familiar 
story of steadily increasing university tuition and steadily declining government expenditure on 
higher education. While Fees Must Fall is a movement that is unfolding on a national scale and 
shutting down a number of South Africa’s universities, it is only the latest iteration of a series of 
student protests that have been unfolding in earnest since March of 2015. The initial protests 
began when a group of student protestors from the University of Cape Town covered a statue of 
colonial magnate John Cecil Rhodes in feces. Protestors toyi-toyi’d (a well-known form of 
protest dancing from the apartheid era) around the statue and called for its removal to the delight 
of some and the disgust of (mostly white) others. Colonial figures like Rhodes, the protestors 
said, had no place in a contemporary South African space of education. The movement naturally 
spread to the university that bears Rhodes’s name, and Rhodes University has begun the process 
of a formal name change.  
Students at the UCKAR joined the Fees Must Fall movement in October of 2015, on the 
heels of protests that had already shut down the University of the Witwatersrand and had been 
met with violence by police and private security officers in the university’s employ. The legal 
groundwork for a similar show of force in Grahamstown would come six months later in April of 
2016 via a court interdict that “prevents students from interfering with other students or 
academic activities, academic or administrative staff at the university,” and makes it clear that 
police will respond forcefully to anything that resembles “kidnapping, assaulting, threatening, 
intimidating or otherwise interfering with the free movement, bodily integrity and psychological 
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wellbeing, and any other constitutional rights of any members of the Rhodes University 
community on the Applicant’s campus” (Mail and Guardian, April 20, 2016). The interdict, it 
should be noted, was not a response to “Fees Must Fall” or “Rhodes Must Fall” protests, but 
instead a series of protests against the prevalence of sexual assault on campus. Names of accused 
rapists were publicly circulated, quotes from university employees dismissing complaints of 
sexual assault were posted in public places, and the university was brought to a standstill. The 
interdict against these protests remains in place, giving SAPS the legal wherewithal to enter and 
exit campus at will, and to shoot (with non-lethal but nonetheless extremely painful rounds) 
students that are deemed disruptive.  
These protests and the increasingly violent response they provoke revolve, in countless 
ways, around bodies: black bodies tired of moving through “white space” (Anderson 2015) that 
is charged with the energy of a colonial legacy; demands that the university protect the bodily 
integrity of female students against violation; the material implications of rising fees that mean a 
choice between paying for food or education; bodies that carry the memory and inscription of 
apartheid (Fassin 2008); and bodies inscribed with new memories through experiences of trauma 
and violence on the grounds of the university.  
The UCKAR, I argue, is institutionally incapable of taking these forms of bodily struggle 
seriously. What follows is both a justification of this assertion and a prologue to the events that 
are currently unfolding at the UCKAR. Specifically, I examine Agon: Conflict and Catharsis in 
Boxing and Performance, a performance by Athina Vahla, and the university environment that 
the work was enveloped within. Agon was a theatre production that placed a boxer (Mziwoxolo 
Mdwayana) and his coach (Thabang Hlalele) from the local township of Joza in the central roles. 
Their regular training exercises were choreographed by Athina, and became a ground for 
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reflection on themes of power, discipline, and the body. In preparation for the show, Athina 
traversed numerous regimes of expertise and knowledge at the UCKAR, drawing on insights 
from the university’s philosophers, sociologists, sports scientists, and artists about the broader 
significance of boxing as a site of struggle and mastery over the self. Panel discussions, 
conceptualized as an integral part of the performance, were similarly eclectic: psychoanalysts, 
community organizers, anthropologists, and physical theatre experts all engaged in theoretical 
and scholarly forms of agon35 that complemented the battle happening in the ring. By putting the 
disciplined and vulnerable body into examination from diverse perspectives in its production and 
performance, Agon was an attempt to take bodies seriously, and to theorize the body in struggle 
across racial, socioeconomic, and epistemic domains at the site of a single performance.  
Agon also took as its aim the development of an ethics that would seek to transcend 
boundaries and borders in forms of self-mastery and self-overcoming. In its examination of 
bodily struggle, Agon invited its audiences and panel participants to engage, more deeply, their 
own forms of agon. The result, it was hoped, would be a new ethics that would mediate new 
forms of knowledge and new genres of performance. 
Drawing on my observations and participation in Agon, I argue that the work was an 
attempt to get professors, students, and surrounding community at the UCKAR to take bodies 
seriously. While the project was not a failure, Agon came up against significant forms of 
constraint. Despite Athina’s travels across the university to generate interest and expert epistemic 
investment in the show, attendance at Agon was sparse, and the panel discussions unfolded to 
completely empty rooms. Athina’s invitation to theorize the body required the transcendence of 
                                                          
35 By way of a basic definition, the word ‘agon’ refers to a struggle or contest. Later in the chapter, I go in depth 
about the original Greek usage and the ways in which it informs the work.  
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the boundaries of disciplinary expertise and a flexible set of epistemologies that are deeply at 
odds with the UCKAR—a space marked by an audit culture (Strathern 2001) in which 
disciplinary orthodoxy and its products as a profession (weighed through assessments) are 
paramount. Gaps in trans- and cross-disciplinary forms of thinking about the body did not lead to 
the student protests that would take place less than a year later, but they do stand as a prior and 
more elite iteration of irresolvable conflicts around the body. Agon as an artwork and the agon 
unfolding through the protests, that is, are both visible evidence of violence—both epistemic and 
embodied—that are continuing to threaten the legitimacy of a post-Mandela South Africa, and its 
universities in particular.  
Athina 
Athina is about five feet tall and has the muscular 
physique of a dancer. Her hair, blonde and punky, would 
either spike up in pieces or lay down flat in a sort of 
disorganized part, depending on her activities for the day. A 
day lecturing in front of students does not render her 
appearance more conservative; her fashion transmitted the 
edgy habitus of the artist no matter what the venue. Much 
like me, Athina can routinely get away with being estimated 
some five to ten years younger than her actual age. Her 
small stature, her intense energy (mediated through rapid-
fire Greek-accented English), and her heterodox fashions 
emanate from a relentless, buzzing source of energy.    
Athina at Rehearsals for Agon, May 
2014 
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The sense of urgency that Athina seemed to have every waking moment is, for most 
people, reserved only for moments of sheer panic. She had a hectic, frantic, scattered drive to all 
her activities, as though she was perpetually running fifteen minutes late wherever she goes in 
life (and she most often was). More fundamentally, she has a sense of intense restlessness that 
propelled her from one activity to the next, unable to imagine what life could be like otherwise. 
“The moment I stop flowing…” she once began to muse, trailing off. She could not even 
imagine, it seemed, how it would feel to be completely at rest. A chaotic and boundless energy 
was her default.  
Then again, it is worth mentioning that I met her at a particularly busy time in her life. 
The latest iteration of a project that she would produce during my stay in Grahamstown was 
already revving into production, and as the director, choreographer, and artistic visionary, Athina 
was solely responsible for making sure that things fell into place. Quite often, things did not, 
setting off a new crisis and a new burst of hectic problem solving.  
When she is not in the United Kingdom or back in Greece creating commissioned works, 
Athina has made her home in Grahamstown for nearly ten years as a figure that seems to revel in 
her liminal social status. While Athina has spent various periods in official positions within the 
drama department (as a lecturer, and most recently as an artist in residence for the First Physical 
Theatre Company), she has spent just as much time living outside of them. Professing herself to 
have no status, Athina sees herself as “a traveler or a passenger” from one thing to another, 
constantly on the move both physically and intellectually.  
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A lifestyle characterized by sustained antistructure doesn’t bother Athina, but it did put a 
strain on her relationships at the time. Her partner Peter expressed a good deal of frustration over 
the fact that she generates no reliable income as an artist. For her work as the director, producer, 
and choreographer of Agon (three month’s work by conservative standards) she drew as her 
payment the sum of 10,000 rand; well under 1,000 dollars. “I was never driven by money,” she 
argued, “but in a way I always managed to survive gracefully.” Part of surviving gracefully, for 
better or worse, meant that Peter would pick up some of their joint expenses as a couple. 
Athina’s sense of his confusion and irritation over exactly what Athina does was palpable: “If 
you can’t rationalize it, is it research?” she asked, mirroring his perspective. “No, he thinks it’s 
purely dances that make absolutely no sense.” While Peter would eventually (and publicly) 
express great pride for Athina and tout the non-monetary and non-instrumental value of her 
work, the ways in which she consistently flouted concerns of economic utility was initially a 
frustration and a source of tension.    
Athina’s liminal positioning with regard to the university is matched by a sense of 
epistemic liminality; intellectually, Athina lives and plays “in the cracks” between disciplines, 
methodologies, and ways of knowing the world. Although her background is “purely dance,” she 
told me, “in my mind I always had other ideas”: themes and spatial configurations that 
consistently transgressed the borders of her own disciplinary expertise. Her experimentation with 
site-specific works caused her to increasingly branch out—first, to other artistic disciplines that 
could be collaboratively brought into conversation with her choreography, and eventually outside 
the realm of art entirely. Driven by the constant search for new forms of bodily movement and 
bodily understanding, Athina can’t settle for an orthodox set of approaches for how bodies ought 
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to move. Instead, each new work brings with it the cultivation of epistemic communities that 
comprise a wide range of interlocutors from a number of different disciplines.   
Her departure from the purity of her own discipline and professionalization has meant 
that ideas of excellence and the drive to create “high art” forms of perfection had to be rethought. 
This was especially the case in a commissioned work that Athina called her “breaking point.” 
Commissioned to create a site-specific piece for the reopening of London’s Royal Festival Hall 
in 2007, Athina found herself working with 150 students, many of whom were marginalized in 
some way, whether because of their race, disability, gender, or socio-economic status. The six-
story newly renovated concert hall normally would have been the occasion for a large scale 
spectacle, beautifully choreographed, aesthetically excellent. To a large extent, this is what the 
producers of the show wanted, although according to Athina they also stipulated that she “spend 
the money quickly and make something.” Feeling that she was a pawn being deployed to 
celebrate token instances of diversity, Athina decided to use the opportunity to strike out beyond 
her expertise as a choreographer. Nothing was straightforward about her attempt to work with 
marginalized bodies: when she wasn’t fighting to center those with bodies typically seen as 
grotesque, ugly, or deformed, she was actively intervening into knife fights between the rival 
gang members that also made up part of her cast. Nonetheless, she found a kind of chaotic 
beauty in working with different bodies. The work was an attempt to center their ways of 
knowing and forms of movement, allowing them to speak on their own terms rather than by 
choreographic fiat. 
This production caused Athina’s conception of aesthetic excellence to be radically 
rethought. “Things changed. My whole life changed,” she told me. There was something larger, 
for her, than aesthetic product. Pushing through borders and boundaries, whether bodily or 
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intellectual, had become a way of life for her; the water she swims in. Most importantly, the 
conceptualization and theorization of her work no longer begins in her own expertise but in a 
dialogical process that includes her performers.  
Agon, her latest work, was thus animated by epistemic approaches and tensions between 
embodiment and intellectual labor that had been developing for quite some time. As a sustained 
meditation on visceral forms of embodied struggle, the challenge inherent in Agon, for Athina, 
was that the language of the body is of a different order than theory. “We live into its fuzziness,” 
she argued. At the same time, the ineffability of embodied experience needed to be rendered 
intelligible in order to showcase bodily knowledge as a legitimate companion to theory: “I 
thought: if we can make this bridge where bodily knowledge is legitimate and serves theory—is 
that possible?” she wondered. “And if it is, how? So that’s, I think, the…what was your question 
again?” Athina set her coffee down absentmindedly. In her own ruminations on the struggle 
between cogito and body,36 she had lost sight of the theoretical question at hand in our interview 
(a question I had asked about her methodology), which was put to her fairly poorly at any rate.  
Agon: Conflict and Catharsis  
Athina envisioned Agon: Conflict and Catharsis in Boxing and Performance as a 
multidisciplinary theatrical event that combined a performance of the rituals and social spaces of 
boxing with academic inquiry and discussion. “Performance-led research,” one of the primary 
goals of the work, would be facilitated through an examination of a boxer as well as a “ring girl.” 
Athina hoped to acknowledge, through both these characters, the centrality of process and 
conflict within the liminal spaces of boxing: moments of pause, of preparation, of steadying the 
                                                          
36 Athina’s reflections undoubtedly proceed from a Cartesian bifurcation of mind and body that is characteristic of 
intellectual expertise more broadly (see Boyer 2005). At the same time, similar to the practitioners of Physical 
Theatre in chapter one, she approaches this divide with the body as a starting point.   
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self. These private moments of conflict and struggle would culminate in public presentations of a 
bodily self that showed a sense of mastery and transcendence. For the boxer, this would be 
accomplished through a live and unscripted bout with an opponent that would be viewed by the 
audience, who would take their places on stage as part of the “community of the ring.” For the 
ring girl, moments of agon would culminate in a performance that combined feminine sexuality 
and bodily power. Agon would also mimic a sense of economic agon through a bidding war that 
would take place as spectators vied with each other for ownership of a piece of art, the sale of 
which would raise money to benefit the local boxing club.  
Three separate panel discussions, considered an integral part of the performance, would 
also take place to process the evidence created by the work. These panels, which encompassed 
disciplines ranging from water science to psychoanalysis, focused on different facets of boxing 
in an attempt to draw knowledge from the embodied practices put on display. The first panel in 
particular would follow a similar format to a boxing match with some modifications: standing in 
separate corners, each of two contributors at a time would have two minutes to give a 
presentation utilizing their own disciplinary frameworks to come to substantive insights about 
boxing. Immediately after, their partner would do the same. Unlike the boxing match, these 
presentations were not antagonistic but collaborative, seeking an answer to the question of 
whether “there is scope for a hybrid performance form which might emerge out of sports as 
drama.” Two subsequent panel discussions would take place the next day to explore facets of 
interdisciplinarity and the social and political facets of boxing.  
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Athina’s vision for Agon as a production evokes, in many ways, the fluidity of agon in its 
ancient Greek usage. It is indeed difficult to overestimate the ubiquity of agon in ancient Greek 
life, given that it referred broadly to contests and struggles that occurred across a variety of 
social domains. War, of course, was one major form of agon, though agon also referred to 
competitive events like gymnikos agon (athletic competitions), hippikos agon (equestrian 
competitions), and mousikos agon (musical competitions).37 Athina’s focus on boxing (itself 
having origins in ancient Greece) places her work within the lineage of such events.  
At the same time, Athina’s commitment to the centrality of debate, discussion, and 
reflection connects her vision for Agon to ancient Greek tragedy and its engagement with civic 
life. Ancient Greek theatre, that is, was also a site of agon in multiple ways. Theatre itself could a 
site of competition between plays, between playwrights, and between actors (Cartledge 1997), 
much like a contemporary drama or film festival. More importantly, agon was a formal element 
within tragedy itself. Generally coming at a point at which two characters (or, at times, one 
character and the chorus) argued from two opposing positions, the agon served to explicitly lay 
out the fundamental conflict of a tragedy and the logics that animated it (Llyod 1992).  
It is precisely with regard to tragic agon that the lines between distinct spheres of agon in 
ancient Greece blurs most radically, for tragedians look the rhetorical form and structure of 
tragic agon directly from civic life. Llyod (1992) argues that the plays of Euripedes in particular 
“clearly owe a great deal, both in form and in content, to a variety of situations in contemporary 
Athenian life which provided a formal context for the conflict of arguments. Prominent among 
them were the lawcourts, but the political and diplomatic debates were also relevant” (1992, 2). 
                                                          
37 See Miller 2004.  
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Far from simply borrowing from and mimicking these contexts, theatre was in a “productively 
dialogical relationship” with the law, such that orators wrote tragedies as well as forms of legal 
argumentation for clients (Cartledge 1997, 14-15). Ancient Greek tragedy, then, not only 
participated in the competitive spirit of agon, but also overlapped with other civic forms of agon. 
The use of agon in tragedy was “an integral part of its engagement with the public life of the 
contemporary city” (Goldhill 1997, 135).   
Athina’s ambitious goal for Agon was to evoke something of the original blurriness 
between theatre and civic life by stitching together seemingly distinct fields in academia and 
performance. By pairing performances of preparation and combat with discussions among 
members of a robust epistemic community, she hoped to represent agon artistically, while also 
showcasing a theatrical sense of agon as a method of critique and exploration. Engagement with 
a broad scope of individuals from the UCKAR community, she hoped, would show signs of “a 
truly interdisciplinary process of observation, reflection and knowledge” to push agon out of the 
space of theatre and into the university community. For Athina, the entire production stood as 
evidence of the agon “between theory and practice, academia and non- academia, the cerebral 
versus the embodied.” In these ways, Agon was an epistemic endeavor that played between 
boundaries of expertise as much as it was an embodied, physical endeavor.  
Taken as a whole, Agon is part of a broader trajectory of interdisciplinary performance 
pieces created by Athina. Topos (2011) and Polis (2012), were both productions for the annual 
National Arts Festival that created collaborative spaces of academic discussion paired with 
performance, often occurring alongside each other. The difference between Agon and these 
works was its central research question (or as Athina framed it in her program notes, “the same 
damn simple question): “if most of us share a body with two arms, two legs, one torso, one head 
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which makes us experience a kind of ‘knowing’ and sharing because of our physical genetic 
make, how can we use this basic inherent knowledge to better ourselves within our daily 
encounters and strivings, our agon?” The goal was thus to generate knowledge through the 
starting point of embodiment. The bodies of the boxers (as well as the body of the ring girl) 
would create an immersive kinesthetic environment from which forms of embodied knowledge 
could be theorized and worked out collaboratively. 
 Through processes of production and performance, Athina—and Agon as her work—
would encounter numerous forms of constraint within the context of the university. These forms 
of constraint, at times, came from enforcement of the boundaries and borders of the different  
regimes of expertise that Athina seemed to revel in muddying.38 Other forms of constraint would 
become apparent as Athina’s interlocutors attempted to overcome their own forms of epistemic 
struggle to help her theorize the work’s themes more deeply. In the sections that follow, I track 
Athina’s process of traversing the university to generate the forms of expertise and theorization 
that she hoped would be put into dialogue with the work, and discuss the performance itself. 
Agon was a success in some ways, but the same time, the work drew a disappointingly low 
turnout, and its panel discussions unfolded to empty rooms, failing to generate the sustained 
theorization and dialog about the body in struggle that Athina had hoped for.   
 
 
 
                                                          
38 Here, I draw analytical inspiration from Abbot (1988), who emphasizes enforcement, contestation, and dispute of 
epistemic borders as constitutive of the professions more broadly.   
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Epistemic Intersectionality: Traversing the University  
For Athina, exploring embodied struggle through boxing was, of necessity, an 
interdisciplinary conversation that had to unfold in multiple registers. Praxis, for her, could not 
be separated from theory, and embodiment could not be parsed from cognitive processes. 
Understanding the body of the boxer meant that race, class, gender, and socioeconomic position 
had to be taken into account. The social contexts surrounding boxing—not only the bout itself 
but more liminal spaces of waiting and anticipation—were also priorities. In terms of a research 
project, Agon was a tall order indeed. While Athina could not simultaneously play the role of 
sociologist, ethnographer, philosopher, and psychologist, she saw her task as bringing experts 
from these fields together in the formation of an epistemic community that would help her 
“bridge the gaps” to derive knowledge from the visceral and embodied evidence of struggle that 
Agon would present.  
Unbeknownst to me until 
her visit to a sociology 
class, ethnographic 
methods constituted a 
central part of Athina’s 
research for the 
development of Agon. 
Inspired the “carnal 
sociology” of Loïc 
Wacquant (2015), and in 
particular, by his research on boxing (2004), Athina had engaged in her own ethnographic 
Athina visiting a sociology class, April 2014 
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research of boxing over the years. As such, she was presented as a social-scientific expert in her 
own right to the class, and was invited to share her ethnographic approach with the students. 
Others, it seemed, had already been speaking to the class about their uses of ethnography; 
Athina’s talk was thus presented as another “autobiographical account of research.” Even so, 
Athina did not come to the class to impart expertise but to seek it, hoping that the students and 
the professor might help contribute to a more robust social-scientific methodology for Agon.   
Athina’s own knowledge practices are driven by a foundational principle of Socratic 
ignorance—“one thing that I know,” she once told me, “is that I know nothing. I love that 
quote!” Her lecture to the sociology students at the UCKAR on ethnography was an attempt to 
deploy some of this ignorance in order to generate insights and refinements for her research. 
Athina did not profess expertise about ethnography as such. She admitted not having any training 
in ethnographic method, and denied that she spoke from any textbook. Speaking “from the heart” 
instead, Athina told the class about how she “stumbled and tripped” her way into ethnography in 
the course of her research about boxing. She was not a proper ethnographer, she told the class, 
and would produce no ethnographic product as the result of her research. She admitted that her 
research was “faulty” and asked the class to help her see where it was potentially “dodgy.”  
As she lectured about ethnography, Athina evinced a particular anxiety about the subject 
of ethics. She went out of her way to address the topic, even when it wasn’t raised by anyone in 
particular. She explicitly wanted the class to know that the research she conducted was not, in 
any conventional academic sense, ethical. She did not submit her project to guidance by an 
institutional review board. She did not hand out and collect consent forms, nor did she gain 
verbal consent for interviews beyond inviting people to participate in conversations with her. She 
readily admitted that she paid informants for their time. Ultimately, she said, sociologists and 
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other qualitative researchers are likely to have a big problem with the way she is conducting her 
research.  
Athina’s anxiety was obviously, on one level, aimed at warning the students against such 
practices, and she repeatedly told them not to do the same. Nonetheless, her lackadaisical regard 
for institutional ethics served as foil for an ethics that stood outside of institutional spaces. The 
research encounter, she told the class, is an encounter with the other, whether that other is an 
object, a group, or a person. This encounter carries the responsibility of finding ways to dialog 
and communicate; a common language must be found to facilitate this encounter. This language, 
for Athina, is barely ever verbal. “Our essence—how we experience the world—is through our 
bodies,” she told the class. Throughout her lecture Athina presented ethnography as a practice 
rooted in an ethics of encounter that is never uniform and not particularly susceptible to 
procedural ethics. It unfolds along multiple axes that transcend issues of consent and 
communication itself; a situational and dialogical exchange between ethnographer and 
interlocutor.   
In this way, Athina defended her sense of research ethics while simultaneously rendering 
it problematic. The expertise that she sought was an identification and intervention into any 
facets of her ethnographic work that were particularly suspect. Yet she was also clear that this 
project did not conform in any rigorous sense to the procedural ethics of the university. In their 
capacity as students doing their own research, they could not, of course, be encouraged to follow 
her lead. But her lecture was also an invitation to interface with her brand of guerilla 
ethnography and its ethics of encounter.  
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Her invitations to dialog and to come to the show were met mostly with silence. As 
Athina’s lecture drew to a close (and after screening a video from the boxing club in Joza), the 
obvious and embodied restlessness of the students (zipping up backbacks, packing up purses, 
looking at cellphones) signaled that the class time was already handily surpassed. Despite her 
attempts to elicit questions from the students, to get help in seeing the “dodgy” aspects of her 
project, the students were uninterested in engaging. She left them with her email address and an 
invitation to come and participate in the conversations that would take place around the 
performance.   
To deepen the engagement of theory with her project, Athina also visited a philosophy 
class that had been reading Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality. As with the sociologists, her goal 
was the deployment of expertise in service of her project, coupled with an invitation to step 
beyond disciplinary boundaries in an exploration of Agon’s themes of conflict and catharsis. “We 
talk about theory a lot, but how do we talk about the language that is visceral?” she asked the 
class. “What happens with this language, the embodied experience?” The application of 
Nietzsche, she hoped, would not only add philosophical insights to the project but also give the 
philosophers a springboard to new arenas of contemplation.39  
After a brief overview of the project, Athina introduced the three video clips of the 
project that she would show to the class, depicting rituals of preparation, a round of shadow 
boxing against an invisible opponent, and a punching workout with his trainer. The fight, Athina 
noted is “all in his head” at this point. The clips gave evidence of an intense discipline that had 
become automatic and a training regimen embodied so deeply that it left spaces for anticipation 
                                                          
39 Athina had already been reading Nietzsche prior to visiting the philosophy class. Her understanding of agon as a 
concept that included inner struggles directed at self-overcoming obviously evokes Nietzsche’s deployment of agon 
in various places (e.g. Nietzsche 2001:6-7). For more, see Hillesheim 1986; Tunsel 2013).     
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of the struggle to come. The philosophers, she hoped, would let Nietzsche speak to this context 
to unpack the themes further and more deeply. 
Through the course of the conversations that followed, which included students working 
in small groups and presenting their findings to the class, boxing emerged as an expression of the 
will to power. The training and preparation rituals, the students noted, are exceedingly “ascetic,” 
evidenced by the highly 
disciplined manner in which 
the boxer directed cruelty 
inward in an attempt at self-
mastery and excellence. 
Constraint rather than excess, 
they argued, is what leads him 
to overcome himself time and 
time again. On the other hand, 
the fight itself is not ascetic at 
all, but instead noble. The boxer—a sovereign individual in Nietzsche’s sense, fuses his nobility 
and will to power with ascetic ideals in the space of the ring. Nietzsche would not entirely 
approve of boxing—the rules make the contest a bit too restrained to truly celebrate the spectacle 
of domination. Even so, he would applaud the self-mastery and the self-overcoming of the boxer. 
Not everyone, it seemed, was completely comfortable with the direction the conversation 
was taking. In a rush toward the end of class (the next lecture would start six minutes later) a 
visiting postdoctoral student briefly took the podium to intervene into what he saw as a kind of 
intellectual seduction inherent in the project. His task, then, was to dissuade the class from being 
Discussion of Nietzsche’s ethics in a UCKAR philosophy class, April 
2014. 
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overly enchanted with the subject at hand: “It’s so important not to be infatuated by these kinds 
of acts. It is something to admire boxing and something else to be a boxer. There’s a difference 
between these two, okay?  Philosophy is a major in which you try to draw connections between 
ideas. That is philosophy, and nothing else.” He concluded by noting the vast range of ideas that 
philosophers get to work with—there are not necessarily any new ideas but endless combinations 
of existing ones.  
Despite this moment of paranoia (driven by concerns of disciplinary purity and framed in 
the erotic language of infatuation), the philosophers seemed generally earnest and excited about 
applying philosophical insights to boxing, and to seeing embodied instances of self-overcoming 
to expand their more disembodied forms of contemplation. Athina considered the conversation a 
success, and closed by making sure the students were invited to attend and contribute to the 
forthcoming panel discussions. 
Athina’s seminar and lecture circuit also brought her to the department of drama. Her 
seminar discussion in this context was not, in any sense, aimed at using the language of 
performance to approach the subject of boxing. Unlike her philosophical foray into Nietzsche, 
with its questions of nobility and the will to power, or sociology and the question of the “dodgy” 
bits of her project, there would be no disciplinary frameworks solicited in this context. While the 
theme was set as “representations of power,” we spent much of the seminar discussing the 
question of “why such an unnecessary or diversionary activity (sport) had become such a human 
necessity.” During our conversation, and unlike either of the other two disciplinary encounters, 
Athina tried the most among the members of the drama department to integrate conversations 
that she had brought with her from other disciplines. Rather than performance expertise (which, 
perhaps, was already assumed), the expertise she projected in this space was the expertise of the 
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catalyst who would bring disparate threads together. Her invitation in this space was a call to 
engage with ideas that she had heard elsewhere, including her visits to the philosophy class.    
These conversational prompts did not get much traction, seeming to stall after short, 
single-sentence answers to the points she was raising. Even so, participants in the seminar were 
generally open to the discussion and certainly engaged with Athina. Their insights were not 
grounded in epistemologies of performance, but instead comprised a collection of functionalist 
analyses of sport, observations of gender and class, and folk psychology. Taking a more critical 
approach, one faculty member “questioned the question” of whether sport truly was unnecessary, 
and argued that sport is a space of play and leisure that is intensely important. Others bemoaned 
the extent to which sport had become a “moneyed, consumerist space” and, at times, an 
unabashedly political tool of nation-building and manipulation.  
The seminar never quite gathered the momentum of a conversation. More fundamentally, 
we did not arrive at any significant sense of disciplinary expertise about sport and boxing. In 
large part, this is due to the already interdisciplinary nature of the drama department, where a 
wealth of disciplinary approaches and forms of knowledge are brought to bear on pedagogies and 
executions of performance. At the same time, there seemed to be a distinct lack of generative 
contribution from the perspective of drama or performance. 
Feeling rather surprised that no one had brought up issues related to performance or even 
aesthetics (and ignoring, in retrospect, Athina’s goal in this particular space), I attempted my 
own recklessly constructed discussion question: “One thing we haven’t touched on yet is the 
spectacle itself,” I suggested. “And the aesthetics of the spectacle that draws us even if we don’t 
play the sport.” I went on to speak to the judgements of beauty—or lack thereof—that are passed 
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upon contexts of sport, and connected notions of beauty to a sense of Kantian disinterestedness. 
A provocation intended to arouse passions around the idea that art, of necessity, could not be 
useful. No one had a chance to take the bait; Athina quickly moved to the next topic of 
discussion: the tension between spaces of preparation and the bout itself.  
A sense of disciplinary contribution was not the goal for the seminar at any rate. Athina 
was working to get other theatre artists to follow her thought process and be led through the 
epistemic tangents and rabbit holes that had characterized her work. It was an attempt, in other 
words, to push her colleagues toward her brand of epistemic eclecticism, mirroring on a smaller 
scale the process that would unfold in Agon. It did seem that her colleagues were willing to 
follow her as far as the seminar went, although only a small handful would show up for the 
performance itself, and none would attend the panel discussions happening around the work. 
Athina’s activities across the university, aimed at generating a community of expertise 
around Agon, were successful in some ways. The instructor of the philosophy class that Athina 
visited ended up presenting on one of the panels, and her visits allowed her to promote the 
performance more broadly. At the same time, it was an uneven process that was met with some 
ambivalence at various points. The suspicion evinced by the postdoctoral student in philosophy 
is a particularly salient reminder that such projects are not always particularly welcome for those 
who wish to maintain a sense of disciplinary orthodoxy. More fundamentally, few of the students 
or professors that Athina invited actually came to the performance, and none would attend the 
panel discussions aimed at putting analytic flesh on the work’s themes. The performance and 
panel discussions, to which I turn next, were the culmination (at least for the moment) of 
Athina’s research on boxing. The reception of and participation in the work is, I argue, visible 
evidence of the constraints against which Agon had to unfold.    
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In the Ring  
Embodied Agon 
Agon and the panel discussions took place in the UCKAR’s Box Theater, a smaller, 
darker, more intimate setting outside of the larger venue within the same building. The Box was 
an ideal setting for Agon: in this space, there is not any substantive distance between the staging 
area and the spectators. The single entrance and exit discouraged quick dispersion of the 
audience, while the warmth of the lobby immediately outside invited further reflection and 
conversation.  
Rather than recapitulate the entire performance, I focus instead on moments of the show 
meant to produce evidence of simultaneously embodied, cognitive, and affective forms of agon. 
In particular, I focus on moments that would be explicitly taken up for reflection by the panel 
discussions that would follow after the work: the moments of preparation and the spectacles of 
violence and blood that would occur during the bout sequence. These moments of struggle would 
serve as the impetus and springboard for more sustained reflection and theorization.   
Agon revolved, in many 
ways, around private 
moments: of self-
composure, of struggle, of 
preparation. Early in the 
show, in a dark and 
otherwise silent space, Mzi 
steadied himself as he Mzi prepares for his bout 
142 
 
 
slowly and methodically wound tape around his wrists. Mzi didn’t look at his hands at all while 
doing so; he had obviously performed this ritual countless times. Muscle memory made space for 
contemplation as he stared out into the empty space thinking about his upcoming bout. His 
trainer entered the scene, carefully checking Mzi’s wrapping job by flexing his wrists back and 
forth. The sharp percussion of the music evoked a sense of time passing and evoked a pensive 
mood that complimenting Mzi’s restless contemplation.  
Visualizing the presence of his opponent, Mzi moved into a short round of shadow 
boxing, followed by a more sustained period of preparation that included a variety of different 
physical exercises: footwork drills around cones, jumping rope, and relentlessly throwing 
punches into a set of pads held by his trainer. Musically, his activities were punctuated by the 
slow dirge of Vivaldi’s Stabat Mater, which, after a few minutes, was taken over by the chaotic 
energy of Prodigy’s rave anthem Poison. As the transition happened, Mzi shifted from his quiet 
and contemplative state to a frantic outburst of intense activity. The contrast between the two 
songs—one quiet and mournful, the other, abrasive and confrontational—was a presentation of a 
kind of dualism inherent in agon: a kind of fearful quietude paired with a relentless urge to 
annihilate.  
Within Agon, Mzi was not performing simply as a boxer, but a black South African boxer 
from the township of Joza, evidenced by the footage of his boxing club that played in the 
background at various points in the performance. The disciplining of his body, accomplished 
through rigorous training and exercise, was also made evident through a team of sports scientists 
that, throughout the show, constantly took stock of his heartrate and other biometric information. 
But Mzi was not just a body—he engaged in intense periods of contemplation as a form of 
preparation, and was constantly probed for information on his own internal mental states. 
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Throughout the show Mzi as boxer thus emerges through the intersections of race and class, 
embodiment and rationality. 
The exploration of the “ring girl” that followed Mzi’s preparations was similarly an 
exploration at the embodied nexus of gender, race, and sexuality. Rather than preparing for a 
fight against an opponent, however, she struggled to make her body conform to the relentless 
standards of femininity and beauty required by her job. Once again, Stabat Mater gave emotive 
content to her own forms of agon as she mentally prepared herself to bear the symbolic and 
physical weight of the signs she would carry for the fight’s spectators and practiced her 
choreography, mimicking the movements she would make once the bout started. Other forms of 
warming up, which included her own version of shadow boxing, were understood to be occurring 
in private before the match, but carried both a determination and a sense of urgency.  
Her preparations demonstrated forms of power that are rendered invisible in her 
performance as ring girl, and her monolog to the audience would likewise dwell in the tension 
between private and public personas. “They call me Foxy,” she told the audience:  
I’m a size 34A. Small, but sexy. I’m sexy. I’m a fighter. My mother used to say: ‘no guts, 
no glory. No pain, no gain.’ I’m a dancer. Yes, I have a child. I ring the bell. I walk the 
rounds. I like walking the rounds. I call the rounds. I ring the bell. I ring the bell on the 
graveyard shift. I…You don’t know who I am.  
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After her monolog was over, Foxy applied lipstick and a grotesque, tangled mess of a blond wig 
to replace her short, brown hair. Stiletto heels replaced her workout sneakers, and Stabat Mater 
would play again once she made her entrance into the stadium, now performing as the ring girl. 
Her movements as the ring girl were intense, seemingly impossible feats of balance and strength. 
One particular moment found her holding a large sign in one hand and one ankle in the other, all 
while balancing on the tiny 
point of one stiletto heel. 
Overcome by the weight of her 
sign, she eventually collapsed as 
the music reached a point of 
mournful crescendo.  But the 
bout was starting soon. She 
picked herself back up and, as the Prodigy once again began blaring, resumed her sexualized 
composure. It was her job to get the audience excited. 
Once the announcer had invited the audience to form the “community of the ring” on 
stage around the fighters and appropriate introductions had been made for each fighter, the bout 
began in earnest. Mzi and Anele, wearing protective head gear, sparred with each other across 
the ring, throwing cautious jabs and dodging punches where they could. In rehearsals, both men 
had been instructed by their coach not to spar too hard, as a serious injury to Mzi would 
jeopardize a bout he would fight in East London only a few days later. 
"Foxy" collapsing under the weight of her sign and gendered 
expectations of beauty. 
145 
 
 
Those actively taking part in the performance, such as Mzi’s trainer and the four drama 
students who served as living posts for the ring—cheered and called out sporadic encouragement 
and points of coaching, particularly when one or the other of the men would land a successful 
punch. The audience itself remained utterly silent throughout much of the fight, uncomfortable 
with their complicity 
in the violence that 
unfolded. They 
tended to jump back 
from the ring if the 
boxers go a little too 
close, and many 
watched with their 
arms crossed, itself a 
kind of defensive posture. Far from the crowd that would ordinarily gather for such a spectacle, 
audience members at the performance were squeamish and noncommittal in their support for the 
community of the ring. This lack of enthusiastic support didn’t tend to dampen the energy of 
either of the combatants, but it did somewhat dispel the pretense of a serious bout with serious 
consequences. 
The audience was shocked out of their complacency at a particularly visceral moment in 
the bout that came about in a completely unscripted way. Anele took a hard punch to his nose, 
and soon blood was gushing from the wound and spraying across the stage. Despite the shocked 
gasps from the spectators, the fight continued with no interference from the referee. Afterward, 
the ring girl did her best to mop the blood up with a paper towel, but a good deal still remained 
Mzi and Anele face off, with drama students serving as "living posts" for the ring. 
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after the bout was over. In subsequent conversations, I learned that this moment was especially 
disturbing and jarring for many in the audience. They obviously had not expected to see blood, 
and the safe pretense of theatre had been disrupted in a radical way.  
Disturbing as it was, seeing the blood on Anele’s face and on the canvas and seeing the 
very embodied stakes of the competition was a pivotal moment for many. Those who would take 
place in Agon’s panel discussions the next day repeatedly recalled this incident as one in which 
distinctions between art and life became blurred, and when issues of embodiment became 
central. Anele was not seriously injured, but the sight of blood was itself visible evidence of agon 
written on and flowing from the body.  
Getting Punched in the Face: Interdisciplinary Agon   
Agon was supplemented by three panel discussions, which were considered an integral 
part of the performance. It was here that evidence, provided by the body, would be examined 
more closely and critically by multidisciplinary panels of academic experts. The organic creation 
of new approaches to the body and new forms of knowledge was indeed the impetus for the work 
in the first place, and the panels were where the work of “bridging the gaps” between practice 
and theory would take place. Unfortunately, this work did not generate the participation and 
enthusiasm that Athina had hoped. While the performance of Agon was somewhat dampened by 
low attendance and a lack of enthusiasm for its bout and its auction, the panel discussions were 
greeted with completely empty rooms. The lack of response from the university community and 
Grahamstown more broadly was evidence of constraint on multiple levels: refusal to participate, 
failure to think beyond the confines of discipline, the enforcement of epistemic borders, and a 
lack of interest in the discussions that were repeatedly and earnestly promoted by Athina.    
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The lack of enthusiasm for Athina’s project cannot be reduced to a simple distaste for 
performance as a genre of critique and exploration, at least in the context of the UCKAR. The 
university routinely commissions works by the drama department to portray pressing campus 
issues and provoke discussion about them—part of the department’s intellectual labor on behalf 
of the university. Productions that tackle issues of race in particular have been praised as 
effective pedagogical tools for audiences as well as the actors themselves (Sutherland 2013a, 
2013b), and during my time at Rhodes I witnessed a series of performances that introduced basic 
issues of scholarship, including citation, plagiarism, and work-life balance. Performance, in the 
context of the UCKAR, is not generally a liability to facilitating conversation but is indeed 
routinely deployed as an asset. The medium of performance itself thus cannot be meaningfully 
posed as an explanation for why Agon, on some levels at least, failed to generate the response 
that Athina hoped.  
While Athina enjoys prestige and professional status in the UK and Greece, her deliberate 
marginal positioning relative to the UCKAR as an institution does not do her any favors, nor do 
her consistent attempts to muddy epistemic distinctions between disciplines. While her labor 
does, in a sense, result in a product of discernable disciplinary origin (performance), it is not the 
authorized research product of the university, strictly speaking. And while she was able to enjoy 
the use of the theatre department’s facilities and some amount of support, Agon was not the 
product of the department itself.40    
                                                          
40 The department’s own productions were much better attended—especially those that were made compulsory for 
students. Other productions through the department would receive much more promotion. I do not intend this as a 
criticism of the department itself, but simply a way of noting the professional resources to which Athina did not 
have access.  
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Athina’s particular brand of performance-driven conversation had detractors as well, 
which added to the weight of her marginal positioning relative to the UCKAR. Some invited 
panelists shared Athina’s commitment to themes of embodiment and struggle, but did not agree 
with the genre in which she presented her epistemic forays. Richard Pithouse, an activist-
intellectual who has used the UCKAR as a base for work alongside a number of social 
movements, did not take Athina’s project seriously and refused to participate. A previous work 
in which he participated, Polis, had (according to him) made a mockery of the subject of 
inequality through its absurd panel structure, which included an academic debate in which chairs 
were positioned around a seductive pole dancer. He categorically refused to be a part of Agon, 
and others failed to show for similar reasons.     
Whether because of her marginal status relative to the UCKAR, her epistemic muddying, 
or a sense of unease with her style, the panel discussions suffered from a decisive lack of 
attendance or interest. Toward the end of the second of Agon’s panels, titled “Everyone has a 
plan until they get punched in the face,” the emptiness in the room could not go unremarked. 
However earnest and penetrating the dialog of the panel, we did, at some point, have to come to 
grips with the reality that no one was really there to see it, other than those involved in some 
other facet of the production (an audience of four people). No one—from the drama department, 
from other departments, or from the community of Grahamstown more broadly—was present to 
engage or hear the ideas that the panelists presented. Toward the end of the panel, Athina wearily 
reflected on the dismal attendance of the panel, comparing it with similar attempts at 
interdisciplinary dialogue in the past:  
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“It’s interesting if you look around here, we are in a theatre. With one, two, three, four, 
five people. You have a very interesting conversation, and I’ve been given the space both 
physical and intellectual from the department. But like with a [previous] year-and-a-half 
series of events, it’s often that my own colleagues and students are never here. We start 
something in order to facilitate a platform to understand something about bodily 
knowledge and interaction. But when it comes to it, people are not here. And it’s not 
about marketing. This [previous] series of interdisciplinary events I started, the idea was 
that you start with the body and try to get the students to be familiar with other ways and 
other manners of bodily expression beyond drama. Rather than just be immersed in 
drama studies only, they know how other artistic or other expressions happen. I felt that 
would be incredible and attract a lot of people…And anyone could be here—except for 
the students and the staff. So by talking about this lonely space…This space that one has 
to stand for, that has a sacrifice, and it’s not economical. This was the question I had: can 
this interdisciplinary space be economical? Does it serve the system of the university?”  
Athina’s comments reflect multiple frustrations. One long-held grievance, shared with me 
multiple times, is the token support given to her by the department of drama. No one openly 
opposes her projects of course, and support in terms of space and time is “nicely and kindly” 
provided. Yet the support she truly desires—engagement with her cross-disciplinary explorations 
of the body—is not met with any response. Her gift of provocation, of time and space to engage 
other ways of creating knowledge, creating movement, creating connections, is not reciprocated 
in kind. More broadly, she expressed an honest sense of doubt about whether it is having any 
sense of broader impact in the space of the university. What the lectures, the discussions, and the 
provocations amount to at the end of the day is a mostly empty room rather than the kind of 
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robust engagement she would have hoped for; the kind of engagement that she desired, as a 
pedagogue, to pass on to her students.  
The panel discussion was indeed a lonely space. Having known Athina—having seen her 
frantic last minute plans, hectic adjustments, and almost berserk energy—I have been tempted 
since Agon ended to see the low turnout of the panel discussions as the result of her poor 
promotion. At the same time, the lack of reciprocation from broader scholarly and artistic 
communities is part of a broader trajectory that encompasses, for Athina, not only this event but 
others as well. For this work, the room will always—seemingly of necessity—be lonely, empty, 
and quiet. There is no visible practical benefit, and such endeavors are generally seen as 
superfluous and trivial. There was simply no demand on campus for a sustained study and 
theorization of the body.  
The panel discussions proceeded in earnest nonetheless. The second panel, “Everyone 
Has a Plan Until They Get Punched in the Face,” was the most explicit attempt to use Agon as 
point of departure for the generation of new forms of knowledge. The discussions that emerged 
from this panel in particular embodied the epistemic and ethical orientations that Athina had in 
mind for Agon. According to James Sey, who chaired the panel, the goal of the discussions was 
not only to start a conversation about embodied research, but also to interrogate the agon of 
research itself. The panelists would focus on agon “not only as a negative conflictual struggle but 
as a productive struggle between practice and research viewed as an intellectual activity,” he 
argued. This “productive struggle” would take as its point of departure the evidence of bodily 
knowledge and bodily struggle that was made visible during the previous night’s performance. In 
conversation with this embodied knowledge, the panel would give panelists and audiences the 
opportunity to think beyond the boundaries of narrow disciplinary confines and generate new 
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forms of knowledge that had bodies as their origin: township bodies (Mzi and his trainer), 
sexualized bodies (the ring girl), bodies in pain (Mzi’s opponent), and elite, academic bodies. 
The interpretation of this evidence would unfold within an eclectic epistemic community 
carefully assembled by Athina, which included Sey (listed in the program as a “theorist, artist, 
writer, boxer”), Sue Southwood (from the Centre for Higher Education Research, Teaching, and 
Learning), Lisa Saville Young (a psychoanalytic therapist), Craig Patterson (a PhD candidate in 
history), and Tally Palmer (from the Institute of Water Research). Some of the panelists were 
firmly entrenched within the UCKAR as professors or PhD students (Southwood, Patterson), 
while others had more tenuous connections to the university (Sey and Palmer). Collectively, the 
group was committed to cross-disciplinary forms of thinking and dialog. 
While the thread tying interdisciplinarity to the question of embodied knowledge was thin 
at times, it was at its most visible when the discussion turned to performance. “We start the 
world totally in our bodies,” Saville Young mused, “there’s no ability to think about our bodies. 
We just are our bodies. We like to forget that later on. We like to think that we are our thoughts 
and words, and I think performance reminds us about that.” Agon in particular contained these 
reminders in a visceral way: the blood that had sprayed the mat during the previous night’s 
performance had deeply impacted all the panelists. The bodily stakes are high in boxing; the 
possibility of pain and blood and sweat are always present.  
The sweat and pain of the boxers (who were incidentally only supposed to be sparring) 
stands, in many ways, in stark contrast to the clean and polished product that academics produce. 
Even so, the panelists argued, the generation of knowledge is itself an embodied activity, a 
process vulnerable in its own ways. This vulnerability is twofold: first, an intensely embodied 
sense of confusion, of frustration, of hesitation; the affect produced when one is trapped in front 
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of an empty word document populated only by a blinking cursor. These are not cerebral, 
intellectual experiences. Secondly, panelists recognized the vulnerability inherent in appearing 
invulnerable to others. The vicissitudes of research are effaced, rendering epistemic struggle and 
the knowledge-making process invisible. Struggle and pain, present in every research endeavor, 
are completely obfuscated in the presentation of final research product, giving the sense that the 
process was effortless and inevitable. “The result seems to be that the research comes across as a 
sort of victorious part of you. You’ve subdued this minor opponent—the research question—as if 
the opponent didn’t stand any chance. I think anyone who’s done any research will admit that 
that thing really could have beaten you,” he confessed. Interdisciplinary research, other panelists 
argued, was a way of making this struggle visible through a process of wrestling and 
collaboration with others. For the panelists, then, vulnerability in research and vulnerability 
about research are, as a matter of ethics, part of research. The production of knowledge is a 
vulnerable process, and that vulnerability was admitted to be keenly felt on a physical level. 
Epistemic agon is not only cognitive, that is, but physical and affective as well. Despite the 
decisive lack of an audience for the panel, it had constituted a form of community that had 
rendered these forms of agon visible.   
While the stated nature of the panel was to “discuss the place of embodiment for research 
in the tertiary institution,” the panelists spent the majority of their time working out an 
epistemology that would facilitate interdisciplinary knowledge production. On the one hand, this 
epistemology chaffed at the borders and boundaries of institutionalized academic disciplines. 
There was no compelling reason, some panelists argued, why methodology should remain 
orthodox in the face of questions that can only be answered through the utilization of a broader 
range of approaches. This is not to say that traditional disciplines and their methodologies ought 
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to be abandoned. Some questioned whether quality would sacrificed once disciplinary integrity is 
breached in favor of broader insight. Others, like Southwood, argued that promoting spaces 
between and beyond disciplinary domains does not preclude disciplinary expertise. “What could 
be built on is the notion of a hybrid of deep expertise and broad experience…A matrix, a warp 
and weft of strong disciplinary structures supporting a tapestry of authentic, engaged, meaningful 
knowledge making,” she argued. The epistemology sought by the panelists was thus one that was 
open to breaching boundaries when necessary, and more fundamentally, a sense that breaches 
needed to be plentiful to explore questions that were not susceptible to orthodox methodological 
approaches.  
For all the panelists, the ethics of interdisciplinarity was driven, on the one hand, by a 
kind of hard-headed pragmatism. Disciplinary orthodoxy, panelists argued, becomes a plane of 
constraint and circularity that cannot respond in robust ways to new questions, let alone generate 
them. Getting “punched in the face” was thus a metaphor for the realization that epistemic and 
methodological frameworks bound by the conventions of a particular discipline ought to be 
abandoned for tools “nearer to hand.” On the other hand, it was mediated by an ethics of 
becoming that actively sought out spaces of discomfort and unease both for academics and their 
audiences. “I think discomfort is our best ethical barometer,” Palmer declared. The discomfort 
here is not necessarily bodily but instead epistemic: too much certainty and confidence about 
knowledge, she went on to argue, means that one is not “in ethical space.” The reconciling 
principle between a “punch in the face” and an embrace of ambiguity was straightforward for 
panelists: the punch in the face came about in the first place precisely because of certainty. Like 
a boxer taking his or her victory as an inevitability, epistemic rigidity and certainty only set one 
up to fall harder. And each panelist indeed had their own conversion narrative; a blinding 
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encounter where the limits of knowledge and the vicissitudes of academic research pushed him 
or her toward a decisive opening of relational, rational, and embodied horizons.  
Of course, not every discipline will hold out the possibility of generative excess and the 
imperative to transgress the boundaries of analytic encounter. For those that do, however, 
epistemic ethics demand the recognition that transgression is both authentic and necessary to 
pursue questions of fundamental import: not disembodied theoretical questions, the water 
scientist argued, but questions of how and why, for instance, water legislation meant to transform 
a racialized system of resource distribution has not done much but spin its wheels for the last 
twenty years. This question, indeed, was the “punch in the face” that first drove her to seek more 
interdisciplinary approaches to her own research.    
“Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the face” was an earnest assessment of the 
nature of constraint in the context of the UCKAR and South African universities more broadly. 
In some ways, the panelists recognized, disciplinary purity does come with its own benefits and 
safety. There is a certain comfort associated with the gravitas of authority that comes from 
expertise within a discipline; while disciplinary orthodoxy can be confining at times, at least 
people will tend to grant assent toward one’s argument when it is made from a position rich in 
cultural capital rather than, say, a starving artist or (worse yet) an independent academic.  
At the same time, panelists found these advantages to be generally outweighed by 
enormous costs: the water scientist in particular noted, with a sense of bored frustration, the 
amount of time consumed by writing and producing academic papers rather than “uncovering 
and loosening the knots of practical problems.” Work within a discipline, for her, is a 
disembodied act of contemplation that does not generally happen in concert with others. She 
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need only look to the meetings that happen around municipal water distribution to see a group of 
diverse actors applying different facets of expertise in a practical way. Academia, for her, is 
disengaged and isolated from problems that are “profoundly more useful than the paper I may or 
may not find time to write” in the midst of eking out research funding.  
Freedom from the constraint of academic discipline, for the panelists, affords the 
opportunity for epistemic hybridity. It forces one to find common ground and a common 
epistemic language to speak with others, making it more applicable to the issues that seem to 
constantly vex Grahamstown: racial divides, resource distribution, and a legacy of colonialism in 
South African academia. And if the directive is to produce ever-increasing amounts of 
knowledge, it is ethically sound to venture as broadly as possible, panelists argued. Nonetheless, 
the community practicing this form of freedom was small. The room, as we had noted, was an 
empty one.    
If disciplinary orthodoxy and institutional divisions of intellectual labor constituted one 
set of constraints, the work Athina hoped to accomplish through Agon was also constrained by 
the panelists themselves. Although Agon had the stated aims of gathering and celebrating 
heterodox disciplinary approaches, there were moments where disciplinary orthodoxy and the 
adherence to rigid academic conventions indeed seemed to trump attempts at theorizing the body 
in struggle across history and across epistemic borders. Indeed, I was complicit in these 
contradictions.  
The panel to which I contributed, for example, had the goal of exploring “how boxing 
might be viewed as a manifestation of social issues.” My own offering to the panel, a set of 
reflections that drew on Geertz’s essay “Deep Play” (1973) and on themes of voyeurism and 
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spectacle, was decidedly not interdisciplinary. I approached and conceived my comments as an 
anthropologist, drew on anthropological theory, and concluded with a set of reflections about 
anthropology and the generation of anthropological theory (and theory in general) as a kind of 
voyeurism. My bodily comportment and disposition reflected the habitus of the professionalizing 
anthropologist.  
A second anthropologist, 
from the UCKAR 
(second from the right in 
the picture), took quite 
the opposite approach. 
“It’s easy to say you’re 
an anthropologist,” she 
began, “but what else are 
you?” Deciding at the 
last second to scrap her 
pre-planned talk, she 
spoke instead for fifteen minutes (rather than five) on memories of her father and grandfather, 
their experiences of boxing, and their history as a “coloured” family in South Africa. She drew 
rich connections between the body of the boxers in the performance and her grandfather’s body 
as a fighter, and spoke to the histories that are written onto each body. Her talk was earnest, 
honest, and not in any sense academic.  
 
Agon Panel, June 2014 
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My own talk, which I took to be quite radical in its suggestion that we gaze at informants 
in qualitatively similar ways to spectators watching a boxing match, fell quite flat. No one took 
up the themes or questions I proposed for further exploration and examination, and my thoughts 
were received without either applause or controversy. Once the panel was over, however, I was 
repeatedly praised for the performance of my presentation. The praise was most certainly not for 
my oral delivery: I had spoken in my usual nervous monotone, and in my anxiety I had sped up 
the delivery of my talk considerably. Nonetheless, I had carefully planned my talk, carefully 
written it, and above all, carefully timed it to ensure that it did not significantly exceed the time I 
was allotted. My talk was praised for its more formal qualities, which included a rigorous 
disciplining of time and a carefully curated set of comments. I was praised repeatedly, that is, for 
following the conventions of an academic conference talk.  
The other anthropologist, who had gone deliberately off script in terms of content and 
allotted time to think more deeply about her own identity and her family’s history, was 
repeatedly declared to be obnoxious by the other panelists and a lone audience member. “Athina 
makes some really bad choices for her panels,” he told me as he registered his disgust with the 
anthropologist’s presentation. He had been in and out of the room at various points during the 
panel, and had left entirely a couple of minutes into her talk. While I found her talk to be quite 
profound, it was not directed toward a particular contribution that anthropology as a discipline 
might make to the questions at hand, nor was it an attempt to bring other disciplines into 
conversation with anthropology. It was intensely personal, intensely un-disciplined in a number 
of ways. Once she registered herself not as anthropologist but as something else, and once she 
went off the grid in terms of the panel’s format, it seemed that she lost a great deal of legitimacy.   
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Within the space of the panel discussions, the collision of embodied knowledge with 
other epistemic domains did not ultimately give rise not to a new form of knowledge, but instead 
created a nodal point for the transcendence and transgression of epistemic boundaries. Those 
serious about Agon’s project discerned what they could about the excellence produced by 
struggle and found salient reminders of their own forms of epistemic agon, even if in an uneven 
and, at times, contradictory way. The possibility of a knowledge generated through the body and 
its capacities for dialog with theory remained open questions; terrains for additional exploration.  
 
Agon in the Post-Mandela University   
In his study of agon in the tragedies of Euripides, Llyod (1992) notes that the agon (in 
this context, the presentation of opposing arguments) “rarely achieves anything” (1992, 15). The 
characters, that is, rarely gain their desired ends as the result of the agon, and the relationship 
between the agon and action of the tragedy is generally indirect or obscure. “It is not surprising 
that the agon usually fails to achieve anything,” Llyod concludes, “since these are tragic conflicts 
which cannot be resolved merely by talking about them. Euripedies thus sometimes makes a 
point of the tragic futility of rational discussion” (1992, 17). Athina did not share this fatalistic 
view of agon, but it seems that her work met a similar fate in the terrain of the university.  
As a study of boxing in particular, Agon was an interdisciplinary project that worked to 
understand the racial, cultural, gendered, epistemic, and socioeconomic forms that agon takes. 
Through multiple panel discussions, lectures to classes at Rhodes, and conversations both formal 
and informal, it worked to take into account the multiple axes along which figures like Mzi 
struggle for bodily forms of overcoming. As it did so, it also recognized the material limitations 
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under which Mzi’s boxing club operates, hoping through the performance to raise both money 
and attention for an institution situated in the townships of Grahamstown. Yet as I have argued, 
Agon, both as a work of art and a task set for the university community, unfolded in a space of 
institutional ambivalence. When it was not met by silence (as with the sociology students, or the 
lack of attendance at panel discussion), it was seen as a fleeting seduction (philosophy) or at the 
very least, a difficult task given the disciplinary constraints under which scholars are routinely 
asked to work. There was simply no epistemic market, in the space of the university, for the 
work that Athina set out to do with Agon. Its silent reception and the ways in which panelists 
spoke only to themselves, I argue, are themselves evidence of the epistemically marginal status 
of its central concerns.  
The difficulties faced by Athina and Agon were also exacerbated by broader processes of 
“audit culture” (Strathern 2000) that characterize the South African university landscape. It is a 
terrain in which academic productivity and success are quantified by discipline-specific outputs, 
understood solely in terms of publications, and primarily as peer-reviewed journal articles 
(Heletta 2016). This is a source of both anxiety and frustration for South African academics in 
general, and was a common source of tension within the department of drama itself. For the 
professors in the department participating in “practice-led research,” a knowledge-production 
process that, like Agon, finds its epistemic starting point in the body, the work of translation from 
embodiment to intelligible academic discourse is a frustrating process indeed: difficult to assess 
and impossible to quantify for auditing purposes. In such an environment, it is little wonder that 
Agon had difficulty generating a sense of conversational momentum in the space of the 
university. A performative and largely improvised multi-disciplinary study of the body is simply 
not the kind of product to which academic expertise is directed.  
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 It is not surprising that the failure of one form of agon—in the tragic sense of 
argumentation—would presage more violent forms of agon later. Bodies in struggle, for better or 
worse, are very much at the nexus of the current unrest at the UCKAR and campuses across 
South Africa. And there is a sense, for students and sympathetic faculty members, that 
administration at the UCKAR and elsewhere have radically failed to respond to this struggle in a 
productive way. When administrative responses do not involve police violence, at the very least 
they attempt force simple and hackneyed solutions onto complex problems. For the protestors, 
agon of this sort indeed accomplishes nothing.   
Case in point: a meme on the UCKAR student body Facebook page likening Vice-
Chancellor Mabizela to President Donald Trump. “Trumpizela,” complete with the requisite bad 
haircut, intimates that he will solve 
the current protest crisis by building 
a “great gate,” to simply block 
students from entering campus. 
“And the protestors will pay for it,” 
one student quips. Yet there is also a 
dark undercurrent to the humor 
connecting Mabizela to Trump: the 
comparison also evokes the 
belligerence that surrounded 
Trump’s presidential campaign and 
the refusal to take responsibility for 
repeated instances of assault at his 
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rallies. Even while Trump’s electoral victory was still an unlikely possibility, students at the 
UCKAR, the meme suggests, felt they were already confronting Trumpist forces at their own 
universities who were not in the mood to compromise. 
 As the South African academic year draws to a close, universities may be able to run out 
the clock and put off “Fees Must Fall” for a later date—this was indeed the fate of the movement 
for the 2015-2016 academic year. But each year, the protests grow in their intensity and urgency; 
each year, the requirement of new epistemologies and new forms of expertise to approach the 
problem seem more palpable. Agon is no longer a spectacle that universities can simply ignore or 
observe passively. Successively intense forms of agon continually threaten to upend the stability 
of a post-Mandela South Africa. Like Athina, the students call for greater and more careful 
attention to bodies, and the price of ignoring them gets more steep with each successive wave of 
unrest.    
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Chapter 4 
Pedagogies of the Self in South African Theatre 
 
Theatre and Life 
“It’s antithetical to our culture.”  
“I am against the process of being artificially inseminated. That is the antichrist.” 
“The idea of masturbating is not even something we talk about.” 
“If I’m going to lose that egg anyway, why not help someone in need?” 
“I want to raise my first child. The second I can give away” (while mimicking masturbation).  
“Things might not go well for you if you have a child out there somewhere.” 
 
These comments (all pertaining to the ethics of sperm and egg donation) came in the 
context of a drama class at the Market Theatre Laboratory in downtown Johannesburg.41 The 
class, titled “Drama and Life,” seemed to have little to do with drama. It was a space of 
contemplation and discussion around anything and everything, including (once I was a guest 
being interviewed by the class) my own stories of growing up among the Mormons of Utah, a 
class-wide debate about whether polygamy was morally justified, and whether it was ever 
acceptable to cheat on one’s spouse. As my first set of observations of a theatre class, it was an 
odd introduction to drama pedagogy indeed.  
  
                                                          
41 The Market Theatre laboratory is a two-year program with very competitive admission that stands, both 
historically and currently, as a viable alternative to earning a drama BA from a traditional university. Steeped in the 
history of apartheid protest theatre, the Market Theatre Laboratory began with the impetus “to create a platform in 
South Africa for young people who had fallen through the cracks of Apartheid and who had been victims of Bantu 
education” and remains  “committed to providing opportunities for youth from disadvantaged backgrounds.” 
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I first came to the Theatre and Life class as the guest of the instructor, Irene Stephanou. I 
met Irene not through theatre networks but instead through Greek ones. Though we would 
ultimately discuss theatre more than our shared ethnicity, she helped me feel more connected to 
my Greek roots, even going so far as to give me the opportunity to tell my life history as a 
“Greek American” while she interviewed me at the local Hellenic radio station as part of her 
weekly show.  
Knowing Irene afforded me the privilege of visiting her class, the subject matter of which 
had perplexed me since our first interview. When I asked Irene what, exactly, she taught in the 
course, she told me that the curriculum was always newly developed according to the 
relationship with her students and the issues that seemed most important to them. At one point, 
she found it shocking that some of her students believed Nelson Mandela had died long ago, 
which prompted her to take the class for a visit to the Nelson Mandela Foundation in 
Johannesburg. Students are overwhelmingly interested in discussing issues of racism and sexism, 
which Irene sees as “just a sign of the times in South Africa—how things haven’t moved.” The 
connection to theatre itself still seemed nebulous, and I continued probing it in our interview:  
NV: I’m still trying to get clear on where theatre comes in, because it sounds like 
you’re discussing social issues and talking about what it means to live in South 
Africa. How do you bring theatre into those conversations?  
IS: It’s the fact that people are telling stories and hearing stories. The rest of the 
time, they’re doing formal acting training. They’re doing writing, they’re doing 
singing, they’re doing voice work. So it’s within that context that they feed each 
other. I think you’re right, because I’ve also asked: where does theatre fit into all 
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of this? It’s the theatre of life. Life is like one big theatre where you watch and 
you observe.  
For Irene, (and John Kani, who developed the idea for the class with her), part of a formal 
education in theatre thus includes a space to reflect on “the theatre of life” alongside other 
students, a space to debate issues of race, gender, and culture, and a space for self-examination. 
The class is firmly situated within the broader legacy of the Market Theatre, where Barney 
Simon, John Kani, Athol Fugard and other theatre luminaries have long fashioned theatre from 
the stories and experiences of ordinary South Africans. Even so, the spaces of dialogical 
examination created in Irene’s class are not for the purpose of creating workshopped theatre 
pieces, but a facet, in themselves, of a broader pedagogy. Irene did not command the class as an 
authority, but mediated class-wide discussions and prompted visiting guests to the class with 
provocative questions; the only instruction was her invitation for students to participate.  
In this chapter, I draw from fieldwork and interviews with two other drama pedagogues 
who, to varying degrees, reject a certain frame of pedagogy. Like Irene, their teaching explodes 
boundaries between theatre and life, opening up spaces of inquiry and exploration that transcend 
the utility of learning theatre technique. In these contexts, the pedagogical space is not only 
directed toward theatre but toward the shaping of self more broadly. In this way, I argue, they are 
forms of ethical pedagogy, given shape through post-Mandela orientations to authority.  
Ethical Pedagogy   
The theme of pedagogy is nearly always present in some form within the anthropology of 
ethics, even when it is not recognized as such or theorized at any great length. In Hirschkind’s 
(2006) account of Islamic cassette sermons, pedagogues of Islamic faith blare through the radio 
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speakers of Cairo; a crucial component of an aural technology for the cultivation of a virtuous 
Muslim self. Pandian (2008) focuses on pedagogy as a scene of object lessons whereby 
missionaries taught a “criminal tribe” to be law-abiding, productive workers of the land. Zigon 
(2010) and Davis (2012) both examine therapists who, in different ways, mold and shape 
neoliberal subjects by teaching forms of self-governance and sociality. The pastors discussed by 
Robbins (2004) preach on virtues and vices, teaching newly-converted Papua New Guineans 
how to act morally. Of course, pedagogues can play this role with varying degrees of warmth; 
they are often stern and sometimes confrontational (Vlachos 2014). Pedagogy itself is not an 
object of analysis for much of this literature, but pedagogues are always found near sites of work 
on the self. 
James Faubion and James Laidlaw have each theorized pedagogy at some length. 
Faubion’s framework for the anthropological study of ethics recognizes “that the subject who 
achieves his or her position typically has a pedagogue to thank” (2011, 60), and he accords a 
central place in his study to the analysis of how pedagogues assign and shape processes of 
subjectivation. Ethics itself “emerges within the primal scene of charismatic performance at the 
moment at which the charismatic leader recognizes the chrism of the other” (2011, 86), moving 
from a sovereign force to exemplar and teacher. Laidlaw (2014) provocatively argues, toward the 
end of his book, that it is “possible both for writer and reader to place themselves in a pedagogic 
relationship to the ethnography, by which I mean genuinely to open themselves to learning from 
and modifying their own thought and conduct in light of it” (216), and pedagogy is central to his 
intervention into debates around conceptions of freedom. 
Within this literature the ethics of the pedagogue himself or herself are seldom probed in 
any great detail. Foucault (and Faubion and Laidlaw in their expositions of Foucault) does 
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extensively explore the ethical minefields of relationships between men and youth in ancient 
Greece, and indeed this relationship needed an airtight ethics to avoid harming youth in their 
development as full citizens. The pedagogical processes at play in these relationships point to a 
broader dynamics of power and freedom that could either facilitate the development of fully free 
citizens or irreparably corrupt the youth and impede their development (Laidlaw 2014, 151). In 
addition, there are well-founded reasons, both theoretical and methodological, for a focus on the 
ethics of the pedagogue outside of this narrower context. The dialectic of freedom and constraint 
at the heart of any ethics has to emanate from someone, somewhere. Whether they are 
domineering or freewheeling, ruthless or affirming, pedagogues are a crucial part of this 
dynamic.   
Ethnographically, there are equally good reasons for focusing on the ethics of pedagogy 
in a post-Mandela South Africa. Questions of authority and freedom in relation to pedagogues—
whether of a white colonial stripe or, more recently, of a university system that mutates and 
carries forward colonial legacies under an ANC banner—are becoming the front lines in battles 
over what exactly a post-Mandela South Africa might amount to. Given the legacy of 
colonialism and apartheid, and given the present (increasingly seen as a form of neo-apartheid by 
my informants and others), the ethics of the pedagogue are an object of problematization now 
more than ever. 
This chapter is, at least partly, an intervention toward anthropological studies which 
presuppose that ethical pedagogues the world over are always in some way engaged in the 
business of telling people what they ought or ought not to do. It certainly makes sense to assume 
that this will always be the case—if Zigon’s (2010) drug rehabilitation therapists didn’t put 
forward certain ways of being in the world as worth striving after, what on earth would they be 
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doing? It is not obvious how anyone could be an ethical pedagogue and not model, invite, exhort, 
or browbeat his or her charges into particular ethical channels.     
The pedagogy that unfolded in the context of my fieldwork is of a different sort. Irene, as 
well as the two individuals I discuss below, embody an ethics of pedagogy that drives toward a 
space in which learners direct their own discoveries about themselves and the world around 
them. While this pedagogy begins in theater, it often winds up in spaces of contemplation of an 
ethics of self as well. It is precisely in these moments that they leave the students to their own 
work. With Wittgenstein, they all might say, in one way or another: “My propositions serve as 
elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as 
nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, 
throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it)” (Wittgenstein 2002, 89). Their pedagogy, I 
will argue, is characteristic of a post-Mandela South Africa that grows increasingly suspicious of 
the authority of pedagogues and exemplars. This dynamic, of course, is not limited to South 
Africa either in terms of the rejection of ethical exemplars (Pandian 2009, Humphrey 1997) or 
regimes of expertise more broadly (Rottenburg 2009). For South Africans, however, it manifests 
in a critical lens on the liberatory projects of the past and a wary eye on those of the present. It is 
a context where Mandela himself is no longer a saint, but as my Soweto informants told me time 
and again, a sell-out who betrayed the cause of liberation to white interests. It is also a context 
where Andile Mngxitama—foremost intellectual of the Economic Freedom Fighters and 
professing bearer of the mantel of Steve Biko—can suddenly find himself under threat of 
violence by members of the party for whom he was once a chief spokesperson (Hunter 2015). It 
is a broader transition in the epistemology of ethics, where not only ethical subjects but also their 
pedagogues feel that knowledge of how best to shape the self should come through one’s own 
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restless contemplation rather than through authority or instruction.  
Playing with Ugli Bob  
Rob “Ugli Bob” Murray occupies an intermediary and 
somewhat liminal position in the department of drama at the 
UCKAR. As a PhD student, he is under the direction and 
guidance of various faculty members, although he also 
engages them as colleague in informal reading groups and 
other departmental events. As a lecturer in the department, 
he is also acts as pedagogue to others; particularly through 
improvisation classes taught to third year drama students. 
While located within the department of drama, Rob is also 
frequently outside of Grahamstown at one or another 
festival, in one or another country, with one or another of the 
faculty or students who have devised a work that is on tour. 
Through his workshops and mentoring, Rob is also an 
important touch point of the interface between the university 
and the “community” of Grahamstown, a term that typically refers to residents of the nearby 
township. Rob, like many of the faculty, constantly oscillates between these different worlds, 
which bleed together more often than not. 
“Ugli Bob” is a nickname typically used in association with his work with the South 
African clowning collective A Conspiracy of Clowns and is not, in obvious ways, an apt 
moniker. Much like the character “Ugly Bob” on the television series South Park (who is 
Ugli Bob, May 2014 
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ridiculed as being hideously ugly despite his lack of any visible defect), Rob is not physically 
ugly. Instead, “Ugli Bob,” like the names “Johnny Rotten” or “Sid Vicious,” tags a certain punk 
rock ethos that is evident in his physical appearance: his hair is often spiked and pushing out in a 
riot of different directions, and he is more likely to wear a ripped and shredded Jack Daniels T 
shirt while conducting a workshop than any kind of formal workout couture. More importantly, 
the name “Ugli” in its misspelling also underscores a certain irreverent playfulness, which finds 
its expression in his physical theatre, miming, and clowning work. Ugliness is of particular 
salience in the ways that his own projects touch various facets of the grotesque: excesses of 
rubbish, rot, and decay, (both social and physical) are prominent in works like Piet se Optlegoed 
and Crazy in Love. “Ugli” in this sense connotes an aesthetic that plays in the terrain of excess 
and the grotesque, retrieving humor from trash heaps and pools of bodily fluid.  
My fieldwork in Grahamstown did not give me the opportunity to fully engage these 
facets of Rob’s artistry; I encountered Rob instead as a PhD student and pedagogue who led a 
series of workshops to further the work of his PhD research on mask work. Even so, his 
pedagogy is, I would argue, “ugli” in the sense that it holds, in one hand, a strong anti-
authoritarian bent, and in the other, a deadly serious commitment to the concept of play, a 
disposition cultivated through the development of a very particular set of physical and mental 
competencies. The telos of Rob’s focus on play, I will argue, was to open spaces of 
contemplation, exploration, and knowledge, the development of new pedagogues and the 
devising of new post-Mandela forms of protest theatre. Rob’s pedagogical ethic is, in many 
ways, a rejection of a certain form of pedagogy. But his workshops did in fact teach a great deal.  
Rob solicited participation in the workshops at the final cast meeting for The Wangai, a 
Xhosa-language, Eastern Cape-inflected spin on Dr. Seuss’s The Lorax. The cast was entering a 
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lull between a run of shows for the Grahamstown community and another round of performances 
at the National Arts Festival, and the cast (comprised entirely of actors from the local township) 
enthusiastically took up Rob’s offer for further training. The workshops, which began in earnest 
in late April of 2014, would focus on puppetry and eventually mask work. As it turned out, 
building a foundation for puppetry would involve a good deal more than building puppets and 
making their mouths move correctly, and the group did not proceed to masks until well after I 
was gone. The workshops I did observe, however, were staging grounds not only for training in 
principles of movement and expression but also of thinking and contemplation. 
Jacques Lecoq et le jeu 
 To understand Rob’s pedagogy (and his theatre work more generally), it is necessary to 
draw out some of the philosophy of a pedagogue from whom he draws significant influence, 
Jacques Lecoq. L'École Internationale de Théâtre Jacques Lecoq was (and still is after Lecoq’s 
death) an intensive two-year program that teaches mime, clowning, and mask. Lecoq was the 
head instructor and chief pedagogue from 1956 until his death in 1999, and his influence in the 
genres of physical theatre, mime, and clowning has been pronounced since then. More 
importantly, Lecoq’s pedagogical approach has found resonance among theatre pedagogues in 
South Africa like Rob, especially in its impulse to de-center authority and allow students to chart 
their own trajectory through exploration and improvisation.  
Lecoq’s approach to the creation of theatre, shaped in the crucible of a totalitarian Europe 
during World War Two, focused on the body itself: not only its potential for movement, play, 
and exploration, but also the ways in which it communicates in the absence of any speech. A 
trained physical educator and athlete, Lecoq was fascinated by the new possibilities he saw for 
the body in the theatre of Jean-Louis Barrault and others during the German occupation of 
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France, and would go on to develop, with other athletes of a similar artistic bent, “a fundamental 
gestural language” for theatre (Lecoq 2001, 4). For Lecoq, unleashing the body’s potential for 
diverse forms of articulation and expression was a direct response to the structured, orderly, and 
deadly-serious bodily movements of European fascism. Lecoq remembers it as a context in 
which “the body and nature were fused together with totalitarian ideas where the chosen race had 
to produce champions, supermen, even gods. It is all too clear where a loss of humour and of 
playfulness can lead” (2006, 38). In contrast to the fixed, mechanical, pure essence of the 
totalitarian body, Lecoq insisted, “tout bouge. Tout evolue, progresse.”42 Understanding 
movement, for Lecoq and the students who would follow him, meant understanding the 
possibilities and potentials for flux and change more generally (Reznek 2012).  
 Lecoq’s commitment to change and flux, set against his experiences during World War 
Two, undoubtedly shaped his pedagogical approach: Lecoq had an ambivalent understanding of 
his own authority, and this ambivalence was apparent in his teaching. In one sense, his authority 
as a master teacher to critique student work was unquestioned, and his comments were seen as 
incisive, piercing, and weighty. At the same time, Reznek (2012) argues, Lecoq expected his 
students to disagree with him, and encouraged them to do so. He did not train students to parrot 
his own style, but pushed them to find their own through independent and group improvisational 
work. In terms of instruction, Lecoq would not tell students what they should do or how they 
should act, but instead focused on what didn’t work about a particular performance—a judgment 
which, according to his former students, always engaged deeply with the logic of the particular 
performance in itself and not external criteria (Sherman 2012). 
                                                          
42 “Everything moves. Everything evolves and progresses” (quoted in Reznek 2012:29).   
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 Lecoq’s pedagogical approach was shaped further by the revolutionary movements of 
1968, when students and workers brought France to a standstill in a series of strikes, occupations, 
and massive demonstrations. In open rebellion not only against the state but against the French 
communist party and labor unions that had grown complacent and moribund, workers and 
students organized at the grassroots level to occupy factories as well as centers of cultural 
production like the Sorbonne and the Théâtre de l’Odéon. As part of a movement that constituted 
a refusal of all leadership, workers as well as students pushed for self-management, arguing that 
“we will have good masters when each will be his own” (Feenberg and Freedman 2001, 39). The 
universities, like the factories, were completely under the control of the students, who refused to 
take exams or continue courses as usual.  
 Caught up in revolutionary fervor, according to former student Simon McBurney, 
Lecoq’s students “turned over the whole school and refused to work. They said to Lecoq, we 
don’t want to work, we want to teach ourselves” (Tushingham 1994, 19). Rather than closing as 
many schools and universities did, Lecoq fully accommodated this radical impulse: every day, 
for an hour, students would work independently in a designated time which came to be called 
auto-cours.43 It was here that the students would improvise and experiment to generate new 
content to perform for the rest of the school. Though Lecoq would suggest a theme for the 
students to work with, it would be up to the student working groups to interpret and develop a 
performance on that theme without any guidance (Sherman 2012). Auto-cours, alongside the rest 
of Lecoq’s methodology, was a decentering and diffusion of pedagogical authority. Performative 
                                                          
43 Lecoq argues that “the revolutionary events of 1968 strengthened the teaching of the school and the desire of the 
students to work there…While the student movement exploded into the streets, we were exploding the traditions of 
gesture and text in search of a new language and new meanings” (Lecoq 2001:11). Lecoq’s integration of the 
revolutionary impulse directly into his pedagogy further suggests his readiness to divest at least some pedagogical 
authority, even if his comments continued to carry great weight with his students.   
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expertise, in Lecoq’s school, was not transmitted by a teacher but jointly discovered by the 
students and instructors (Sherman 2012). 
 These discoveries took place through the cultivation and exercise of a disposition that 
Lecoq called le jeu (commonly translated as ‘play’). Although it was a central facet of Lecoq’s 
pedagogy, he did not theorize it at length or discuss it much in his written work. For Lecoq, play 
was simply what occurs “when, aware of the theatrical dimension, the actor can shape an 
improvisation for spectators, using rhythm, tempo, space, form” (Lecoq 2001, 29). Since his 
death in 1999, however, Lecoq’s students have drawn on their own experiences with him to 
theorize this concept more robustly within the context of his pedagogy. Play, they argue, is the 
“imaginative space claimed by the performer to create material beyond the prescription of both 
the director and the written text” (Murray 2004, 34) and a “state in which the performer is 
capable of spontaneous responses within preconceived rules, a flexibility that results from 
awareness of and connection to others” (Sherman 2010, 94). More generally, Lecoq’s use of 
play, Frost and Yarrow point out, is underpinned by “the sense that ‘play’ is a salient feature of 
mankind’s capacity for the production of symbolic form, signaled primarily in Schiller’s 
Aesthetic Letters and in Huizinga’s Homo Ludens. Thus, it also implies playfulness—the 
pleasure derived from discoveries in the moment of creativity” (2016, 65). From these 
characterizations, play emerges as a disposition characterized by fluency in principles of 
improvisation, and at the same time, an orientation toward transcending those principles when 
appropriate. One who plays in this way knows the rules and when to break them, taking pleasure 
in the discoveries that result. 
Play is also, Lecoq’s students have pointed out, a dialectic of freedom and constraint. On 
the one hand, an individual is completely free to make what she will with her body and the space 
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around her to craft an improvisation. Lecoq gave little guidance on how actors ought to 
improvise or play, and actors who worked too hard to ape the styles of Lecoq or the other 
instructors were more apt to receive derision than praise (Sherman 2012). Successful play 
culminated in the discovery of one’s own style and orientation toward the world. In this sense, 
play is “the antidote for the mechanical and fascist body;” a strong political intervention in which 
the means of production is radically shifted back to the individual (Reznek 2012, 39–40). At the 
same time, play is not completely anarchic but done within purposeful boundaries (Murray 
2003).  
  Finally, play presupposes a certain relationship to others with whom one shares the stage 
or space. It includes “the energy that is shared between performers on stage and in rehearsal” 
(Frost and Yarrow 2016, 65) and what emerges from interactions between various players. 
Sherman connects this facet of play to the concept of “radical giving,” (2002) noting that play 
“thereby suggests an ethical relationship among agents involved in the embodied work of being 
and of learning” (Sherman 2010, 95). The freedom of the individual in playing is tempered 
through both bodily discipline and an ethical imperative to remain responsive and attentive to 
others in the creation of a common aesthetic project, however ephemeral that project might be.   
The importance of play was formalized within Lecoq’s two year program for students: 
play was the primary criterion through which first year students were judged admissible for 
continuation to the second year of Lecoq’s program, and those who had no aptitude for play were 
summarily cut. Like auto-cours, significant portions of class time (ninety minutes of a four hour 
day) were devoted to improvisation, where students would perform either alone or in small 
groups in front of the entire school. Play was a product of Lecoq’s pedagogy as well as a 
prerequisite for more advanced classes.  
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Pedagogies of embodied contemplation 
 Though rarely acknowledged explicitly, Lecoq’s influence on South African theatre is not 
hard to find. His South African students include William Kentridge (who directed Ubu and the 
Truth Commission), Jennie Reznek (current director of the Magnet Theatre in Cape Town), and 
Sylvaine Strike (who presented four separate shows on the main stage of the National Arts 
Festival in 2014). The influence is also obvious in the physical theatre of Andrew Buckland, 
whose blend of clowning, mime, and Physical Theatre has set him apart as a unique brand. 
Lecoq’s “Seven States of Tension” were taught in workshops I attended both in Grahamstown 
and Johannesburg, even if its origin was not always made explicit.  
 Lecoq’s brand of pedagogy found a welcome home in South Africa after apartheid. For 
white pedagogues who are reflexive about their own racial positioning and the history of 
apartheid, anti-authoritarian and dialogical ways of teaching theatre are increasingly attractive. 
Reznek, a student of Lecoq who has implemented similar forms of training in Cape Town, 
argues that “as a result of the history of colonization and the apartheid project that ruptured 
relationships between people there was an inevitable vigilance in regard to potential subjugation 
and oppression in the learning environment. This necessitated the exploration of models of 
teaching that did not impose the pedagogy with an absolute authority” (2012, 84). Like Reznek, 
Rob’s pedagogical approach is one that works to open a space of play that does not dictate the 
pace or product of discovery.  
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 Rob’s pedagogy, much like Lecoq’s, proceeds from a diffusion of authority. One of the 
more crucial facets of leading the workshops, he told me, was:  
“leaving a space so that it’s not just me going ‘I’m teaching you now,’ so that I’m in a 
position of authority and you’re in a lower position with it all coming to you. It’s going, ‘hey, 
let’s see each other as equals. I’ve got experience. You’ve got experience as well. How can 
you discover things?’ I’ll help guide and my job is to be as honest as possible, trying to 
create a space where people get astonished at a shared discovery. I’ve always loved that idea: 
how do we discover things? How is knowledge discovered in this first place? I think it’s 
particularly important in this country, which has a long legacy of things being shoved down.” 
For Rob, inquiry, discovery, and knowledge are firmly within a performance matrix: this is 
where a shared process of contemplation is initiated, provided that sufficient space is left by the 
pedagogue. Inquiry and exploration, importantly, are also foregrounded here against South 
Africa’s history. Given a legacy of “things being shoved down,” he told me, it is all the more 
important that pedagogy does not reproduce hierarchies that stunt free inquiry. Rob’s workshops 
seek ultimately to cultivate embodied knowledge through a pedagogy that remains sensitive to 
issues of authority (Dolan 1996; Sutherland 2013a, 2013b). 
Instruction in Rob’s workshops was minimal and tended to taper off after a basic 
explanation of exercises, gradually ceding ground to the participants and their own inquiries into 
movement, breath, and space. The workshops always began with an intensive physical regimen 
of exercises, and it was here that Rob’s pedagogy was at its most commanding. The exercises 
that inaugurated each workshop were not simply warm-up stretches. They were complex, 
difficult, and counterintuitive motions designed to isolate and exercise particular parts of the 
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body. In one set of exercises, for example, Rob instructed the participants to “break the 
alignment” of the body at various points, coaching them to move their necks, extend their chest, 
move at the knees, and then at the pelvis, all while keeping the rest of the body rigid and straight. 
These actions were repeated in rapid succession, backwards and forwards. Participating in the 
warm-up exercises on a sparsely-attended day of the workshop was an uncomfortable and 
embarrassing (yet productive) way of gaining insight into the corporeality of the expertise 
(Boyer 2005) that Rob was working to impart. There was a cultivated comfort in their action, the 
product of sustained and disciplined work, that contrasted starkly with my relative inflexibility 
and bodily awkwardness.  
Rob’s verbal instructions during these stretching periods initially struck me as being quite 
esoteric. Early in the workshop series, during breathing exercises, participants were repeatedly 
urged to do things like “feel a connection to the space,” “see the space,” and “see through the 
walls.” I gradually realized that there was a distinct progression from one exercise to the next, 
and from one workshop to the next, building toward the cultivation of a sharpened awareness of 
self, object, and others in a fixed space. Awareness of self, mediated through the breath, grew to 
encompass the space each participant inhabited. This space was then encountered in a steadily 
expanding radius: to begin teaching principles of mime, Rob had the participants create a fixed 
point of space with their fingers that was horizontal to the navel, and had them rotate around this 
fixed point before directing them out further into the space.   
 The extent of Rob’s facilitation early in the workshop series was the work of cultivating 
awareness of embodied movement in fixed space. At the same time, a heightened sense of 
perception was never an end in itself, but instead a method of working toward more advanced 
forms of bodily movement. Once he was satisfied that awareness of space was established, 
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pedagogy began to fade, replaced by moments of play in which participants would explore their 
own forms of movement. Thus, after several exercises oriented around exploring the self in 
space, Rob introduced the presence of objects through a series of exercises with sticks. “Allow 
the stick to go where it wants,” Rob encouraged the group, “give up the responsibility of 
deciding.” On one level, the participants were merely acting as if the stick was deciding while 
they controlled the direction and movement of both the stick and their body. Even so, the play of 
this exercise fostered a type of spontaneity and an immediacy that was free from the calculation 
of decision. Movements in the workshop were impulsive, and impulse began not in the brain but 
in the stick, which had become an extension of the body. In this way, the play had begun in 
earnest. 
 The following workshop continued its focus on objects, beginning with large sheets of 
butcher paper. Rob had the participants “take a moment to get to know the paper,” and members 
of the group were encouraged to touch, feel, and smell their way across their sheets. The paper, 
he said, was something with its own force and energy, made as it was from a living thing. After 
devoting a good deal of time to having each participant find the paper’s unique breath—periods 
of rise and fall, relaxation and excitation, the group made one piece of paper move and breathe 
together. While this exercise was difficult, the group found some “moments that were 
connecting” in their movements, and one man described a qualitative difference between 
moments when their action and thoughts were in concert and when they were not—“you can feel 
it,” he said.  
 Eventually, the papers were mashed by each member of the group into a shape of their 
choosing. These shapes themselves became animated, each with their own principles of 
respiration, movement, and ways of encountering the world. As the shapes encountered each 
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other—sometimes with curiosity, other times with aggression—Rob repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of play, telling them to “leave space” in the interactions. Stimulus and response, he 
coached, should both be somewhat delayed so as to not close off possibility and options from 
what the paper itself wants to do, and what the paper manipulated by others might want to do. 
In the stick exercises and the paper workshop alike, play began as a solitary project but 
grew to embrace a world of others. This pattern continued once the workshop turned to address 
the manipulation of puppets as well. The puppets were made from the same paper the group had 
explored earlier, wound 
and taped together by 
two groups of three 
participants. Rob had 
no direction as to what 
the puppets should look 
like, although he did 
guide them in how to 
fashion a body, arms, 
and legs. Two puppets 
thus emerged, each 
with their own unique traits and characteristics. Moving each puppet, “giving it a life of its own,” 
was a common project that required the coordinated but unvoiced intentions of three separate 
individuals. 
 As they gained increasing fluency in the movement of their puppets, Rob largely left the 
group to their own devices. The only direction he gave to them was to “find in a gesture” what 
Puppets created in Rob's workshop, May 2014 
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they tried to express in words with their puppets, as the immediate impulse was to make them 
speak. Remaining in silence and communicating through gesture, he told the group, would 
enhance the possibilities open to their character’s movements, actions, and reactions to the world 
around it. The use of silence for Rob was more than pragmatic, however: it also grew out of what 
he saw as ethical necessity. Rob told me that the principles of his workshop teaching were, in 
fact, first developed with a workshop that taught drama to deaf students, many of whom could 
not read. This prompted a different approach. “We just started with bodies meeting in space,” he 
told me. “What does it mean? What do we feel? And once we observe how life is, how 
connected to life we are, how can we tweak that to make it more deliberate now? What if we 
come in with this attitude, we’re aware of that, we react to that. You start finding a very almost 
subconscious language. It’s preverbal. Before any word is spoken. We don’t need words.” 
Although the workshops I encountered were with performers who were what Rob would call the 
‘hearing,’ the principle was the same: teaching was an act of mapping out a terrain of wordless 
encounter and exploration of bodies, aimed at opening up spaces of cooperation and play. 
 Rob’s workshop pedagogy was the most structured when it came to the exercises that 
developed and enhanced fluency in a range of bodily movements. Conversely, it ebbed to its 
lowest tide when participants were acting out one or another scenario, either with the sticks or 
with the puppets. Movement of the body and awareness of space and others, firmly established 
through rigorous training, set the perimeters within which free play and improvisation was 
encouraged. Not unlike Lecoq’s auto-cours, participants were largely left to their own devices. 
These spaces of time were always where the real artistic breakthroughs would happen, as the 
group collaborated on content together with minimal direction from Rob. 
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 To Rob’s visible disappointment, the men of the workshop did not publically present the 
results of their explorations in puppetry to the UCKAR students or faculty. It was clear that the 
group did not mind the scrutiny of the university theatre context—an improvised piece called 
“possessed sticks” was shown for Rob’s third year class to more acclaim than any of his other 
students received. Even so, members of the group seemed preoccupied with various other 
projects. Two of the men, in particular, were always ready to bring the skills they had learned in 
the workshop across the road and uphill into the townships; always thinking about how puppetry 
could be employed in shows to teach people about human rights; always wondering how skills of 
awareness and bodily discipline could feed into their own workshops with township children. 
The lessons learned in Rob’s workshop and the results of their contemplation in the space he had 
created ultimately sent pedagogical ripples outward, as the men took their lessons outside of the 
university context.  
From post-apartheid to post-Mandela pedagogy  
 Rob’s reliance on Lecoq’s pedagogical approach is undoubtedly driven by his own 
aesthetic sensibilities, which include intensive studies of mask work, mime, clowning, and 
physical theatre. It is also, however, an expression of a white pedagogical subjectivity that seeks 
to refashion spaces of learning in the aftermath of apartheid. Aside from small correctives or 
explanations, he gave few instructions or direction. He did not disseminate knowledge, but 
created a space for participants to make their own discoveries. Experiments with bodily 
movement and the discoveries that arise from them are vested in a collective working together.  
 Rob was not alone in pursuing forms of pedagogy that actively de-centered authority in 
Grahamstown. Alex Sutherland (2013a) has implemented similar theatre programs both inside 
and outside of formal academic spaces at the UCKAR, arguing that performance is key to an 
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embodied knowledge that can probe the complexities of racialzed and gendered bodies. 
Sutherland is clear that her position as a white, privileged female places her in a position of some 
authority, particularly when it comes to the theatre program she conducts in a medium-security 
men’s prison. Even so, the drama pieces devised and developed by the inmates are their own 
creation, and a number utilized the spaces of play she opened up to experiment with a range of 
gender identities. 
 These models of pedagogy are certainly post-apartheid phenomena in the sense that they 
take whiteness (and more nebulously, the history of apartheid) as the substance of ethical work 
toward transformation of the learning space. Rob, Reznek, and Sutherland each grapple with 
questions of identity, diversity, and authority in the workshop space, and Sutherland’s drama 
program participants in particular actively confront the complexities of post-apartheid black 
masculinity (see also Ashforth 2004; Moffett 2006; Wood et al. 2007, 2008). These issues, and 
the configurations of authority harnessed by pedagogues to provoke questions about them, have 
taken on a new urgency in post-Mandela South Africa, where whiteness continues to be rendered 
visible and de-centered in ways both large and small. 
 The post-Mandela edge of Rob’s workshops is found in the discourses and conversations 
into which the workshop participants entered as a direct result of their own contemplation and 
discovery. The workshop process culminated in a production called Waterline, an intense yet 
humorous take on Grahamstown perpetual water shortage. Frequent disruptions to the water 
supply, in the white suburbs, are enough to cause a panic about possible shortages, though there 
is an ebb and flow to this panic that generally crescendos during festival season. In the townships 
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of Grahamstown, it is a perpetual crisis of hydraulic citizenship (Anand 2011, 2017)44 in which 
people routinely have to fill buckets or containers from nearby streams. For this reason, the 
presence of “performers from the community” in Waterline stood as a stamp of authenticity, and 
the work was critically well-received at the National Arts Festival. In its relentless parody of 
corrupt local government, Waterline struck a cord outside of the immediate locale of its 
production—it received glowing press reviews as part of the Cape Town Fringe Festival, and 
toured internationally in Amsterdam as well. 
 Even as the men from the workshop continue to teach their own workshops to others, in 
turn becoming pedagogues in their own right, they also participate in forms of political theatre 
that no longer look to apartheid but rather the governing ANC as a target of criticism. One of the 
men in Rob’s workshops, S’bo, was a pedagogue himself—although a reluctant one. His 
pedagogy is an anti-pedagogy. He denies the influence of mentors and exemplars, and maintains 
that he does not want to be either for the children that he teaches. S’bo represents the outer edge 
of a counter-pedagogical spectrum, and it is to him that I turn next. 
 
S’bo 
The first time I saw S’bo was in a performance of Brett Bailey’s Exhibit A. A re-creation 
of the “human zoos” (or ethnographic exhibitions) of the nineteenth century, Exhibit A featured 
grotesque tableau vivants45 that depicted the horrors of colonialism as well as modern-day abuses 
against migrants and refugees in Europe. Despite the amount of controversy that whirled around 
                                                          
44 For Anand, “hydraulic citizenship” is “a form of belonging to the city enabled by social and material claims made 
to the city water’s infrastructure (2011, 545). Anand theorizes at length the “pressure” that Mumbai’s slum dwellers 
place on the city’s government and engineers. In the case of Waterline, this pressure is enacted through politically 
sharp satire and criticism that seeks to draw attention to the crisis and hold civic leaders accountable.   
45 “Living statues,” situated in different poses.  
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Exhibit A (which would only compound with a similar work, Exhibit B) the work was a gripping 
commentary on colonial history and the voyeurism of the black body. As part of the work, S’bo 
played a refugee situated on the stairwell between the two floors of exhibits. His blank, glassy-
eyed stare met mine for as long as I dared to look at him, and I moved on. He would meet the 
stares of hundreds of audience members as part of the 2012 National Arts Festival, receiving 
looks of indifference, compassion, and mockery in turns.   
I met S’bo again when I returned to Grahamstown in 2014. As part of the UBOM! theatre 
company, S’bo played the titular character in The Wangai. Within the hierarchy of the cast and 
crew of the production—a hierarchy I observed closely through countless rehearsals, 
performances, and cast meetings—S’bo occupied an intermediary position between the other 
actors and the two directors. Although he was not a director, the two co-directors of the show 
(very seasoned and well-respected artists in their own right) took S’bo seriously. They listened to 
his notes and suggestions and often implemented them, and frequently allowed him to lead the 
rest of the cast through warm up exercises in the morning. He was a leader and a model cast 
member: professional, punctual, hard-working, and easy to get along with. 
Leading warm-ups, for S’bo, was not about teaching a set of exercises as much as it was 
an exercise in bringing cast members together in collaboration. His warm-up exercises were 
often unconventional; they could involve activities from having each cast member perform a 
series of Kung Fu moves to having the whole cast do a “gorilla walk” around in a circle. 
Whatever he had the cast doing on any particular day, S’bo’s exercises were not directed as 
much as explained, at which point everyone did them together. Along with other artists from 
Grahamstown, S’bo also leads workshops at the Makana Drama Development festival and more 
informally outside of institutional spaces. By the time I was getting ready to leave Grahamstown, 
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S’bo was being recruited by a local school as a drama teacher, a prospect that he found very 
exciting. S’bo enjoyed teaching drama, especially to children. 
 S’bo never thought he would be a teacher of any kind, and never set out to be one. Even 
recalling his recruitment as such seemed to leave him a bit uneasy, as he recalled that “when they 
saw me adjudicating [at a local theatre festival] and talking to the kids, they said ‘wow, you are 
very good at what you do. You have a very good way of motivating kids.’” S’bo immediately 
went on to tell me that he is certainly not a motivational speaker and does not want to be 
recognized as such. Motivational speakers are patronizing and condescending, S’bo told me; they 
act as though they are better thinkers and as though they know things that other people do not. 
S’bo’s disdain for claims of epistemic superiority clearly shapes, for him, the model of his own 
pedagogy: 
“I don’t go there saying ‘okay, I know better than you do.’ So, if I’m having a lesson, this 
is our lesson. We are all involved in teaching this lesson. You’ll be learning something 
from me, and I’ll be learning from you. I have my guidelines, but I don’t impose them. I 
don’t go there saying ‘okay, listen. Now we’re going to learn this and you should learn 
this.’ That is not the best way to teach. But of course, I teach about theatre and my 
approach to theatre. What I think about how things should be done.” 
While S’bo feels that his destiny lies elsewhere (exactly where, he isn’t sure), he feels that 
teaching others is somehow a part of it and is generally happy in his role as a theatre practitioner 
(the only label he feels comfortable giving himself). His lessons, however, could never proceed 
from a presumption that he knows a right or even a good way to act.  
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The approach that S’bo teaches is relentlessly innovative and proceeds from a rejection of 
any and all theoretical or philosophical predecessors. It is pre-representational,46 driven not by 
any grounded telos but instead by pure experiment, pure event, pure becoming.47 It emerged 
during struggles with his own pedagogues as a drama student at Lovedale College (in King 
William’s Town), where he found it obnoxious to have to learn the theory and method of 
Grotowski, Stanislavski, and Artaud, among others. “Why are we being taught about other 
people’s ideas instead of being taught to groom our own?” he asked. “Are our own ideas 
inferior? I was never a follower. If there is a big trend going on out there, I would think ‘I’m 
going to do it this way.” Nor would S’bo posit indigenous dramatic models as an alternative to 
more Western theatre traditions. His approach is to figure things out for himself without any 
preexisting model; to take his time figuring out a character he is playing and to examine that 
character from every conceivable angle. This means his process of embodying a character takes 
longer, often to the frustration of those around him. “I’ll take my time,” he said, “and then I 
know when I get it, I take a very big hop, and I’ll get over everyone.” The approach S’bo tries to 
impart to his learners is to take their own approach, and it teaches it through modeling his own 
process.  
S’bo’s workshops, similar to Irene’s, are aimed at breaking open a dialogical space in 
which life art and life bleed into each other. “When I teach, I don’t say ‘this only applies in 
theatre.’ I talk about things in general,” he said. The content of conversation is not restricted to 
                                                          
46 In a discussion of philosophy in the ancient Greek Polis, Colebook (2000) explains the pre-representational—a 
contrast from the representationalism of modern epistemology as well as the anti-representationalism of post-
modernity—as “a continuity between meaning, ethics, law, the cosmos, and one’s body.” In contrast to an ethics 
grounded in rules and foundations, “ethics was lived as one’s own, practiced way of life; and philosophy was not a 
procedure of valid arguments but a practice of self-formation” (2000:50). 
47 In this sense, S’bo’s stance is also resonant with the German philosophical tradition of Bildung, which has been 
given extensive ethnographic attention by Boyer (2005b) and Tinius (2016).    
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theatre, and he hopes that people who are not even interested in theatre will participate in his 
workshops. Nor does he tailor the content of his discussions based on the age of his learners. 
More explicit topics, he said, are things that children are already discussing anyway. In his 
workshops, no one is wrong. No one is right. Perspectives instead emerge through dialogue and 
the synthesis of multiple viewpoints.  
S’bo does not acknowledge any mentors or formative individuals that helped to shape his 
pedagogy. For all his work as a teacher and mentor to others, S’bo himself does not want to be 
seen as an exemplar of any kind either; people can learn from him, but he was adamant that he 
does not want to be perceived as a role-model of any kind. Role-models, for him, are connected 
both to teaching and to learning in that their presence does nothing but stymie self-development:  
“I don’t believe in role models because you are limiting yourself. When you say ‘okay, 
so-and-so is my role model,’ you want to be that person. You want to live by this other 
person’s principles, though you have a mind of your own. It was my decision not to drink, 
not to smoke. No one taught me how to be a man. I learned from life. I saw that I don’t 
like the way that someone who drinks does things.” 
In this sense, negative exemplars play more of a formative role than positive exemplars for S’bo. 
Although he admitted that positive exemplars are important, contemplation of a poorly-lived and 
shameful life seemed far more productive for him than reflection on someone who lives well. A 
good twenty minutes of our interview, in fact, was devoted to discussing a radio DJ who justified 
his serial infidelity through the claim that he was “only human.” S’bo scoffed at the way this 
individual would blame his own decisions on being human, and reaffirmed, at some length, his 
own ability to think about whether his actions are hurting other people. Positive exemplars, to be 
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clear, are not totally absent for S’bo, but they only occupy the fuzzy background of an ethics that 
finds him constantly striking out on his own.  
S’bo’s pre-representational aesthetics and ethics are part of a broader philosophy of 
politics that casts a suspicious and wary eye on leadership, unsure of why leaders are ever really 
necessary in the first place. There is a certain paradox, he told me, in the fact that people suppose 
themselves to be free even as they affirm that their power is vested in the hands of political 
leaders who subsequently ignore them. He doesn’t believe that leaders belong on a pedestal of 
any kind; the first political mistake that people make is putting them there in the first place. 
Further, he resents the feeling that he has to vote for anyone, given that he is profoundly 
unsatisfied with any available choices. “What if I do not believe in any of these people? Who 
should I vote for? For the sake of voting? That is another kind of oppression,” he argued. S’bo 
directs the trajectory of his own life and doesn’t feel comfortable vesting power in others, even 
as he attempts to avoid having other people looking at him as an authority figure.  
Finding a space for S’bo 
 Finding a conceptual space for S’bo’s pedagogy and his philosophy more broadly—
making them “speak” to broader facets of life in post-Mandela South Africa is not, in any sense, 
a straightforward task. S’bo was an ideal interlocutor; he was always happy to talk informally 
and our interview itself was close to three hours long. At the same time, he is a novice 
ethnographer’s worst nightmare. He is a model of hard work and discipline who does not want 
anyone to act like him and a teacher who (according to him) does not teach but instead 
facilitates. Although he is exemplary in a number of ways, he does not want anyone to follow his 
lead. Unlike Rob, he cannot be linked to a particular cannon of theatre or a particular 
philosophical movement. His pedagogy does not attempt to implement the ideas of a pedagogue 
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from another space and place or try to instill it with fresh, localized meanings. He is also unlike 
Irene, whose dialogical pedagogy claims participation in the Market Theatre’s impetus toward 
the telling and hearing of uniquely South African stories, finding models in Barney Simon, John 
Kani, and others. His ethics derive positively from his own introspection, and negatively from 
spurning the bad examples of others.  
 S’bo can only be characterized through the traits he rejects, and his ideas seem to resist 
epistemic or ethical archaeology of any kind. I am certain he would want it that way. Yet the task 
of writing as a contemporary anthropologist seems to demand that he stand as proof of 
something: perhaps resistance—or conformity—toward something or other that is neoliberal, or 
even more crassly, that he is some new species of organic intellectual. Perhaps he could be. My 
own resistance to presenting him as such is the intuition that, however vaguely, S’bo’s pedagogy 
does gesture toward something about post-Mandela South Africa, still nebulous enough that it 
has not yet been named or claimed by anthropology (or perhaps any discipline). It is the 
intuition, shared by Jean and John Comaroff (2012) that South Africa, and the global South more 
broadly, is the cutting edge of new epistemic, ethical—and, I would submit, pedagogical—
subjectivities. 
 S’bo does make for an interesting comparison and contrast with Humphrey’s (1997) 
examination of ethical exemplars in Mongolia; at least enough to characterize the status of 
pedagogical and ethical authority in this moment. Humphrey contrasts Mongolian conceptions of 
moral life with Western ones, arguing for the primacy of a self-fashioned ethics over rule-based 
morality. It is not that rules are unimportant for Mongolians, but simply that it is imperative for 
each individual (in order to be an individual) to distinguish themselves through their own self-
formative choices. Exemplars and pedagogues stand at the heart of this process, providing 
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models and examples for how to live life well. The radical difference, of course, is S’bo’s 
steadfast rejection of positive exemplars—declaring anyone to be a model for one’s own actions, 
for S’bo, cedes too much freedom and creativity. For the Mongolians, by contrast, “a person 
without a teacher is a no-body,” though of course there is always critical adjustment to the 
exemplar in a process that is “open-ended and unfinished” (1997, 34).  
 Yet in other ways, S’bo share many similarities to Humphrey’s Mongolian interlocutors. 
S’bo places “greater weight on the ‘practices of self’ than on the issues raised by following the 
rules” (1997, 42-43). S’bo would much rather toss out many conventions—aesthetic and moral—
and decide what to do through his own introspective processes. Like them, he sees the 
importance of negative exemplars as object lessons of how one can go about life in the wrong 
sorts of ways. S’bo also shares with them something more germane to a post-Mandela South 
Africa—a wary glance at politically sanctioned exemplars. For Humphrey’s interlocutors, the 
incessant calls to follow the example of good and sacrificial Maoist heroes began to ring hallow 
and became grounds for satire and mockery. Like them, S’bo grows increasingly wary of calls to 
emulate heroes of South Africa’s struggle.  
 S’bo’s ethics thus combine a distaste for pedagogues to a wariness and suspicion of 
exemplars more broadly. While there are not many that hold a position quite as extreme as his, 
S’bo’s ethics do speak to broader facets of a post-Mandela South Africa, where popular 
exemplars and a legacy of colonial pedagogy are both thrown radically into question—often 
together. Contestation around broader spaces of pedagogy has long been a harbinger of broader 
social transformation in South Africa. The Soweto Uprisings of 1976 are perhaps the most 
celebrated example, but pedagogy in the service of revolution has been a facet of South African 
life for much longer (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; 1997). The latest iterations have come via 
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the “Rhodes Must Fall” and “Fees Must Fall” movements. They are, in many ways, a rejection of 
white pedagogy—a much-needed push to transform the space of university from its colonial 
legacies, its dominant epistemologies, and the economic inequalities on which it rests. The 
solutions, within this movement at least, are straightforward: there needs to be more black 
representation in the professoriate (Petersen 2016), universities should not be named for 
individuals who are increasingly seen as colonial antagonists (Daniels 2015), and education 
should be a right rather than an increasingly expensive privilege (Tshabalala 2015). It is not 
surprising that students in a post-Mandela South Africa grapple anew with the question of 
epistemic and ethical authority alike. 
While my South African friends and interlocutors would likely agree about the 
importance of these questions, I also found, in various places, a sense of unease around where 
authority should be vested (if not a corrupt ANC); who ought to provide models for aesthetic 
theory and practice (if not the Western cannon) and, more fundamentally, who ought to stand as 
an ethical exemplar (not John Cecil Rhodes, certainly, but increasingly, not Nelson Mandela 
either). In response to the Rhodes Must Fall campaign, the satirical news site Banana Newsline 
reported on a similar (but fictional) protest to remove Mandela’s statue: “The traitor must go,” 
the protestors chanted, as they covered the statue with black trash bags. “Madiba sold our people 
out when he negotiated with the whites,” one man said. “It’s because of him that white farmers 
still have land.” Although parodic, Banana Newsline’s fictional protestors make an argument I 
heard in earnest numerous times. Mandela is not a teacher, a leader, or an exemplar, interlocutors 
told me. Pensively, they searched for other teachers, other exemplars. Perhaps Shaka Zulu, 
perhaps Dingane kaSenzangakhona Zulu. Not Mandela. Like the Mongolian rejection of Maoist 
icons, the state’s promotion of Mandela is becoming increasingly suspect. 
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Among the interlocutors who put Mandela himself on trial, perhaps the closest analog I 
found to S’bo during my fieldwork was a man named Sam. Sam is not only a pedagogue but also 
an artist, and not one who lived in Grahamstown but in Soweto. He was bothered by the question 
of “why I am here in this world,” and, like S’bo, had a mind that was relentlessly open to 
different ways of answering it. His metaphysics were drawn from his own readings of Western 
philosophy, Kabbalah, the Upanishads and Vedas, quantum physics, and a substantial amount of 
conspiracy theory (including the existence of Atlantis, aliens, and plenty of shadow organizations 
like the Illuminati and the Knights Templar). His integration of these influences was a bricolage 
of his own making, and Sam struggled as an artist, against familial and social expectations, to 
make a living in his own way and to live life free from precedents set by others.  
I was reminded of Sam one day when S’bo told me, during a casual conversation, about a 
documentary he watched about asteroids and supernovas. “Scientists are always predicting 
disastrous things far out in the future,” he told me, “but the truth is, something catastrophic could 
happen to the earth at any point. All life as we know it could come to an end.” Sam too saw the 
world as being on the constant brink of chaos and destruction (although for him it would likely 
come through the work of a shadow government rather than a cosmic disaster), and both men 
seemed perfectly comfortable going about their lives with full acknowledgement of this fact. But 
their similarities end with their common hunger for contemplation of life’s mysteries. As a 
practitioner of forum theatre, Sam’s aesthetics were the aesthetics of the oppressed (Boal 2008), 
and his pedagogy was the pedagogy of the oppressed, drawn from his own training with a 
pedagogue who was himself a student of Augusto Boal. While Sam’s philosophical horizons and 
creativity were similar to S’bo’s, S’bo’s rejection of any mentor or exemplar sets him apart even 
from someone as epistemically eclectic as Sam. Sam’s knowledge comes from everywhere. 
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S’bo’s knowledge does not, according to him, derive from any place other than his own 
introspection. 
Even so, I do see something of S’bo in the restless spirit of many of the black South 
Africans that I talked to as they wrestled with exactly who might best tell them what it meant, as 
black South Africans, to live a good life. Some find the answer in the Economic Freedom 
Fighters, whose populist and nationalistic rhetoric seeks to shape South African in the model of 
Zimbabwe through nationalization of industry and seizure of property from whites. Some look to 
the philosophy of Black Consciousness and those who claim to bear the mantel of Steve Biko. 
From S’bo, there is no answer, only a relentless questioning. In a post-Mandela South Africa, 
S’bo is ahead of his time. But not by much. 
 
Conclusion: Counter-pedagogy and Ethnography 
Rob and S’bo, each in their own ways and to varying degrees, are practitioners of a 
counter-pedagogy. Their teaching does not begin with the presumption of authority but an 
invitation to participate in spaces of dialog and exploration. Rob’s pedagogy is ongoing—it 
began with a set of workshops and continued as the group toured Waterline in Amsterdam. As 
the work toured in South Africa, cast members gave their own workshops—most recently in the 
townships of Cape Town—to others. S’bo’s pedagogical encounters are more temporally fluid—
S’bo does not offer a series of workshops as Rob did; he simply teaches when called upon to 
teach, touring with various theatre groups in between.  
The pedagogy of both men points beyond theatre to a certain way of being in the world. 
S’bo’s workshops, ostensibly oriented around theatre, frequently bleed into life through 
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conversations about anything and everything, and one needn’t even be interested in theatre to 
attend. For S’bo, because “life is theatre and theatre is life,” there is no clear demarcation of one 
or the other in the setting of the workshop. He takes participants through physical exercises, but 
what he really feel he teaches is his “way of doing things;” an approach that disavows all 
mentors, influences, and ideologies, and claiming everything as his own creation, for better or 
worse. S’bo ultimately teaches a relentlessly questioning form of being in the world, but does not 
want to be seen as a model of a specific mode of life—an ethics that I had a hard time finding 
elsewhere in South Africa, but an ethics nonetheless. The ethical pedagogy that Rob imparted 
through his workshops is more ethereal, less oriented around epistemology or morality itself and 
more phenomenological. A way of knowing self in space alongside other things and beings. A 
mode of attentiveness and collaboration. Above all, he teaches the importance of play and 
creation.  
 Toward the end of The Subject of Virtue, Laidlaw argues provocatively that ethnography 
itself can act as ethical pedagogue, that “that anthropological thought, in particular the exercise 
of the ethnographic imagination, can be a mode of reflective self-formation, a form of spiritual 
exercise” (2014, 224). Ethnography, he argues, plays a pedagogical role in this way when the 
self is shaped, through engagement with ethnography, to overcome initial puzzlement over a 
particular way of life. Using the example of Wari mortuary cannibalism, Laidlaw argues that 
from it we can gain an understanding of a different way of life and orientation toward death that 
expands our moral horizons; new understandings of mourning, compassion, and duty from a 
practice that initially strikes many as grotesque and abhorrent. For Laidlaw, ethnography can 
impart these lessons without at all suggesting that cannibalism is a practice that should be readily 
adopted.  
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What are the pedagogical possibilities opened by an ethnography of counter-pedagogues 
like Rob and S’bo? What can be learned from those who insist, to varying extents, that they do 
not teach? If both men teach differing forms of being in the world, they are forms of being that 
are temporally, socially, and politically bound to South Africa. They are post-Mandela forms of 
pedagogy that participate in broader debates around issues of authority, and more broadly, 
epistemology, that continue to be the touchpoint in arguments that freedom never really came in 
1994 and that only a post-Mandela generation might be able to work toward freedom, however it 
is ultimately conceptualized. Shortly after I left the field, thousands of students marched on the 
Union Buildings in Pretoria to agitate for more affordable—and decolonized—forms of tertiary 
education. New pedagogies will continue to respond to these demands. The ethics of pedagogues 
in their responses or refusals to respond (so far, they have, by and large, joined with the students) 
to student demands in South Africa is a key facet in a dynamic of power and freedom. These 
dynamics are of interest to anyone interested in the formation of the self, the violence of the 
state, and emerging epistemologies.   
To push Laidlaw’s claims of ethnographic pedagogy one step further, it is also worth 
considering the possibilities of ethnography that is itself counter-pedagogical. What would 
ethnography be if it took S’bo’s orientation (the more extreme of the two cases) as its guiding 
pedagogical impulse? Like S’bo, it would simply show a form of life, while explicitly 
repudiating itself as any kind of guide or exemplar. Such ethnography immediately runs the risk 
of generating what Laidlaw condemns—an ethnography from Geertz’s “merchants of 
astonishment” meant to titillate and perhaps shock—that does not lead to any kind of self-
formation or greater understanding. It would be odd ethnography, to say the least. Perhaps not 
even ethnography at all. The counter-pedagogical impulse, however, that could be constructively 
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extracted is a skepticism of self; a healthy grain of worry that there is not one way to write an 
ethnography of anything. This principle, it seems, is not qualitatively different than the 
reflexivity anthropologists are often urged to practice. In that sense, anthropologists are already 
more like S’bo than might have been supposed.  
The more provocative ethical disposition that might be drawn from S’bo’s counter-
pedagogy is his disavowal of any mentor, any pedagogue, any teacher, and any influence. This, it 
seems, is a place to which ethnography cannot follow S’bo. As Jessica Marie Falcone (2013) 
argues, anthropologists are firmly embedded within networks of giving and exchange that make 
citational performance crucial. The hau of theory, in the giving and receiving of ethnographic 
texts, is part and parcel of the discipline itself as a cumulative social science. Ethnography 
without recourse to precedent would be lonely and, it seems, theoretically impoverished. From 
S’bo, I suggest, anthropologists might however take more of an impulse for ethnography that 
strikes out on its own, without worry for pedagogues and predecessors, and without the anxiety 
of having to “make an intervention” or “fill a gap.” This form of ethnography does not exist and 
may never exist, but we might approximate it to a degree, rendering ethnography more pliable, 
less disciplined, and, for that reason, more open to engagement with a broader range of 
conversation partners. 
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Chapter 5 
Exhibit B: Traveling and Transnational Antiracist Whiteness 
 
Transnational South African Whiteness  
This chapter, which draws on ethnographic data and analysis of media accounts, is an 
engagement with transnational circulations of South African whiteness. Specifically, I engage 
the work of white South African artist Brett Bailey and his productions Exhibit A and Exhibit B, 
tracking the works between South Africa, Germany, and the UK. Exhibit A and Exhibit B were 
re-creations of nineteenth century “ethnographic exhibitions,” in which individuals were brought 
from Southern Africa, South America, and other exotic locales to be displayed in Europe for a 
curious public. Bailey’s re-creations of these “human zoos” (as they are pejoratively called) was 
meant to critique forms of white gazing and colonial history, though its representational 
strategies and Bailey’s own whiteness would be the cause of intense controversy when the work 
traveled outside of South Africa. 
I examine the debates surrounding the Exhibit series with attention to how Bailey’s 
whiteness continually shifts as the work travels: in South Africa, Bailey makes the case that he is 
wrestling with a history of privilege and colonialism and engaging in his own ethical journey. In 
Germany, however, he becomes a pedagogue foisting a lesson of racial history on others. In 
London, Exhibit B was cancelled after an online petition and series of protests, and in this 
context Bailey transformed into an iconoclast and champion for the value of artistic expression.48  
                                                          
48 Similar protests and debates around Exhibit B also broke out in Paris after the work’s cancellation in London. In 
this chapter, I focus on the debates in London, which preceded the largely analogous protests and arguments once 
the work came to Paris.   
198 
 
 
Far from being monolithic, I argue, whiteness can be a space of freedom for ethical work in one 
context but can become constrained and contested as it crosses borders. The legitimacy of 
antiracist South African whiteness, I ultimately argue, is increasingly eroding in the context of a 
post-Mandela South Africa.    
Transnational Circulations of Whiteness  
My examination of Bailey and the shifting terrains of South African whiteness is in 
dialogue with critical whiteness studies, which has grown substantially as an interdisciplinary 
endeavor over the last twenty years. Drawing upon histories of colonialism, segregation, 
apartheid, and more enduring regimes of privilege, anthropologists, sociologists, philosophers 
and others have challenged whiteness as an unmarked racial category (e.g. Dyer 1997; hooks 
1992), drawing attention to the visible and invisible privileges of whiteness (e.g. Frankenberg 
1993; Page & Thomas 1994) and productively complicating the view that whiteness is a uniform 
and homogeneous construct (e.g. Hartigan 1992, 1997, 2005; Perry 2002). The burgeoning field 
that whiteness studies has become makes it a difficult task indeed to contain these studies in a 
succinct literature review—literature reviews on whiteness themselves tend to be fragmented and 
topic-oriented rather than comprehensive (e.g. Grimes 2002; Manglitz 2003; Martin-McDonald 
and McCarthy 2008). No longer a sub-field of critical race studies, whiteness studies itself has 
even been deemed worthy of periodization via “waves” (see, for instance, Twine and Gallagher 
2008 on the “third wave” of whiteness studies).  
 Given the rate at which scholarship on whiteness continue to proliferate, it is curious that 
so few scholars of whiteness have addressed its transnational dimensions, that is, the circulation 
of whiteness between and across national borders. Existing volumes on the theme of 
transnational whiteness (e.g. Moreton-Robinson, Casey and Nicoll 2008) do not actually take the 
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movement of whiteness or white people through differing contexts as their object of study. The 
situation is very much the opposite, in fact: studies of whiteness that do not originate from within 
the Global North are counted as “transnational,” degrading the term into a vacant signifier not 
unlike the nebulous category of “world music.” Others (e.g. Boucher, Carey, and Ellinghaus 
2009) address the colonial (and thus transnational) origins of whiteness through historical 
approaches, though the emphasis in these studies is more on the formations and colonial 
trajectories of whiteness rather than its movement across borders. Borders themselves, and white 
circulation between and through them, remain undertheorized in critical whiteness studies.    
Studies of indigenous sovereignty have a good deal to contribute in this regard, showing 
not only the historic entanglement of race with borders, but the incomplete and ongoing work of 
whiteness (especially in settler-colonial contexts). Historically, these studies point out, the ability 
of whiteness to move easily across borders is not simply a function of whiteness, but is 
constitutive of whiteness itself. In settler-colonial contexts like Australia, Moreton-Robinson 
(2015) argues, white migration provided necessary reinforcements in service of a white 
European identity for the nation-state, and the state, in turn, provided incentives through easy 
access to citizenship and property, conferring a sense of belonging for whites upon arrival in a 
new place. Possession of these rights, of course, is built upon the dispossession of land and of 
sovereignty from indigenous peoples (Kauanui 2008; Schech and Haggis 2004). The history of 
settler-colonial borders is a history of whiteness in the making.   
  At the same time, borders are more than history frozen into a sense of place; they 
continue to mediate the politics of citizenship and belonging through projects of settler-
colonialism that remain ongoing. In Simpson’s ethnography of the Mohawks (2014), for 
example, borders become an ethnographic pressure point at which discourses of citizenship, 
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sovereignty, and belonging are revealed. Simpson compellingly shows the entanglements of 
borders (and by extension, nation-states) with indigenous sovereignty by privileging moments of 
refusal—moments when she and others steadfastly reject the predication of U.S.-citizenship and 
assert indigenous sovereignty and belonging in response. These acts of refusal are a direct 
challenge to the settler-colonial ambition to either eliminate or assimilate its indigenous 
populations.49  
The most compelling studies of whiteness across borders thus far follow the impulses at 
work in Moreton-Robinson, Simpson, and others, carefully showing not only the mechanisms 
through which whiteness facilitates its own circulation, but also the instability, precarity, and 
anxieties that continue to haunt projects of white nation-building. Lundström (2014), for 
example, examines the experiences of white Swedish women in their migrations to the United 
States, Spain, and Singapore, ultimately arguing that “whiteness, as a social construct, assumes 
different shapes cross-nationally and is moulded by individual actors and transnational relations” 
(2014, 167). Lundström theorizes whiteness as a “form of embodied and institutionalized cultural 
capital that can be converted into other forms of capital across social space” (2014, 13). Through 
a multisited ethnography, she tracks the shifting nature of Swedish whiteness as it becomes “re-
installed” in new racial terrains. Through the course of Lundström’s ethnography, Swedish 
whiteness emerges as a “fluid, contextual, and relational construction with unstable boundaries” 
(2014, 12), not least because of the mediation of whiteness through the constitutive matrices of 
gender and sexuality. Whiteness for Lundström’s informants was an undeniable asset at times, 
                                                          
49 See also Kauanui, who argues that whiteness “constitutes a project of disappearance for Native peoples (2008, 10-
11). Kauanui, like Simpson, argues that settler-colonialism works to domesticate indigenous sovereignty through 
discourses of “recognition,” in an attempt to enfold indigeneity into the nation-state. Borders, both figurative and 
actual, are a place where this work unfolds in Kauanui’s account as well as Simpson’s.    
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but it was also attended with gendered expectations of labor and domesticity depending on the 
context.     
As a settler-colonial context, South Africa has likewise proven a productive springboard 
for studies of white movement across borders. The end of apartheid and the transition to a non-
racial democracy have been attended by the departure of significant numbers of white South 
Africans.50 British South Africans in particular, as Andrucki has argued, have readily harnessed 
the power of a “visa whiteness machine” (2010) to gain access and citizenship in the United 
Kingdom and, by extension (at least until Brexit) to the broader European Union. Transnational 
mobility, Andrucki argues, “is not incidental to, or an epiphenomenon of, whiteness in South 
Africa, but is immanent in it” (2010, 360). South African whiteness is mobile, constantly shifting 
between contexts and adapting as it does so.  
The study of these circulations has allowed for a more robust theorization of the mutating 
properties of whiteness as it crosses borders. Andrucki (2013) examines the “imaginative 
geographies” that shape perceptions of South Africa and the United Kingdom for white English 
speaking South Africans who regularly circulate between the two contexts. Similar to Moreton-
Robinson’s (2015) work in the context of Australia, Andrucki articulates a powerful sense of 
South African belonging rooted in ontological connection to land and place. Once in the United 
Kingdom, white South Africans do not feel at home as whites but instead feel isolated, yearning 
for a more “authentic” life on the African continent. For Andrucki, imaginative geographies 
serve to figure South Africa as “African,” a status that is deployed in frequent comparisons 
                                                          
50 Fisher (2010) notes a parallel process of white immigration from Zimbabwe.  
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against the drudgery, boredom, and loneliness that attends a life in the “soulless” United 
Kingdom (2013, 5).  
Pauline Leonard (2013), by contrast, focuses on British whiteness and its mutations upon 
entry to South Africa. Focusing on labor in particular, Leonard examines the changing fortunes 
of white British women by comparing apartheid-era immigrants with their post-apartheid 
counterparts. The privileges of British whiteness, she argues, are more ambiguous and more 
precarious in an era of post-apartheid employment driven by Black Economic Empowerment 
laws. Although whiteness still “works,” by and large, to confer access to resources and entry into 
high paying industries, many of those privileges, according to informants, seem to be eroding.  
 South African whiteness, of course, is not monolithic and uniform. While many white 
South Africans have chosen to immigrate abroad or retreat to the white enclaves of Cape Town, 
Johannesburg, and Durban (or even the primarily Afrikaans white “homeland” of Orania), there 
are others who have chosen to reflexively and dialogically cultivate new forms of whiteness. 
Taking whiteness as a substance of ethical work on the self, some white South Africans 
deliberately cultivate new “hybrid” identities that embrace facets of African culture (Steyn 
2001), and might go as far as embracing indigenous forms of African religion (Teppo 2011; 
Wreford 2007). The end of apartheid, these scholars argue, was a time of great anxiety for white 
South Africans, but it also came with opportunities to forge a new whiteness for a new South 
Africa; an anti-racist strain of whiteness that would fully embrace and dwell alongside black 
South Africans.   
 These newer, less intransigent forms of South African whiteness move across borders as 
well, and have done so largely through aesthetic export. During the height of apartheid 
resistance, the works of white South African directors like Athol Fugard and Barney Simon 
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toured abroad to critical acclaim, bringing the indignities of apartheid to European and North 
American audiences and further stoking anti-apartheid sentiment. Simon in particular was 
relentlessly committed to cross-racial collaboration in the production and performance of theatre 
and to telling uniquely South African stories that exposed apartheid’s racism, urging audiences to 
see that new forms of racial relation were possible (Stephanou and Henriques 2011). After 
apartheid, works like William Kentridge’s Ubu and the Truth Commission further excavated a 
South Africa’s racial history and the extent to which whiteness itself could be brought to justice. 
One needn’t widen the scope far to see newer, more complex aesthetic exports that peddle new 
forms of South African whiteness: rap/rave group Die Antwoord has taken the Global North (and 
the United States in particular) by storm, promoting and celebrating a hybridized, bastardized, 
lower-class white identity that revels in impurity and mixing (Krueger 2012; Lewis 2016; Marx 
and Milton 2011).51  
Brett Bailey’s Exhibit series is thus situated within a lineage of anti-racist theatre and 
performance with a fairly celebrated history. More importantly, his tour of Exhibit B offers an 
approach to circulations of whiteness that differs substantively from Lundström, Leonard, and 
Andrucki’s studies of white migration. Rather than seeking the advantages of a new life outside 
of South Africa, Bailey remains in transnational locales only temporarily. His movements and 
interactions with local racial contexts thus cannot be understood as the relocation of whiteness in 
a new racial terrain, but instead as an attempt to promote a form of whiteness as worthy of 
import into new locales. Not unlike Barney Simon or Athol Fuguard, that is, Bailey sought to 
draw on a South African form of antiracist whiteness to tell the story of colonialism and 
                                                          
51 The domain of literature is another area in which these forms of South African antiracism are readily visible; 
authors like J.M. Coetzee and Antjie Krogg have explored South African antiracist whiteness at length.  
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apartheid, and also to suggest that a reflexive and diological form of whiteness is possible and 
worthwhile. Exhibit B is an attempt to put forward a particular antiracist subject position as a 
worthy alternative to local white subject positions already in place. 
  The controversy that surrounded Bailey as he toured the work in different European 
locales reveals the steady depreciation of anti-racist South African whiteness as worthy subject 
position in transnational settings. Far from a passive migrant subject to the constraints of a new 
racial context, his role as the director of an extremely controversial theatre piece makes Bailey a 
catalyst that exacerbated local racial debates about the meanings of whiteness. As Exhibit B 
makes evident, South African theatre still has the uncanny ability, when travelling abroad, to 
occasion deliberate and earnest reflection on issues of race. At the same time, Bailey found 
himself confronted with a radically different set of racial terrains than Fugard or Simon may 
have dealt with.  
 In this regard, it is helpful to return briefly to Lundström’s metaphor of the “re-
installation” of whiteness in new locales (2014, 3). It is unclear if Lundström means to use this 
metaphor in a technological sense, likening the process of whiteness crossing borders to the 
transfer of, for example, a word processing program to a new computer. If this is her intended 
meaning, she does not deploy it at the depth she could have, speaking, for instance, of failed, 
impartial, or incompatible re-installations. The metaphor in this sense is helpful for 
understanding the argument I will advance about antiracist white South African subject positions 
in a post-Mandela South Africa. If we imagine local racial dynamics as a diverse set of operating 
systems, antiracist white South African subject positions are increasingly rendered incompatible. 
They are, at the very least, glitchy in some systems, and may even be (to stretch the metaphor a 
bit further) flagged as a malicious form of malware.    
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Beginning in South Africa—where I draw primarily from my own ethnographic 
engagement with the work—the chapter then shifts to Germany and the UK, tracking the Exhibit 
series toward a more robust understanding of South African whiteness across borders. Extending 
arguments made in a previous publication with regard to the work in Berlin (Vlachos 2014), I 
argue that Bailey’s encounter in London reveals the dissipating cultural capital of South African 
whiteness—the transnational white face of a post-Mandela South Africa. As a study in ethics, the 
chapter also reveals that antiracist work on the white self does not easily travel.  
Exhibit A: Technologies of the (White) Self  
Exhibit A played in South Africa as 
part of the “performance art” program 
at the 2012 National Arts Festival in 
Grahamstown, giving audiences the 
opportunity to “gaze at a variety of 
people from across the continent” for 
fifty-five rand (approximately five 
dollars). Held in a darkened and dreary 
two-story schoolhouse strewn with 
leaves and dirt, the performance began 
when individual audience members 
were called, one at a time at random, 
to enter the building alone. Once 
inside, audience members were 
confronted by a series of tableaux-
Exhibit A Program, National Arts Festival 2012 
206 
 
 
vivants depicting grotesque scenes of colonial horror: a Herrero woman in a German prison 
camp scraping the skulls of fellow prisoners to prepare them for export and anthropological 
study; a woman lying chained to a bed in the quarters of a French colonial officer; a “pygmy 
couple” displayed in curiosity cabinets alongside measuring tape, taxidermy animals, and a copy 
of Darwin’s Origins of Species. In the last room of the top floor, a Nambian choir of 
disembodied heads sang a series of dirges in Xosa and Tswana against the backdrop of historical 
photos of decapitated heads exported to Europe for study. The lower floor of the building 
modernized the themes of transnational racism with a specific focus on African refugees to 
Europe: in one room, a man sat bound and gagged on an airplane seat, and a nearby placard 
listed the names of a number of refugees who had died of strangulation and asphyxiation during 
deportation flights.  
Exhibit A was an intense and uncomfortable work to experience as an audience member, 
not least because the tableaux were staged with live actors who returned my gaze with their own. 
As I wandered from room to room in a stupor, I met, for as long as I could, the gazes of each of 
the performers, who returned stares filled with anger, rage, pain, desperation, and a range of 
other emotions. Exhibit A had undeniable beauty and power as a work, but its beauty was always 
mediated by grotesque reminders of a painful colonial history as well as a history of the black 
body presented as spectacle for white European and American audiences (Andreassen 2015; 
Corbey 1993; Lindfors 1999). Unlike the happy or dancing natives who would have appeared in 
ethnographic exhibitions held in Paris, London, Berlin, or Chicago, Exhibit A sought to turn 
voyeurism and spectacle on its head through the ongoing, silent interrogation by each of the cast 
members.  
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After exiting the school, audiences could sit and debrief around a fire, discussing the 
work with each other or simply pondering in further silence. The mostly white audience 
members attending my performance, and many other afterward, expressed feelings of grief, 
shame, and disgust in response to the work, and were unsettled by what they had seen. Black cast 
members, with a much more intimate view of audiences, experienced these emotions firsthand as 
they witnessed raw and vulnerable bouts of crying and apology from white audiences.  
These visceral displays by audiences were, paradoxically, the real performance of Exhibit 
A, according to Brett Bailey. At a public interview, he made it clear that the work was 
deliberately constructed in this way when he noted that “The performers are told, as they sit 
there, that the performers of this piece are the audience moving through, that you’re actually the 
audience, and you’re sitting watching a lot of people coming to watch you. You are the audience, 
they are the performers.” In this way, Exhibit A, it turns out, was performed by mostly white 
audiences, choreographed with a myriad of expressive reactions for reception by the tableau-
vivants. The cast, according to Bailey, had the power of the gaze at their full disposal.    
Exhibit A’s cast took this instruction to heart, and at least one of them (who I later came 
to know as S’bo when I returned in 2014) used the opportunity to conduct his own ethnography 
of white emotion. As I talked with him about his participation in the work, he frequently 
mentioned the opportunities he had to “see through” the audiences. While I initially took this 
comment to mean that he was trying to see things from their perspective, the reality that 
eventually emerged was quite different: audience members had become transparent to him. 
Given the hundreds of reactions that he had witnessed, it was not hard to guess that an audience 
member was feeling sad, intimidated, ashamed, or overwhelmed. He had the power to categorize, 
classify, and discriminate between different audience members and draw generalized conclusions 
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about the range of possible reactions from the audience. As he stood frozen on the stairwell 
between the two floors, he engaged in a sophisticated study of how people might respond once 
the gaze is turned back on them.  
Despite the feelings of guilt and shame that this reversal of gazes provoked in its 
(overwhelmingly white) audiences, Brett Bailey denied in public discussions and elsewhere that 
the intention of Exhibit A was meant to shame people:  
“People say to me, did I make this work to shame people? And it’s like, no, not at all. I 
made this work to excavate. Another thing that’s in this work is that I’m a white South 
African. My family has been here since 1674, the one side of my family. They were 
probably slave owners; they were complicit in everything that’s happened here, really. 
My own society, my people have been immensely enriched by a lot of these atrocities 
here. And also I was born in 1967, I was conscripted into the army, the role models at 
school were the priests, the guests on TV were putting forward a philosophy of racism, of 
racial superiority. So I can’t ignore that that is part of my cultural DNA, my intellectual 
DNA, it’s part of who I am, I can’t deny it. I was brought up with that, and it’s the soil 
that I absorbed as a kid. How do I unravel that? What were the roots of that? What was 
that all about?” (Quoted in Vlachos 2014:61) 
As I have argued elsewhere, Bailey’s narrative hinges on metaphors of archeology and 
excavation. Establishing his ancestral connection to the land and simultaneously problematizing 
it, he described the work as a process of digging down to the roots of his own racial past and an 
archeology of his racialized experiences as a white South African growing up during apartheid. 
For Bailey (in this setting at least) the work wasn’t meant to compel shame in audiences, but was 
instead a response to the shame he felt as he encountered the history of ethnographic exhibitions 
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and mined his own ancestral history in South Africa. It was also, importantly, conceived and 
devised alongside a cast of black South African performers with whom Bailey regularly 
discussed issues of personal and social South African racial history (Vlachos 2014).  
The ethical thrust of Bailey’s work—not least in his impulse toward excavation—
corresponds quite well to arguments made by Paul C. Taylor in “Art, Education, and Witness; 
Or, How to Make our Ideals Clear” (2009). Taylor argues that “a certain kind of perception is 
essential to ethical practice,” and that “cultivated aesthetic experiences, both good and bad” 
facilitate the development of this perception (Taylor 2009, 25). Taylor’s approach hinges on a 
post-analytic52 philosophical intervention into critical race theory. Although critical race theory 
is “an essentially ethical enterprise,” he argues, it “cannot realize its ethical purpose until it 
demands some manner of self-excavation from the ethical agents that its genealogical analyses 
mean to inform” (2009, 26). Aesthetic encounters are an integral part of this process of self-
excavation; they allow the cultivation of a creative ethical sensitivity that responds to the 
particulars of context rather than the intransigent ethical principles of a more consequentialist or 
deontological stripe.  
For Taylor and Martha Nussbaum (whose aesthetic theory he draws from),53 the 
complexities of ethical life call for an ethical agent who is more of an improvisational artist; 
someone who can internalize and begin from a set of moral norms or traditions and apply them 
to the particulars of a situation at hand, rather than operating as a simple a rule-computing 
machine. “Certain works of narrative art not only model this process but also insist,” Taylor 
argues, “on the truths that require it” (2009, 28). Adding a Foucauldian twist to his account, 
                                                          
52 Taylor, who identifies as a post-analytic philosopher, stresses “the subordination of conceptual analysis to 
empirical, even experimental, inquiry” (2009, 26).  
53 See Nussbaum 1992.  
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Taylor goes on to assert that a complete (and virtuous) internalization of rules of conduct 
necessitates “a critique of the constitutive power of the rule,” and more generally, “a critical 
relation to the norms that constitute the self” (2009, 30). It is precisely in the aesthetic realm, 
Taylor argues, where we readily find such opportunities for such critique, and by extension, a 
kind of self-excavation.  
The upshot for post-colonial contexts, in Taylor’s account, is the need for relentless self-
excavation of colonial histories and the ways in which it has oriented perception, and it on this 
point that Taylor’s work is most germane to Exhibit A:  
To be postcolonial is to exist in a state of at least nominal disaffiliation from colonial 
relations of dependence and exploitation, but it is also to remain affected by, and to 
continue to have to work through, the legacies of those relations, and their persistence in 
altered forms. This is the condition not just of obvious colonial powers and their former 
colonies… It is also the condition of herrenvolk, or “master race,” societies like South 
Africa, Australia, and the U.S. (U.S. possessions notwithstanding) after the abandonment 
of de jure forms of ethnoracial expropriation and oppression. We pledge in these places 
to do better, to come to grips with our histories and transcend them, and to make 
ourselves into viable multiracial democracies. But we can pursue this aspiration 
responsibly only if we excavate the legacies of the past, unearthing the deposits that the 
past has left in our economies, cultures, and psyches. This means, among other things, 
attending to the specific perceptual lenses and models to which our colonial legacies 
predispose us in our attempts to interpret and navigate the social world around us” (2009, 
30).      
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Art can and does play an integral role in facilitating this post-colonial excavation and self-
critique. It does not even need to be morally good or commendable art; many of the examples 
that Taylor draws on from Dances With Wolves to The Last King of Scotland evince deeply 
problematic forms of whiteness. Nonetheless, “the right artworks, even, and perhaps especially, 
ethically problematic ones, position us to ask: ‘what does it mean that I respond to this piece as I 
do? What kind of person am I, for this work to resonate with me?” (2009, 35).   
Taylor’s insights allow for a principled, sympathetic reading of Exhibit A: in its process 
of inception, construction, and production, Exhibit A was a technology of the self that allowed 
Bailey to work toward a different sort of (white) subject position: one characterized by racial 
reflexivity and informed by dialogical relationships with others. In its performances, it 
rhetorically functioned as a mode of justification for this subject position, critiquing and working 
to upend a legacy of white voyeurism that began in colonialism and persists through problematic 
forms of cultural representation (Butler 2010; Naidu 2009, 2011; Rassool & Witz 1996; 
Rogerson 2004; Witz et al. 2001).54 Transforming its audiences into a spectacle, Exhibit A was a 
work that Taylor might find interesting (even if problematic) for its structured critique and 
reversal of colonial forms of gazing and interrogation of histories of European exploitation. Even 
as it disturbed its audiences and drove them toward emotions of shame and grief, it staged 
                                                          
54 In this regard, it is important to note that Exhibit A was explicitly positioned in South Africa as a response to The 
Spear, a painting by white South African artist Brett Murray. The Spear was a parody of “Lenin Lived, Lenin Lives, 
Long Live Lennon,” a propaganda poster created by Viktor Semenovich Ivanov. In The Spear, Jacob Zuma’s head 
replaced Lenin’s, and his penis and testicles were exposed. The Spear generated so much outrage that the work was 
ultimately vandalized and covered in white paint. A quote from Achille Mbembe referencing The Spear served as an 
epigram for the Exhibit A program: “What has irked many is the realisation that, after almost 20 years of freedom, 
the black body is still a profane body. It still does not enjoy the kind of immunity accorded to properly human 
bodies.” (Mbembe 2012). 
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intimate and personal encounters that forced audiences to attend to their own forms of seeing and 
being seen. 
Although Exhibit A received a good deal of critical acclaim, not everyone was apt to give 
the production such a sympathetic reading. During a chance meeting with Bailey and members of 
his production company in one of the festival’s recreational areas, Bailey told me that there had 
been a lively academic debate about the ethics of the piece. Many people, it seemed, felt that 
Exhibit A recreated the very violence that it set out to critique. Performance artist Jane Corrigall 
echoed these criticisms after seeing the work, arguing that Exhibit A is “a problematic work that 
reaffirms the stereotype of the Africans as victims…Viewers are meant to confront their own 
guilt—complicity in the atrocities or even their ignorance of them should induce it. It’s a farce 
from both sides; a game that exposes a desire to scrutinize others, the thrill of the grotesque, which 
is masked, erased, and forgiven by the subsuming guilt that automatically ensues” (Corrigall 2012, 
para. 13). I told Bailey I had been hearing the same sorts of critiques from other festival goers, 
some of whom had not seen Exhibit A. “Well, fuck them,” Bailey declared. Confident in his cast 
and in the hard racial work he had undergone in creating Exhibit A, Bailey pressed on throughout 
the festival, to mostly critical acclaim.  
Bailey, though, would not be able to brush off his critics with such ease once the work 
began a broader European tour. As criticism of the piece increasingly gathered momentum, he 
found himself at odds not only with liberal academics but also with a growing body of antiracist 
protesters who refused to accept that the piece could be anything but “the masturbation of white 
guilt” (Akala 2014) and a cynical attempt to exploit a painful colonial history to make a name for 
himself. In the sections that follow, I track debates that attended showings of Exhibit B in Berlin 
and the UK to argue that the white subject position Bailey cultivated in South Africa was not 
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ultimately transferable to other contexts. Whiteness is context-specific and bound by local 
histories, but so are white antiracist subject positions: they are not readily portable, nor readily 
installed beyond the contexts from which they originated.  
 
Exhibit B: Race and Representation in Berlin and London   
Guilt and Catharsis in Berlin 
A few months after Exhibit A’s 
staging in South Africa, Exhibit 
B55 began a lengthy European 
tour as part of the “foreign 
affairs” program of the Berliner 
Festspiele. It was here that 
protests around the Exhibit 
series began to erupt, as a 
group of antiracist community 
theatre activists protested the 
work and challenged the legitimacy of Bailey’s antiracist stance. Bailey’s responses to the 
protests were not dismissive as much as they were combative; Bailey was willing to engage 
detractors, but he was unwilling to put into question the fundamental impulse of the work, which 
had undergone a significant shift from its South African iteration.  
                                                          
55 Exhibit A and Exhibit B are largely the same work. The structure of the work and many of the tableaus remained 
the same, while some tableaus were modified to address local racial histories. For example, Sieg (2015) points out 
that in Belgium, one of the actors playing an asylum seeker wore a shirt reading “Zwarte Piet is racisme!” to address 
the longstanding practices of blackface that have been subsequently banned in the Netherlands (2015, 252).       
Brett Bailey: Facebook post via Third World Bunfight 
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No longer approaching the work as the excavation of a racial past and the cultivation of 
new white subject positions, Bailey was much more explicit in this context about the centrality of 
grief and shame, telling media that the work includes “a kind of catharsis—this is definitely 
something Europeans need, and I give it to you with the help of a black cast” (Vlachos 2014, 62). 
Rather than a work driven by self-excavation, Bailey thus sets up Exhibit B in this terrain as a 
work of antiracist pedagogy; the orchestration of a ritual that will lead other whites through 
emotions of grief and shame to new forms of racial consciousness. It is this shift, I argue, that 
followed the work as it circulated in other European contexts.   
Bühnenwatch (Stage Watch), a theatre advocacy group that has the aim of “bringing 
racist traditions and practices on German stages to an end” was vocal in its criticism of Exhibit B, 
arguing that the work fails on any relevant level to reverse historical forms of voyeuristic gazing. 
Their critique is worth quoting here at length: 
Despite claiming his seemingly anti-racist intentions, Brett Bailey reproduces the idea of 
Africans as objects, serving purposes of entertainment, comfort or, in this case, the 
education of white people. The artist claims that the people exhibited in the 
‘Völkerschauen’ of the 19th and 20th century were exposed to the European gaze—and 
that his work ‘reverses’ this gaze. We cannot see any reversion here…After all, it is not 
whites, but Black Africans that are standing motionless for over 45 minutes—some of 
them almost naked…The staging will purge feelings of shame in white people, but there 
is no analysis of sources and mechanisms of racism, so there is no fostering of a critical 
discussion. It is not anti-racist to mirror their own everyday experiences of racism to 
Black members of the audience. Here, painful Black history is being abused to advance 
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the careers of white protagonists and to soothe the bad conscience of a white audience 
that is constantly ignoring the voices of their Black fellow citizens (Bühnenwatch 9/29). 
Far from reversing colonial forms of gazing, Bühnenwatch argues, Exhibit B simply reproduces 
them.  
Bühnenwatch’s broader criticism of Bailey’s antiracism unfolds from two directions. 
Firstly, on a formal level, Bailey enacts racism through the positioning of black bodies in the 
work. Far from a passive artistic choice, they argue, Bailey actively exploits his black casts by 
deliberately positioning them as victims. “Standing motionless” and “almost naked,” they serve 
only as showpieces. Second, and more fundamentally, Bühnenwatch argues that Exhibit B is a 
piece made by a white artist for white audiences; a cynical attempt to prick the liberal white 
conscience at the expense of its black cast and the pain of black spectators. Worse still, it does so 
without generating the any impetus toward antiracist analysis or action. It recklessly uses black 
histories for shock value, that is, and does not sustain any commitment to critically questioning 
and working against current forms of racism in Germany or elsewhere.  
These two arguments would continue to haunt Exhibit B as it traveled beyond Germany. 
The second in particular, I argue, is the more damning of the two in terms of Bailey’s attempt to 
develop, promote, and export a form of white antiracism. As the work continued to tour beyond 
Berlin in the Netherlands and France, it garnered critical acclaim but also increasing amounts of 
criticism. Following a performance at Edinburgh in August of 2014, Bailey and a local British 
cast of actors got ready for a run at the Barbican in London, and it was here that critiques of 
Bailey’s antiracism would come to a head. 
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London Closure 
The protests against Exhibit B in London, which would ultimately lead to the closure of 
the show, began with a change.org petition with the title “Withdraw the racist Exhibition 
‘Exhibit B—The Human Zoo’ from showing at the Barbican from 23rd—27th September.” A 
letter attached to the petition, which was delivered to the administration of the Barbican, argued 
that Exhibit B was an “outrageous act of complicit racism” that does not expose but instead 
reinforces colonialism and acts as a “caging instrument of white supremacy.” The petition 
steadily gained momentum and support from antiracist protestors in the UK, ultimately gathering 
nearly 23,000 signatures.56  
It was not the petition itself that resulted in the closure of Exhibit B, but instead a protest 
of nearly two hundred people at the Barbican who, on opening night, made good on the petition’s 
promise of direct action should their demands not be met. Accounts of the protest diverge. 
Demonstrators were quick to 
point to the fact that, despite 
police presence, no arrests 
were made and that the 
protest was largely peaceful (Odunlami and Andrews 2014). Bailey argued in a Facebook post 
that the protestors stormed the building seconds before the opening. The Barbican, citing the 
“extreme nature of the protest and the serious threat to the safety of performers, audiences, and 
staff,” cancelled all performances of Exhibit B.   
                                                          
56  https://www.change.org/p/withdraw-the-racist-exhibition-exhibition-b-the-human-zoo. Last accessed April 6, 
2016.  
Brett Bailey, Facebook post via Third World Bunfight 
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The controversy generated by Exhibit B and its cancelation by the Barbican set off an 
explosion of debate that reached beyond the theatre industry, beyond the United Kingdom, and 
beyond Europe, reaching international media outlets from the New York Times to Russia TV. 
Numerous opinion pieces advancing arguments at the intersections of race and representation 
would continue for months afterward. While these debates cover a wide range of rhetorical 
terrain, they collectively reveal the shifting significance of South African antiracist whiteness 
abroad.  
Writing from mainstream media outlets, free speech advocacy think tanks, and personal 
blogs, supporters of Exhibit B held fast to arguments that the closure was an open and shut case 
of artistic censorship. “For those committed to the defense of free inquiry and artistic expression, 
this is not a complicated matter. And it would be only slightly more complicated if the work in 
question were indisputably racist. The right of artists to express themselves as they see fit must 
be inviolate, as must the right of audiences to make up their own minds about the merits of what 
they produce,” argued Jamie Palmer (2014, para. 6). Playwright and theatre critic Bonnie Greer 
argued that by getting Exhibit B cancelled and preventing her from seeing the work, the 
protestors had “quite simply refused me the choice to live my own life. This, in its own way, is a 
tyranny too” (Greer 2014). For Kenan Malik, the closure of Exhibit B “shows how even those 
who see themselves as progressive and as defenders of free speech can often be less than fulsome 
in their defense of artistic freedom” (2014, para. 2).  
218 
 
 
It is also worth noting that the London cast members themselves felt censored by the 
work’s closure. Stella Odunlami argued that “my freedom of expression was taken the moment 
the protestors decided to attempt to 
storm the venue, causing it to be 
deemed unsafe. It was at that 
moment that the protestors retained 
their right to free speech and I had 
mine taken away” (Odunlami and 
Andrews 2014). A joint statement 
by the entire London cast of Exhibit 
B echoes this sentiment, arguing 
that they had been “censored and 
silenced by protestors, who truly 
have an ill-informed and misguided 
perspective of this significant and 
informative piece of work.” 
Supporters of Exhibit B did not miss the irony of this silencing from critics, paradoxically driven 
by arguments that Bailey silences his own cast (Atkin 2015, 141).  
 Staunch opponents of Bailey’s work responded to these arguments only to a limited 
extent. While Kehinde Andrews argued that “art is not beyond censorship when offensive in 
nature,” (Andrews 2014), protestors, by and large, focused their arguments on a sustained 
criticism of the work’s problematic forms of representation and of Bailey’s form of antiracist 
whiteness. The actors, opponents argued, are placed in extremely compromising and degrading 
Facebook post quoting statement from Exhibit B's cast 
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positions of victimization. Exhibit B, after all, featured women performing as Sarah Baartman57 
and other exotic specimens who were naked from the waist up, as well as a woman chained to a 
bed in a context of rape. The nudity in particular led to charges of sexualized racial exploitation: 
“I find the whole exhibition perverse and akin to racial porn,” Sarah Myers argued. “This was 
about sexual excitement in seeing semi-naked women and men, in bondage, the power of the 
audience being in control, the subjects being objectified, and in short getting off on it and then 
feeling guilty for getting off on it” (Jamal 2014). Further, whether the actors were nude or 
clothed, opponents of the piece frequently cited the effect the work would have on its black 
audiences, forcing them to “confront the history of their objectification, the systematic denial of 
their personhood” (Atkin 2015). For these critics, the power of the gaze given to the actors by 
Bailey would not be enough to mitigate white voyeurism.   
Racial representation, it is argued here, is 
problematic to the extent that it bleeds into reality, 
augments voyeuristic impulses, and re-traumatizes 
black communities and audience members by 
forcing them to confront unreflexive and 
insensitive reminders of a painful history. Some 
defenders of Exhibit B would insist that mimesis of 
is not akin to endorsement for (Martin et al. 2014); 
calling the impulse to accuse Bailey and supporters 
                                                          
57 Also known as the “Hottentot Venus,” Sarah Baartman, a Khoisan woman from Cape Town, performed on the 
stages of London and Paris. As the Hottentot Venus, Baartman was described in one program as a “most correct and 
perfect specimen” of the people of South Africa (Strother 1999:25). She was repeatedly subject to lewd demands, 
groping, and prodding from audiences, and upon her death, her genitals and skeleton were preserved, remaining on 
display at the French  Musée de l’Homme until 1974 (see Crais and Scully 2009).    
This image, which implicitly draws a link between 
Bailey and the Barnum and Bailey Circus, 
circulated widely online and on posters at protest 
events. 
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of supporting historical human zoos “deeply problematic” (Walling 2014). While these 
arguments are a suitable defense on the grounds of Bailey’s intention, they failed to answer the 
sustained critique of representation, rooted in a phenomenology of black experience under which 
black communities continue to feel daily forms of marginalization. With Bühnenwatch, these 
critics argued that antiracism should not entail mirroring experiences of racism to black 
audiences.   
Challenging Antiracist Whiteness  
 While opponents of the work thus focused a good deal of energy decrying its problematic 
forms of representation, criticism of the piece as a fundamentally white endeavor were far more 
common. These forms of critique meet Bailey on his own racial terrain, taking him at his word 
that the Exhibit series is indeed the product of a white South African who came of age during 
apartheid. Yet it is whiteness—and South African whiteness in particular—that makes the piece 
so problematic for those who agitated against it. Exhibit B, opponents of the work argue, is an 
attempt to re-center whiteness, and an insidious one for the ways that it cloaks its intentions in 
anti-racist rhetoric. Its attempts to cultivate white antiracism, according to this line of 
argumentation, only happen at the expense of black bodies, and the guilt that the work provokes 
is counterproductive at best. 
 In a critique of Blood Diamonds/Terminal (another work by Bailey produced for the 2009 
National Arts Festival in Grahamstown), Andrew van der Vlies argues that the work “seems 
calculated as one to be experienced by the privileged, and experienced as shocking and/or 
cathartic. In a hostile reading, this might be judged no more than an attempt by Bailey to deliver 
forms of affect to the affluent, an affective experience for those who can come and go” (van der 
Vlies 2013, 500). While rhetorically setting himself up in contrast to this hostile reading, van der 
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Vlies nonetheless declares Terminal to be “a safari into the marginalized lives that make possible 
the kinds of comparatively privileged lives lived by most audience members” (2013, 501). In a 
similar way, critics of Bailey relentlessly charged that Exhibit B was a work designed for a white, 
affluent audience. In London, the twenty-pound ticket price was prohibitive to many, ensuring 
that well-heeled white liberals would be the only audience in attendance (Schutte 2014). Others 
drew attention to the classist connotations of the venue itself (Akala 2014) and to the hopelessly 
deluded elites that praised the piece while knowing nothing about the demographic it purports to 
represent (Abbey 2014). The result, all things considered, is a work of theatre created by a white 
artist, promoted by a white theatre space with a white executive board and funded by a white city 
government—all of whom “have determined what they think is anti-racism in a modern London” 
(Jasper and Govinda 2014).    
It is quite reasonable to suppose that the price of admission to Bailey’s zoo in London 
was prohibitive to lower-income theatre-goers, thus ensuring a certain (white) class composition 
for an audience that would in turn have their experiences affirmed by elite upper-class white art 
critics. The more vexing problem for Bailey’s opponents, however, is found in the teleology of 
the piece: Exhibit B does not de-center but radically re-centers whiteness. Its central protagonists, 
critics argued, are not the black tableau vivants depicting colonial atrocities but instead its white 
audiences. Confronted with a display of unbearable atrocities, they are moved to feelings of guilt 
that are, presumably, worthy of esteem. Far from standing in solidarity with black victims of 
violence, Exhibit B is more about the affirmation of antiracist whiteness than the atrocities that it 
purports to depict (Jenkins 2014).    
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In this analysis, guilt itself is not necessarily the object of criticism, but instead the fact 
that, in a cynical utilitarian calculation, the moral weightiness of this guilt will seemingly always 
trump the costs of its production in and through black bodies (Muir 2014). “It’s a twisted 
dynamic,” Jane Corrigall argues, “because guilt can only be appeased through the play of 
victimhood” (2012, para. 14). Exhibit B, that is, hinges on a racialized division of moral labor 
whose ultimate product is white purity. The power of Exhibit B derives from a dynamic whereby 
black suffering and the silent pedagogy of the gaze culminates in a heightened historical racial 
sensitivity, expressed through emotions of guilt.  
The forward moral trajectory of the guilt produced by Exhibit B is not entirely clear—
especially to its critics—and for this reason is another focal point for criticism. Akala (2014) and 
Schutte (2014), for instance, both express skepticism that Exhibit B fosters a commitment to 
ongoing antiracist activity or solidarity with groups who currently suffer from marginalization 
and racism. Michael (2015) allows that some white audience members might be well-versed in 
critiques of structural racism; these individuals will have no problem assessing and interrogating 
their own discomfort after seeing the work. Others who are more racially naïve, however, will 
feel discomfort without any adequate tools to interpret it appropriately, which might shut down 
rather than encourage further conversations about race. Overall, the work’s structure gives rise to 
a cathartic experience of white guilt, but it remains unclear how, for Bailey’s audiences, this guilt 
becomes productively deployed after the performance is over.  
Bailey’s own writing makes it clear that he has moved beyond his own sense of racial 
guilt to “cast off what no longer fitted—those ideas and concepts born of a sheltered education 
and apartheid conditioning; all that marshmallow-soft whiteness. To allow myself to be anew” 
(2003, 12). For Bailey, this included prolonged periods of living in rural and isolated areas of 
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Eastern Cape province among the mPondo, working with a sangoma to learn indigenous rituals 
and forms of healing. There are frameworks for making sense of this alternative form of 
whiteness in South Africa in critical whiteness studies; Teppo (2011), for instance, studies the 
transformation of a spiritual landscape that after apartheid has made indigenous African forms of 
religion (at least in principle) available to whites. Other nascent white subject positions 
occasionally make a splash in South African media, particularly when white South Africans 
intentionally move into the townships or depressed inner-city areas as an expression of solidarity 
(Smith 2013).  
Of course, Bailey has his South African detractors (and he had them well before Exhibit 
A), who have frequently made the case that he has appropriated—aesthetically and otherwise—
the history and traditions of African cultures. Even so, it could at least be said that 1) Bailey is 
sensitive to the history of apartheid, and has been publicly reflexive about his role in apartheid 
society as a white South African, and 2) has adopted white subject positions informed by African 
spirituality and performance traditions as an expression of these subject positions. At the same 
time, these local South African racial sensitivities, cultivated through years of study, travel, and 
contemplation, do not travel well. They are not taken as evidence of accomplished racial work in 
other contexts; they do not provide evidence of sensitivities to localized racial tensions in other 
locales; they do not provide resources for how his white European audiences might process their 
guilt in a similar way. Bailey’s failure to acknowledge local specificities of race, interestingly 
enough, is one point on which supporters and detractors of Exhibit B seem to converge.  
While sympathetic to Exhibit B, Damian (Damian et al. 2015), for example, 
provocatively implicates both Bailey and broader voices of debate around Exhibit B, critiquing 
the ways in which racial heritage and artistic intention are given priority rather than the “ways in 
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which it acts in different contexts.” Without attending to local configurations of race—their 
historical precedents and current trajectories—Exhibit B does not fully engage conversations 
about race that are of immediate import to its audiences. Exhibit B’s tableaus undergo alterations 
between one city and the next, in particular to identify and depict real migrants who have been 
killed during deportation. With the exception of the choir (which has remained constant), the 
actors in each city are also new, drawn from pools of local talent and subjected to a rigorous 
interview process. Beyond these changes, opponents and supporters alike concede that the formal 
elements of the piece remain static and do little to interrogate local racisms.  
Comparing Exhibit B to similar attempts at merging art with ethnographic practice, 
Chikha and Arnaut (2013) describe in some detail the work that Bailey performs in order to 
localize the work to its audiences. Nonetheless, they go on to argue that Bailey’s on-site 
adaptation 
“Is not, however, pursued with regard to the local categories of debating alterity, be it in 
connection with ex-colonized subjects, migrants, or allochthones. In Belgium, for 
instance, the distinction between Francophone and Dutchophone is an important national 
grid on which other categories of otherness and different cultural attitudes towards 
‘others’ are articulated. Instead of people engaging with these local categories, they are 
submerged in the racial dyad black and white” (2013, 675).  
This dyad, they go on to argue, compresses more nuanced differences and inequalities in favor of 
the work’s forms of reversal and meta-representation (676).  
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Sieg (2015) gives a more sympathetic reading of Exhibit B despite its cursory treatment 
of local racial dynamics. While finding it “irrefutable” that “Exhibit B is not attuned to the 
complexities of nationally or locally specific contemporary racisms or to the way that blackness 
relates to other categories of difference” (2015, 256), she argues that there are more redeeming 
qualities of the work that seem to trump this deficiency. For Sieg, the work “indeed approaches 
anti-racist empowerment” as “a two-pronged intervention in European discourses of security on 
the one side, and in the restructuring of European museums on the other” (2015, 250-51). In 
terms of the latter, Bailey’s tableaus draw upon museum conventions that “isolate, 
decontextualize, and elevate objects through lighting, frames and pedestals (252). At the same 
time, she argues, “the addition of a live person disrupts familiar viewing expectations and throws 
into startling relief habits of looking and knowing” (258). But the real ethical thrust of the work, 
she contends, turns on the work’s invitation to the viewer to bear witness to the casualties of 
European securitization. In drawing links between the colonial abuses of the past and the current 
treatment of migrants, Exhibit B promotes a form of witnessing that “inaugurates a dialectic of 
receiving evidence and transforming that evidence into new ethical imperatives that guide 
individual behavior and social transformation” (264). These ethical imperatives, for Sieg, are a 
call to respond to an emergency that transcends the borders of any particular nation-state.   
Sieg’s sympathetic (though not uncritical) analysis of Exhibit B is a plausible 
interpretation of Bailey’s intentions for the work, bolstered by Bailey’s own arguments in the 
Guardian that “Exhibit B is not primarily a work about colonial-era violence. Its main focus is 
current racist and xenophobic policies in the EU, and how these have evolved from the state-
sanctioned racism of the late 19th century” (Bailey 2014). On Sieg’s reading, Bailey is not 
addressing his critique of contemporary racism at the level of any particular nation-state, but at a 
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higher level of scale that moves beyond borders. The racial dynamic given priority here is 
intricately bound up with questions of national belonging, citizenship, and transnational patterns 
of migration. Bailey does address the structural particulars of nations like Germany and the UK 
insofar as he calls attention to facets of securitization within those countries, pointing out 
specific individuals who have died during deportations. But the work does little to speak to what 
Sieg identifies in the German context as Alltagrassismus (everyday racism), “the linguistic and 
perceptual traces that perpetuate racialized patterns of exclusion” (2015, 256) that German 
antiracist activists and scholars have been pointing out for some time.  
While conceding that Exhibit B does not adequately speak to ordinary, everyday forms of 
European racism, Sieg would “weigh its blunt reductivism against its ambitious transnational 
range and historical scope, which attends to national specificities but places them within a larger, 
European racial imaginary in a way that is unparalleled” (2015, 256). The assumption that 
Exhibit B’s range and scope is weightier than its problematic forms of representation, of course, 
depends entirely on whose scale is being used. Sarah Myers’s criticism hinges entirely on the 
fact that a white South African is degrading black actors to make a convoluted point about 
history, as do the arguments of many of Exhibit B’s most vocal critics. None of the work’s 
opponents, in fact, make reference to its attempts to address Europe’s immigration crises. The 
spectacle of semi-nude black bodies depicting scenes of colonial abuse, for protestors, is 
sufficient to negate any ethical traction that the latter half of the show might make.  
Such objections are, in every case, coupled with demands for greater representation in the 
arts industry. Bühnenwatch’s frequent protests about the use of blackface in German theatre are 
two-pronged, criticizing not only a harmful form of caricature but the simultaneous paucity of 
available roles for black German actors. In the United Kingdom, protests against Exhibit B 
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responded in a similar way to severe racial underrepresentation in the upper echelons of the arts 
industry. “Breaking News: In 2016, a group of middle aged white people have (yet another) 
meeting on ‘diversity’ in the arts,” reads a sarcastic headline from Uprise, one of the many 
groups behind the protest of Exhibit B (Uprise 2016). The lack of racial diversity on the 
Barbican’s board, for many, was likely why the show was allowed to proceed in the first place 
(Akala 2014).  
Bailey’s failure to take these calls to dialogue seriously is compounded by the fact that 
his reputation, history, and ethics are not readily intelligible outside of his own context. Exhibit A 
generated some controversy in South Africa, but garnered more praise than criticism. A public 
discussion about the work as part of the Thinkfest! program at the National Arts Festival was met 
with friendly questions and comments that didn’t require Bailey to justify the work morally as 
much as to explain its representation and aesthetic precedents. Most telling, perhaps, was Anton 
Krueger’s introduction for Bailey: “I don’t think Brett needs a lot of introduction. If you’re 
sitting here you’re probably aware of his pedigree as one of the most innovative, intelligent, 
mind and soul-bending artists from South Africa” (Krueger 2013, 2). Part of this pedigree is 
aesthetic, of course: South Africans will be familiar with Bailey’s attempts to blend indigenous 
performance traditions with “a handful of Western avant-garde and a dash of showbiz” (Bailey 
2003, 9). But part of this pedigree is also racial: the story of a white subject position forged 
through intensive engagement with African religion, ritual, and life-worlds.    
In South Africa, Bailey can refract the politics of representation through a personal 
narrative of transformation, reflexivity, and ongoing dialogue. He has plenty of South African 
detractors to be sure, but he also has the ability to respond to them with a set of justifications that 
are at least intelligible and that have precedent, even if they are ultimately rejected. Few South 
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Africans, for instance, would express the same consternation and shock at a white South African 
who aspired to be a sangoma as they would have twenty years ago. These cases remain rare, but 
after apartheid they have entered the catalogue of ethical freedoms made newly available to 
white South Africans (Teppo 2011). Bailey’s deployment of African aesthetics and spirituality, 
for him, were earned through hard work, patience, learning, and dialogue with black South 
Africans.  
No analogous frameworks for the justification of racial virtue are available to Bailey once 
he leaves this racial context. No frameworks, that is, that would easily allow the re-installation of 
antiracist South African whiteness in a new context. Once beyond his own borders, as Sieg 
perceptively notices, protestors do not credential his antiracist trajectory elsewhere, but instead 
reject the “whistle-stop nature” of Bailey’s current work and its pronounced lack of commitment 
and care to local (racial) contexts, which contrasts with longstanding local efforts to utilize 
theatre for the formation of racial consciousness (2015, 255). “I think I was made into a type,” 
Bailey has argued subsequently. “I was seen as a racist South African. That immediately typecast 
me. Now explaining the work has become part of the modus operandi. Although I’m not sure it’s 
useful” (Crawley 2015). The demand for an explanation and a justification of Exhibit B is 
simultaneously a demand that he justify a claim to antiracist solidarity anew in each context. The 
transitory nature of this form of whiteness nearly guarantees that such justifications won’t be 
accepted.        
Traveling Whiteness, Transnational Anti-racisms  
Broadly speaking, it remains the case that visible and invisible benefits are conferred 
through whiteness, and many of these benefits do cross transnational borders with ease. As 
Andrucki (2010), Leonard (2013), and Moreton-Robinson (2015) note, these privileges include a 
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greater ease of mobility; the freedom for whites to migrate elsewhere in search of new lifestyles, 
new opportunities for wealth, and new terrains for the shaping of self. While this freedom does 
become attenuated through its intersections with gender and class, whiteness moves across 
borders with relative ease.  
The travels of Brett Bailey’s white antiracism, however, complicate this picture on a 
number of levels. White antiracist subject positions do not travel well. They are unavoidably 
local, and are crafted in response to place-specific histories in dialog with place-specific others. 
The scope of ethical freedom for whites who would perform antiracist work is constrained 
beyond a particular set of borders: the only freedom in movement here is a freedom to begin the 
work of antiracism anew in each context. 
My own antiracist sentiments are illuminating in this regard, and also reveal a paradox at 
the heart of anthropology as practiced by those of us who continue the venerable tradition of 
traveling abroad for fieldwork. Many of my own antiracist sensibilities were formed and shaped 
through more than a decade of engagement with South Africa’s history of race. During this time, 
I have intensively studied aesthetic, philosophical, religious, and cultural interventions into 
histories of colonialism and apartheid. I formed close relationships with black and “coloured” 
South Africans that transcended the utility of fieldwork, making and learning from many 
mistakes. I have felt emboldened by crossing into spaces where few white South Africans dare to 
tread, and have reveled in showing various forms of antiracist solidarity to South Africans in 
townships like Katlehong, Joza, Alexandra, and various neighborhoods of Soweto. The impact of 
these antiracist sentiments is likely far smaller than I imagine, and my task was made undeniably 
more easy through the privilege of being a white North American, which carried a good deal of 
cultural capital and assumptions of good will during my fieldwork.  
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Back in Houston, little of this work matters. My fieldwork and studies of South Africa 
have given me the impetus to cultivate a subject position rooted in antiracism in Houston, but 
this subject position was not conferred automatically. I cannot simply produce a “good white” 
certificate from South Africa to gain trust and rapport with communities of color in Houston. I 
can only imagine the obnoxious ring my voice would carry if I did attempt to put my fieldwork 
forward as a valid antiracist credential. The antiracist subject position to which I aspire is only 
starting to be built through deliberate and intentional relationships with others, making and 
learning from mistakes, taking seriously critiques of whiteness by indigenous peoples and people 
of color, and engagement with local aesthetic, philosophical, religious, and cultural interventions 
into local Houston racial histories. It takes time to cultivate trust and rapport, and by the time I 
do so, I will likely be on the verge of moving to a new context, depending on where the winds of 
academic fortune blow. I doubt I am alone in this.   
There are, to be sure, white anthropologists who embody sturdy local antiracist subject 
positions prior to leaving for the field. Whether acknowledged or not, the justifications of those 
subject positions and the subject positions themselves rarely mean anything to foreign 
interlocutors. Subject positions are forged anew in each context, and chunks of them are left 
behind upon return, regardless of whether the white anthropologist wishes to carry them. This is 
but one form of constraint with which white anthropologists must reckon along with Brett 
Bailey.  
Bailey, of course, is not an anthropologist. He does evince some ethnographic 
sensibilities, at least to the extent that Chikha and Arnaut (2013) can confidently argue that his 
work constitutes a significant rapprochement between art and ethnography. It is also the case that 
the Exhibit series was constructed from extensive archival research into the darker corners of 
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anthropology; particularly the discipline’s early complicity with racial science. Nonetheless, his 
Exhibit works were not the product of sustained, reflexive ethnographic engagement, especially 
outside the confines of South Africa.  
This is not to suggest that Bailey needed or needs to be an anthropologist to engage in the 
kinds of antiracist interventions that he hopes to accomplish. Yet something like an intensive 
ethnographic approach would be necessary to dialog, to cultivate trust and rapport, and to 
intervene into a set of local racial dynamics to lend local antiracist legitimacy to the work he 
hopes to accomplish. Any open and earnest forms of dialog, however cursory, would have at 
least shown goodwill and may have mitigated some of these tensions in advance. More sustained 
and lengthy engagement with local populations would be even better, although it would have 
made the tour Bailey embarked on much more complicated (and likely expensive), logistically 
speaking.  
Current iterations of racialized discourse in Europe do make attention to local racial 
dynamics substantially more complicated. European anxiety about borders has taken on immense 
weight in conversations of race, particularly in the wake of terroristic attacks in France, 
Germany, and Belgium. Conversations about race in Europe increasingly turn on “a (racialized) 
distinction between ‘deserving’ or ‘real’ refugees and so-called economic migrants” (Fernando 
and Giordano 2016). One could wonder, then, where all this talk of race leaves European 
populations who are currently (and were historically) raced outside of this newer lens. Sieg 
(2015) suggests that Bailey’s transnational antiracist intervention was rejected, at least in part, 
because of tensions “between relatively recent arrivals from Africa (many performers recruited 
by Bailey were asylum seekers) and more established minorities of colour in Germany and the 
UK” (2015, 251). Whether or not this tension exists and to what degree, it is clear that more 
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established diasporic black populations in the United Kingdom (and in France, which saw similar 
protests to Exhibit B) felt largely excluded and marginalized from a performance that purported 
to advocate on their behalf. To the extent that black UK citizens already feel marginalized and 
underrepresented in the arts industry and more broadly, a shift in racial attention toward more 
transnational concerns is going to exacerbate such a dynamic.  
It is interesting to note that Bailey’s 
new work in development, The 
Raft, will focus much more 
intensively on the plight of asylum 
seekers from Syria and elsewhere. 
As he continues to tour Exhibit B 
and Macbeth in Europe, Bailey has 
begun spending increasing amounts 
of time visiting the camps of asylum seekers, particularly in France and Greece. The reception of 
this (as yet) unfinished work remains to be seen, but it may at the very least suggest a growing 
ethnographic sensibility in how Bailey is choosing to construct new works.  
It is unclear whether Bailey will attempt another reckoning with European racial history, 
at least in the form of a work like Exhibit B. The controversies around the Exhibit series and its 
travels through Europe show that Bailey will need to work against the constraints of South 
African antiracist whiteness and its depleting value abroad. South African antiracist whiteness is 
no longer extended the assumption of good will (if it ever was), but must prove itself anew in 
each locale to which it travels: something anthropologists too should keep in mind as they pack 
their bags to and from the field.  
Brett Bailey: Facebook post via Third World Bunfight, March 7, 2016 
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Epilogue 
The Rocks and the Stones Along the Way 
The Olive Tree Theatre occupies 
the top floor of the Yarona building 
opposite the Pan African shopping 
centre on 3rd and Watt St in 
Alexandra, a township situated just 
across the freeway from the 
exorbitant wealth and consumption 
of Sandton City. The theatre space 
itself was, in a very real way, built 
up from nothing. Beginning only 
with the barest of concrete floors 
and ceilings in an empty, industrial 
space, the theatre has grown into a 
beautiful and vibrant meeting place 
for film screenings, poetry readings, 
workshops, and theatre 
performances. The space itself is a 
work of art, appearing more complete and more aesthetically striking every time I would go to 
visit and, for now, visit from afar via social media. It reflects the tireless work of a woman and 
an artist who came to be one of my dearest South African friends during my fieldwork and in the 
years after.   
Olive Tree Theatre, March 2014 
Olive Tree Theatre, August 2016 via Facebook 
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Ntshieng Mokgoro is the artistic director of the theatre space and of Olive Tree Theatre 
Productions, and is an accomplished artist in her own right. She is the first black female recipient 
of the Standard Bank Young Artist Award for drama for her production of The Olive Tree in 
2009. This is in addition to numerous other awards. She has been interviewed for O Magazine as 
well as Drum Magazine, and the women’s theatre festival she spearheads each year receives 
considerable media attention. She has toured throughout South Africa and all over the world.  
 
 
Ntshieng (right) mentors a group of women as part of a film making workshop, March 2014. 
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Ntshieng is a woman who occupies a number of very demanding subject positions. She is 
not merely a theatre artist but also mother; not merely a mother but the sole financial provider of 
her household as her husband struggles to find work. She provides not only for her children and 
husband but also for her extended family—brothers, sisters, and others who likewise struggle to 
make ends meet. When there is money, she also provides food for the children who come to the 
theatre space for dance or drama classes. Artistically, she is a writer, director, and producer of 
theatre in addition to being a workshop facilitator, mentor, and pedagogue.  
Olive Tree Theatre Productions, which occupies the bulk of her time and creative 
energies, was formed with multiple goals in mind. The first is to address gender disparities in the 
theatre industry. Through Olive Tree Theatre productions and the theatre space, Ntshieng told 
me, she wants to “give a platform to upcoming female directors because I had experienced the 
hostility towards female directors and the lack of access for space to stage work…A lot of 
women who are creative felt they have been sidelined and have chosen to quit the industry.” To 
address some of this disparity, she mentors young female directors from Alexandra and 
elsewhere, helping them produce shows and helping them write scripts—for which they retain 
primary writing credits. Ntshieng also hopes to turn the space into a vibrant community arts 
center that will expose the Alexandra community to theatre:  
“For me, Olive Tree is for my people—for developing an audience in Alexandra. A 
whole lot of people do not go to the theatre and their excuse is ‘Windybrow, Market 
Theatre—it’s far, you have to take a taxi and walk and catch another taxi; the show starts 
at eight and then you have to go back at ten, late at night.’ The other thing is that our kids 
are not exposed to the magic of theatre. All they know are amateur plays that are 
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performed at school and they think that is theatre. I still want to do magical shows for my 
community. I want this to be a haven for kids to come here and watch a show.”   
Finally, the space and the theatre organization are both explicitly conceptualized as a bridge 
between community theatre and professional theatre—a space where residents of Alexandra can 
see world-class actors and artists and also a space where local artists can become 
professionalized into the industry.  
If these three goals do not sound like a tall order, especially when stacked against the 
constraints of financially providing for her entire extended family, the fault lies entirely with me. 
Beyond these considerable challenges, Ntshieng has had to operate with no real funding despite 
repeated applications—the theatre space was set up thanks to donation of equipment like stage 
lights and generators, and the space donated—at first with a fair amount of ambiguity about how 
long it could be occupied. While Ntshieng has a volunteer administrator as well as several 
volunteers to help her run the space, but much of the responsibility for the success or failure of 
the theatre space and Olive Tree Theatre Productions rests entirely on her shoulders. At times, 
juggling this myriad of roles has been too much even for her to handle.  
There was a particular day when all of these projects began to come unraveled in the 
space of about twenty minutes. The theatre space was hosting a double-bill that night that 
included a work from “The Stars of Alex,” a group of children from a local primary school (the 
same school Ntshieng attended as a child) that had, in collaboration with volunteers from the 
Netherlands, developed a work about their own dreams and aspirations as children. The work, 
which I had seen in rehearsal, was fantastical and whimsical in its imagery, and at the same time, 
hard-hitting in its messages of the realities that many children living in Alexandra have to face. 
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The children and their mentors were proud of the work, and excited to perform in the theatre 
space. As the children began unfolding their theatrical debut, however, disaster struck: some of 
the children, leaning against the scenery backdrop from behind, caused the tall wooden panels to 
come crashing down, knocking into lights and other equipment and bringing an abrupt halt to the 
show.  
Ntshieng did not see this catastrophe happen—she was busy taking an emergency phone 
call with the actors of a production she was directing at the Windybrow theatre in downtown 
Johannesburg. The actors did not want to perform that night. They felt demoralized from 
repeatedly performing to a nearly empty theatre, and were saddened by the death of Nelson 
Mandela just a few days before. Ntshieng had to convince them that they had an obligation to the 
theatre and to any ticket holders to perform the work. When she was not on the phone with them, 
she was on the phone with one of the co-owners of the Yarona building, who apparently had not 
authorized the use of the space past six p.m., which meant that the second theatre group—
bringing its own large audience of friends and associates with it—would not be able to perform. 
To complicate matters further, the co-owner of the building, who was white, preferred to mediate 
through Ntshieng’s white volunteer assistant, and preferred that she be present to supervise the 
use of the space. Nthsieng was faced with the task of convincing the owner—through her white 
proxy—to let the performance happen. As some of us tried to put the scenery back together for 
the children—some of which was visibly broken and likely to fall again—the power in the space 
went out. The children were devastated, and some felt strongly that they never wanted to hazard 
the risk of performance again. Their white mentors, who had developed the performance with 
them, had returned to the Netherlands and were not present, so Ntshieng had to try to console 
them the best she could, even in the midst of the other chaotic scenarios unfolding for her.  
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Added to these burdens, as Ntshieng would tell us later, was the pressure to make sure 
that my wife and I—the white folks visiting the space—were enjoying ourselves and watching a 
successful night unfold, and seeing her at her best. An astute observer of racial issues—
especially given many of her own experiences—Ntshieng rightly pointed out that a failure or 
shortcoming on the part of one black person is often generalized as the failure of an entire race 
(e.g. “black people can’t ever run things well”). This confluence of events and pressures—all 
very stressful in themselves—eventually made Ntshieng break down in tears. “I don’t even know 
who I am anymore,” she cried.  
In a later interview, I got a chance to talk with Nthsieng about that day. “What makes you 
pick yourself back up and keep going after having a day like that?” I asked her. Her response is 
worth quoting at some length:  
If I quit, I’m not quitting alone. There’s a whole bunch of people who are looking up to 
me. People who I give hope. People I’m a role model for. So if I quit, then I fail them and 
I feel responsible for them, because then where would they go? Who else would they 
look up to?... If it’s this hard, it means I have to go back and look at the truth of the 
matter and maybe approach everything and try to be honest and try to find out: what are 
the wrongs. Not being emotional, but realistic. What is it that I can change and not 
change? If there’s something I can change, why not change it? If I can’t change it, instead 
of being bitter, can’t I find something else? You realize that you actually thought you 
have arrived at a certain point, when you are only just starting. So let the journey carry 
on. You come to that point where you kick the blanket and say ‘I started this journey and 
I have to keep moving until I get it right.’ I said to somebody one day: maybe this is my 
dream but maybe I’m not meant to see this dream coming alive but to spearhead it. 
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Somebody might step in and run with it. That’s okay—it wasn’t for me, it was for us. If I 
quit than the next person who’s supposed to run with it will fall into the pit and won’t be 
able to get out. I have to keep paving this hard road so that it becomes smooth for her 
when she runs or he runs on this. Maybe I’m the one who’s chosen to clean up the rocks 
and the stones along the way. It’s fine—I’m going to do that. It takes all of your energy. 
It exhausts you. It also digs out things and strengths that you are not aware that you had.   
 
Ntshieng continues to push on, despite moments when everything seems to be crashing down 
around her—moments that lead to basic questions of who she is and how she ought to live. Her 
hard work, by and large, has largely been rewarded: the theatre space continues to flourish and 
continues to host important events like the annual Women’s Theatre Festival. She continues her 
pedagogy as well, mentoring and training up others who will come after her.   
 There are several reasons why I chose to conclude this dissertation with a set of 
reflections about this space and Ntshieng. The most straightforward of these is that I wanted to 
find a way to honor her both as an artist and as one of my most important interlocutors and 
friends during my fieldwork. But this story—of a moment where everything collapses and one 
must move on in the aftermath—highlights many of the themes that have animated this 
dissertation. It also provides an opportunity to address one common response that I have received 
to my focus on (a Foucauldian) ethics in a post-Mandela South Africa.   
 
An Anthropology of South African Ethics  
In her response, Ntshieng’s ethical work is shown to be work on her own self. When 
things go wrong or when she feels like giving up, she has her own technologies of self that allow 
her to step back and assess what can be improved and what cannot be. Those things she cannot 
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control are let go, but these decisions are only arrived at after a satisfactory amount of thought 
from what she calls a “realistic” perspective. Yet in focusing on Ntshieng’s work on herself—
and the projects of self-shaping that have animated the other characters in the dissertation—it 
may seem as though ethics is only about the self. Perhaps, the objection might go, the 
importation of Foucauldian ethics as an analytic is too Westernizing and too Global-
northernizing in a context where moral and ethical frameworks are more communitarian. Further, 
haven’t I simply reduced everyone to mindless autopoietic automatons, especially with the 
insistence that a good deal of the theatre I witnessed is only incidentally directed at audiences?    
The telos of Ntshieng’s work on herself, however, is not on behalf of herself but instead 
the community she desires to serve, and this is crucial. The project is for them, the rewards and 
benefits are for them, and the abandonment of her project means that they will suffer. They are 
the reason she must keep going; the reason she must keep wrestling with uncooperative actors 
and a building owner who, at the time, preferred to dialog with her white counterpart rather than 
her.58 The subject position Ntshieng works to occupy, if there is one, is that of a visionary—a 
visionary, Ntshieng admits, who has to be comfortable with much hard work that comes with 
little immediate payoff. She also needs to be comfortable transferring her own successes onto her 
community rather than claiming them as her own. She has already done so: when she received 
her standard bank young artist award, she noted that “the award belongs to the community, it is 
just that it is through me.” The subject position of visionary is a nodal point through which her 
work flows outward to others. 
                                                          
58 Ntshieng now has a much better relationship to the building’s owner, who has subsequently much more 
supportive. 
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 In a similar way, the ethical work of KFTG and its members (discussed in chapters one 
and three) begins in the self but never ends there. It empowered the members of KFTG to reach 
out to their neighbors and others with valuable information, and led to pedagogical projects 
dedicated to shaping and transforming others. Brett Bailey—controversial as he is and misguided 
as he may be—has a genuine desire to translate the transformations of his own whiteness to 
others as well. There exists, within the work of ethics I have described in South Africa, a 
productive tension between the interpersonal and the structural, and between the social and the 
collective. Ethics needn’t put these categories at odds with each other: they certainly were not at 
odds for Foucault, who maintained that the care of the self always, simultaneously, involved the 
care of others as well.  
The individual and the social are held in productive tension within local ethical 
frameworks as well. This is the essence of Ubuntu—an indigenous Southern African ethic 
summed up by the phrase “I am because we are” or sometimes “a person is a person through 
other persons.” While Ubuntu stresses the intrinsic value and dignity of individuals, it is also 
true, as Munyaka and Motlhabi point out, that “one is able to discover a sense of self-identity 
only in reference to the community in which one lives” (2009, 68). Vices like selfishness thus 
not only harm larger networks, but also the man or woman from which the vice emanates, insofar 
as it harms their moral status in these networks. Ethics, in the framework of Ubuntu, is found in 
the interplay of both individual and collective.  
There have been scandalously few direct references to Ubuntu within this dissertation—
which ostensibly set out to address ethics in South Africa. This is not without a good reason: 
Ubuntu was mentioned in situ only rarely during my fieldwork and preliminary fieldwork. In 
fact, the only mention of Ubuntu I ever heard was from one of the Norwegian visitors described 
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in chapter one, part of a comment made in passing that was never taken up further. One reason 
for the absence of Ubuntu could be its ubiquity: Ubuntu is a term that most South Africans are 
familiar with, and the tourist to South Africa is likely to see its deployment in an introduction to 
South African life, likely as a justification for hospitality. A far more likely reason for Ubuntu’s 
absence in discussion, though, could be its baggage as one of the key metaphors of South 
Africa’s post-apartheid nation-building projects. During the transition from apartheid, it was 
relentlessly heralded by Desmond Tutu and others as an alternative moral framework to brutality 
of apartheid, and as a way of moving forward in a joint moral nation-building project. It could be 
that the language of Ubuntu has been overused and placed among the tropes and metaphors that 
have increasingly come under question in a post-Mandela South Africa. While Ubuntu as a term 
is rarely used, though, the ethical thrust of Ubuntu persists, part of a dialectic between the 
individual and the collective that plays out in South Africa and beyond (Bongmba 2006). In this 
sense, it has made multiple appearances throughout the dissertation, even if implicitly.  
Ubuntu is rarely easy to live out. I certainly don’t want to leave the impression, for 
example, that it gives Ntshieng pleasure to face hardship so consistently. The reality is quite the 
opposite—she is consistently stressed out and pushing herself to the limit physically and 
emotionally. She has also said that she resents being celebrated as a “strong woman” because 
often, these forms of moral praise for women implicitly paper over the injustices, inequalities, 
and pressures that women are subjected to on a regular basis and spins a narrative of redemptive 
suffering. The toll Ntshieng’s ethics takes on her is visible, much like it was for Janet, who 
sensed that her work was transforming her into a worse person rather than a better one. Such 
cases make visible the darker side of ethics that is rarely acknowledged. The work of occupying 
a particular subject position can come with enormous costs to one’s own well-being. This makes 
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the continual occupation of these subject positions all the more commendable, but does not 
change the fact that it can be a painful process as well.    
 Constraints of various kinds play a significant role in the possibilities and limitations of 
the self in South Africa. Some emanate from the expectations and pressures that come with kin-
based relationships, as discussed in chapters one and two. For artists in particular, these can be 
exacerbated by other, more structural forms of constraint—the political economies of theatre that 
I discuss both in chapter two and, to a more limited extent, in Ntshieng’s story. Some are 
institutional (as in chapter three), limiting the ability of artists like Athina and her sympathetic 
academic interlocutors to fully engage the meaning of bodies in struggle. Sometimes constraints 
are completely ignored or denied (as S’bo does in chapter four). But they are always present 
nonetheless, and in making them visible I have traced some of the contours of life in a post-
Mandela South Africa: a moment not of rupture but of entangled continuity with the freedoms 
and constraints of the past. 
 Race continues to play a significant role as well, attenuating the options that are available 
for the work of ethics. It continues to correlate in many ways with class: white South Africans 
are more likely than others to be more highly educated with higher-status jobs and higher 
incomes. At a minimum, it can be said that little time for ethics exists when basic needs have not 
been met, and that black South Africans continue to struggle for access to institutions that remain 
white (though these institutions are increasingly being forced toward change). But race in post-
Mandela South Africa is a good deal more complicated than this as well. The presence of well-
connected wealthy black elites is in no small way connected to populist political movements, 
who increasingly see the ANC as the guardians and beneficiaries of white wealth (Mngxitama 
and Kaganof 2013). Even so, white South Africans, by and large, continue to enjoy more 
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freedom, ethically speaking or otherwise, than others. Colonial and apartheid legacies continue 
to shape the selves that South Africans are capable of constructing.   
 Whiteness, of course, carries its own forms of constraint. They are qualitatively different, 
of course, but shape the contours of ethical life for white South Africans and white others (like 
Athina and myself) on the periphery. These constraints, in the dissertation at least, are at their 
most visible through a transnational lens. Brett Baily’s white subject position in South Africa 
(chapter five) is accepted by many (even if contested by some), bolstered no doubt by his status 
as an elite artist. Abroad, however, Bailey has become absolutely toxic for many in the black 
diaspora, suggesting that the work of ethics doesn’t cross borders. My relationship to Ntshieng is 
another example: it was only through the cultivation of trust and rapport that she felt comfortable 
telling me, among other frank and honest conversations about race, that my presence as a white 
male was initially a source of anxiety for her. I hope and trust that this is no longer the case. But 
even if Ntshieng and I can now have more open discussions about race, it has meant little in 
terms of my antiracist commitments once I returned to Houston. I did not return from South 
Africa with a “good white” certificate that could be shown in dialog with local racial others, a 
fact that has similar implications for other white anthropologists going to or returning from the 
field. The most that we (anthropologists) can take back are the forms of listening and postures of 
learning we gain in the field.  
With this in mind, I returned from South Africa with a renewed commitment to issues of 
race in the city of Houston: a bustling metropolis that, much like Johannesburg, is both 
stunningly diverse and mind-numbingly segregated.59 Among other activities, this commitment 
                                                          
59 In a report for Rice University’s Kinder Institute for Urban Research, Emerson, Bratter, Howell, Jeanty, and Cline 
(2014) analyze census data from 1990, 2000, and 2010 to argue that despite its oft-touted diversity, “the city of 
Houston is far more segregated than other areas of the region” (2014, 3).   
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has led me to involvement as both volunteer 
and audience member of the T.R.U.T.H. 
Project, a local organization that uses theatre, 
dance, spoken word, and visual art (often all 
present together) as a tool for healing and 
growth for LGBTQ communities of color. For 
the T.R.U.T.H. Project community, much like 
my South African interlocutors, art is a 
technology of personal and communal growth, a 
source of freedom, and a means for gathering 
people to discuss important issues (mental 
health awareness, issues of stigma, HIV, 
and police violence, among others). Like 
many of the South African artists with whom I dialoged, the artists and audiences that make up 
the T.R.U.T.H. Project are explicit about the forms of freedom they seek and the constraints that 
they encounter in doing so. The dialectics of freedom and constraint—and the aesthetic forms 
that make it visible—are present in my own context as in South Africa.     
To the extent that ethnography can act as a tool of ethical pedagogy (Laidlaw 2014), 
ethnography of a post-Mandela South Africa does speak in a pedagogical register to the Global 
North. The “crisis of liberalism” (Boyer 2016) in the United States and Europe has many 
parallels to post-Mandela South Africa: populist movements set against nepotistic elites, 
anxieties about borders, and, increasingly for the United States, new forms of reckoning with a 
white supremacist past and present. It would not be surprising to see, as in South Africa, new 
The T.R.U.T.H. Project's "Aritivism" event in Houston, 
September 2016 
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conceptions of the political that cast only a passing glance at elections. New possibilities for 
ethical life in the Global North will be opened and/or foreclosed in the coming decades, just as 
they have been in South Africa in the last twenty years. As the Global North continues to evolve 
toward Africa more broadly, those in the Global North can look to South Africa for new forms of 
freedom and new forms of ethical life. They can also look to South Africa to understand the new 
forms of constraint that might emerge from the Global North in the coming years. An 
ethnography of South African theatre, in particular, should also prompt them look to South 
African artists and follow the impulse to craft and continually shape the self as a work of art.   
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